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I. ASSAULTS AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Several crimes of violence, threatened violence, or even potential vio-
lence are included in a chapter unfortunately entitled "Assault."l This ge-
neric nomenclature is confusing in light of several of these offenses not con-
stituting any form of assault. Two of these non-assaultive offenses-Going 
Armed With IntentS and Setting Spring Guns and Mantraps8-are discussed 
in this Article in the more appropriate chapter on weapons offenses. 
A. "Felonious Assault" Classification 
Whether or not the various individual offenses in this chapter are actu-
ally aggravated forms of assault is crucial in several respects, all of which 
relate only to whether a particular offense is a "felonious assault,"· which in 
turn automatically qualifies as a "forcible felony."1J The term "felonious as-
sault" has been defined by the supreme court as "any assault the commis-
sion of which constitutes a felony.'" Thus, any offense either in the "As-
sault" chapter or elsewhere in the Criminal Code7 which is a felony (of any 
1. IOWA CODE ch. 708 (1979). 
2. IOWA CODE § 708.8 (1979). See text accompanying notes 769-83 infra. 
3. [d. § 708.9. See text accompanying notes 784-89 infra. 
4. See text accompanying notes 1SO-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 
(19SO). 
5. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1SO-83 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (19SO). 
6. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1978). 
7. That the classification "felonious assault" is not limited to offenses in the "Assault" 
chapter is evidenced by Attempted Murder, IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979), being determined by 
the supreme court in State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1978), to be a "felonious assault." 
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class) "and necessarily includes an assault"8 is a "felonious assault," as dis-
cussed above.9 
B. Assault 
Unlike the pre-revised statutelO which merely used the common law 
name of Assaultll without defining it, the revise9. statutel ! specifically de-
fines an assault as essentially being either an attempted battery or an activ-
ity which places another in fear of a batteryl8 the latter type being an ex-
pansion of the prior law. Like the prior statute, however, a consumated 
batteryl4 is not required and a simple battery is punishable under the As-
sault statute itself. 11 Assault, however, is now a specific intent crime,I8 un-
like the pre-revised law,I7 and thus there can be no negligentl8 assaults (or 
batteries). 
The elements of the revised crime of Assault specifically are: (1) with-
out justification; (2) and with apparent ability to execute the act; (3) doing 
8. State v. Young, 293 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Iowa 1980). 
9. See text accompanying notes 326-41 in Part I of this Articlt, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(19SO). 
10. See IOWA CODE § 694.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
11. "The offenses of an assault, or an assault and battery, is declared criminal by section 
694.1, The Code; but for a description of the offense, or in order to ascertain what would 
amount to an assault, or an assault and battery, we must resort to the common law definition." 
State v. Redmond, 244 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1976). 
12. IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979). See IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, II IOWA UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ANNOTATED (CRIMINAL) at No.s SOl, S04 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, IOWA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 171-77 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON]; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON 
CRIMINAL LAW §§ SO-82 (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT]; R. PERKINS, PER-
KINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 28 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as R. PERKINS]. 
13. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 172. 
14. "A battery is the unlawful physical contact resulting from an assault." J. YEAGER, 
IOWA CRIMINAL CODE TRAINING MANuAL, at 46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TRAINING MANUAL]; 
Accord, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § SO. 
15. "One who attempts to strike another commits an assault. If he succeeds in striking 
the other, it is an assault only, not assault and battery." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, 
§ SO. An aggravated battery, inflicted intentionally, which results in a "serious injury" is pun-
ishable under the serious (class C felony) offense of Willful Injury, however. See IOWA CODE § 
708.4 (1979). 
16. For a general discussion of specific intent, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (19SO). 
17. See IOWA CODE § 694.1 (1977) (repealed 1978) (codification of common law crime of 
assault). 
Id. 
18. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § SO, states: 
A battery of the criminal-negligence type as where motorist A by reckless driving 
unintentionally injures pedestrian B, does not include an assault, which requires an 
intent to injure or (alternatively, in many jurisdictions) to frighten. So at most it can 
properly be said only that every intentional battery necessarily includes an assault. 
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any act; (4) with the intent either to (a) cause pain or injury, (b) result in 
insulting or offensive physical contact, or (c) place another in fear of imme-
diate physical contact of a painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive nature. 
The focus of these assaultive acts is upon the intended results, thus not 
requiring specified results. For example, no touching is required, nor need 
the victim of the assault actually be frightened when the assault consists of 
an attempt to commit a battery. Nor need there even be an actual intent to 
commit a battery, when the assault consists of a threat intended to place 
another person in fear of a battery. 
The apparent ability requirement could be troublesome, in light of the 
statutory phraseology which fails to make clear to whom the ability to exe-
cute the act must be apparent.lll Because the statute focuses upon the de-
fendant-actor's conduct, Professor Yeager feels that the apparent ability re-
fers to the actor.SO Accordingly, a defendant threatening to detonate a 
simulated explosive would not be guilty of the offense, provided that he 
knew it would not explode. Such a result does not seem reasonable. The 
proper focus of attention should be solely upon the defendant's act of 
threatening to detonate what would appear to a reasonable person to be a 
real explosive. After all, the defendant's act was intended to place another 
in fear, and the act of placing another in fear is all that is necesssary in 
order for the crime of Assault to be complete. 
,A third enumerated type of Assault occurs either bylill (a) intentionally 
pointing a firearmll toward another, or (b) displaying in a threatening man-
ner any dangerous weapon toward another. The first alternative was re-
tained from the prior law,ls while the second represents an expansion fo the 
types of weapons covered·4 under the assault provisions. This type of As-
sault-which focuses entirely upon the defendant's conduct-contains no 
apparent ability requirement, nor does it require proof of any specific intent. 
Thus, the defendant's purpose in pointing the firearm is irrelevant. III Like 
19. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 708.1(1) (1979), which defines one type of assault as "[a]ny act 
which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact 
which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute 
the act" (emphasis added). See State v. Yanda, 259 Iowa 970, 146 N.W.2d 255 (1966). 
20. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 173. 
21. IOWA CODE § 708.1(3) (1979). 
22. There is no general definitional clause for the term "firearm" in the Code; for a dis-
cussion of the caselaw definition, see text accompanying notes 128-43 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE. L. REV. 239 (1980). 
23. ld. § 694.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
24. Only pistols, revolvers, or guns were included under the pre-revised statute. See IOWA 
CODE § 694.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
25. This is subject, of course, to the "limited consent defense," which is discussed imme-
diately below in the text accompanying notes 40-55 infra. "Actors in a play are not guilty of 
assault when one points a firearm at the other, when the script calls for this." TRAINING MAN-
UAL, supra note 14, at 47. 
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the pre-revised law,18 the weapon need not be loaded27 (and, of course, the 
discharging of it is unnecessary). Nor should it be necessary that the person 
who was assaulted know or have reason to believe that the weapon was 
loaded,18 in light of the fact that the assault statute focuses entirely upon 
the defendant's conduct.11I 
1. Overt Act 
The requirement of an act for Assault means that the common law prin-
ciple that mere words, even if they are threatening, do not constitute an 
assaultso remains unchanged. Because an overt act is essential to an assault 
of the attempted-battery type, it has been stated that: "the force intended 
to be applied must be put in motion; otherwise there is merely an intention, 
and not an attempt, to inflict the battery. Mere preparations or mere words 
and threats, whatever may be the intention, can never amount to an assault; 
there must be some act which, if not stopped, may apparently . . . produce 
injury."81 At first blush, it appears that mere words could be the basis of the 
new second type of Assault: placing another in fear of a battery. Neverthe-
less, the requirement of an act apparently precludes this interpretation. As 
summarized by one commentator: 
Criminal assault [by intentional scaring] needs, in addition to (1) the in-
tent-to-scare mental element and (2) the apprehension result element, 
(3) the further requirement of some conduct by the defendant, conduct 
of the sort to arouse a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Thus it is 
not enough to constitute an assault to give another a fierce look intended 
to frighten, though the other is actually frightened by the look. So, too, 
threatening words alone, without any overt act to carry out the threat, or 
indecent proposals by a man to a woman, not accompanied by any at-
tempt to carry them out without her consent, will not do.82 
Cursing another, witho~t a show of force, has been held to not consti-
tute an assault, even though the victim was, in fact, frightened~8s In con-
trast, the act of "lifting the fist or a cane in a threatening manner" has been 
26. See State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728,145 N.W.2d 910 (1966) (unloaded gun pointed at 
robbery victim constitutes putting in fear). 
27. See State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979). 
28. See State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859). 
29. This focus on defendant's conduct is apparent throughout the language requiring spe-
cific intent. See IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979). 
30. "Threats are not sufficient; there must be proof of violence actually offered." R. PER-
KINS, supra note 12, at 132, quoting, People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 525(1880). See W. LAFAVE 
& A. SCOTr, supra note 12, at §§ 611-12; J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 302-04 (1934) 
[hereinafter cited 88 J. MILLER]; see State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 188 N.W. 709 (1922). 
31. J. MI:u.ER, supra note 30, at 303. 
32. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, supra note 12, § 82. 
33. State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S.E. 544 (1904). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 499 1979-1980
1979-80] Iowa Criminal Code 499 
considered sufficient for an assault where the other requisites were present.s• 
Some commentators have suggested that an exception be made for in-
formational words,811 thus permitting a conviction for Assault, without an 
overt act. The most common example given is accosting someone from be-
hind or in the darkness while claiming to have a weapon, such as, "make one 
move and I'll shoot." While this certainly would have the effect of frighten-
ing the victim, nevertheless this circumstance does not appear applicable to 
Iowa law, in light of the express statutory requirement that there be the 
apparent ability to execute the act (of shooting). Something more than a 
bald assertion of having a weapon should be required (e.g., sticking a blunt 
object against the victim's back or simulating the cocking sound of a fire-
arm). Of course, the third type of Assault under Code § 708.1(3) occurs 
when a firearm actually is pointed at another or is displayed in a threaten-
ing manner. 
2. Assault on Peace Officer 
A legislative bill providing for a mandatory jail term for an assault on 
an on-duty peace officer failed to pass in 1979.88 Not only would a deferred 
judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence have been unavaila-
ble, but in addition, the defendant would have been ineligible for parole 
(and thus would have to serve the maximum sentence imposed by law) 
under this proposed law. This bill presumably would only have included the 
simple misdemeanor8'7 offense of simple Assault and would not have in-
cluded the aggravated assault offenses such as Assault with Intent to Inflict 
Serious Injury. 88 
A more practical approach for the General Assembly to adopt for spe-
cial punishmentS9 assaultive attacks on peace officers would be to create a 
new serious misdemeanor·o crime for a battery intentionally inflicted on 
34. State v. Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, _, 165 P.2d 234, 239 (1946). 
35. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 12, § 82; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 
132. 
36. H.F. 170, § 11, 68th G.A. (1979). 
37. A simple misdemeanor is punishable in the sentencing judge's discretion, by either a 
determinate or fixed period of confinement for any number of days up to thirty days or a fine in 
any amount not exceeding $100, but not both. IOWA CODE § 903.2(3) (1979). All of the ameliora-
tive sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sen-
tence of probation) are available in lieu of the prescribed allowable confinement or fine. [d. § 
907.3. 
38. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.2(1) & 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 56-69 infra. 
39. The constitutionality of a similar statute was upheld in People v. Prante, 177 Colo. 
243, 493 P.2d 1083 (1972). 
40. A serious misdemeanor is punishable in the sentencing judge's discretion, by either a 
determinate or fixed period of confinement for any number of days up to one year or a fine in 
any amount not exceeding $1,000, or both (confinement and a fine). IOWA CODE § 903.2(2) 
(1979). All of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred sentence, a deferred judg-
ment, or a suspended sentence of probation) are available in lieu of the prescribed allowable 
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peace officers. This would authorize a sentencing court in its sound judicial 
discretion to impose a jail sentence in excess of the thirty day limitation for 
simple Assault in situations of aggravated assaults short of being an Assault 
with Intent to Inflict Serious Injury. 
3. Domestic Abuse 
Amidst a flurry of legislative bills on the subject, the Iowa General As-
sembly in 1979 passed the Domestic Abuse Act.41 Although closely tied to 
the offense of Assault, this new act will appear as a separate chapter in the 
next Iowa Code.41 "Domestic abuse" is statutorily defined as an assault 
between co-habiting family or household members, including separated 
spouses not residing together at the time of the assault.48 Moreover, a vic-
tim's rights are not affected by leaving the residence or household to avoid 
domestic abuse.44 On the other hand, children under eighteen unfortunately 
are not protected,411 thus rendering the act in essence a wife abuse act. 
The primary purpose of this statute is to provide an avenue for a family 
or household member to seek a protective court order to prevent domestic 
abuse by another family or household member, including a separated 
spouse.46 Also included are provisions for temporary and emergency orders 
prior to a hearing, with violations of either this order or a court-appointed 
consent agreement to be punishable as Contempt.47 This act wisely does not 
include a provision included in another bill which makes it a crime for a 
peace officer to not speedily file assault charges upon request by an alleged 
victim of domestic abuse.48 Police discretion in filing criminal charges is de-
sira.ble; of course, the victim may file the charge directly.49 
The aforementioned civil proceeding is, by express terms of the statute, 
"in addition to any other civil or criminal remedy."lIo Thus, it merely sets 
out the obvious as to the crime of Assault covering disputes between family 
or household members, without making any changes in the criminal law. No 
new crimes are added and no crimes are expanded. Furthermore, no changes 
are made in the penalty schedules. 
confinement or fine. [d. § 907.3. 
41. 1979 Iowa Acta ch. 147. 
42. [d. § 1. 
43. [d. § 2. 
44. [d. § 7(2). 
45. [d. § 2(2). 
46. [d. § 5. 
47. [d. §§ 6, 8. 
48. H.F. 170, § 11, 68th G.A. (1979). 
49. See IOWA CODE § 804.1 (1979). 
50. 1979 Iowa Acta ch. 147, § 7(1). 
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4. Grading 
The only grade of simple Assault is a simple misdemeanor,'1 which is 
the lowest classification of criminal activity in the Iowa Code. This one 
grade encompasses an overly broad range of criminal activity: merely threat-
ening another with injury, actually injuring another, and pointing a firearm 
at another. 
5. Consent as Defense 
A "limited consent defense" has been codified to excuse contact, which 
otherwise would constitute an assault,1IS between "voluntary participants in 
a sport, social or other activity, not in itself criminal."I111 However, an other-
wise assaultive act must be "a reasonably foreseeable incident of such sport 
or activity" and must not create "an unreasonable risk of serious injury or 
breach of the peace."114 If both of these provisos are not met, then the de-
fense will not be applicable. Moreover, because of the restrictive nature of 
these limitations, it appears that this defense is available only on a charge of 
simple Assault. The defense, by its express terms, does not apply at all as a 
general defense to criminal activity, and thus would never be available to 
legitimatize such inherently criminal activities as "street fights, barroom 
brawls, and sado-masochistic excesses."all The burden of disproving the exis-
tence of this special defense is placed upon the prosecution in Uniform Jury 
Instruction No. 809. 
C. Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury 
The least serious of the aggravated forms of Assault in the new Crimi-
nal Code is the crime of Assault With Intent to Infiict Serious Injury," as 
the successor to the pre-revised crime of Assault With Intent to Infiict Great 
Bodily Injury.iJ7 Professor Yeager is of the opinion that the two terms are 
comparable. lIS It is submitted that such an opinion is incorrect,ae however, 
51. See note 37 supra. 
52. This proviso "recognizes that acts which may constitute an assault when committed in 
one context may be permissible in another context, and that the statutory distinction between 
permissible and impermissible physical contact should be clearly delineated." Yeager, Crimes 
Agaimt the Person: Homicide, Assault, Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping in the Proposed Iowa 
Criminal Code, 60 IOWA L. REv. 503, 517 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yeager Note]. 
53. IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 809. 
54. IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979). 
55. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 176. 
56. IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
802·03; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 177. 
57. See IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
58. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 177, which states: "'Serious injury' in § 
708.2(1) can be compared to 'great bodily injury,' the term formerly used." Id. 
59. See State v. Bousman, 276 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1979). 
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because the degree of specificity in the standard of "serious injury"80 ap-
pears to portend considerably more than the basically undefinable former 
standard of "great bodily injury."81 This former term has been interpreted 
as "an injury to the person greater than that which ordinarily results from a 
single altercation between parties with the fists or the like. "82 This standard 
seems to be less than the considerably more demanding standards for a "se-
rious injury," specifically, serious permanent disfigurement', disabling mental 
illness, or protracted loss or impairment of a function of any bodily organ. 
1. Grading 
The grading of this offense complicates matters further. As an aggra-
vated misdemeanor,8s the maximum jail sentence for this offense is two 
years, as opposed to the one-year maximum under the forerunner statute. 
Yet, the maximum penalty for the next lower misdemeanor offense, simple 
Assault,l14 remained unchanged at thirty days. The next higher offense under 
the revised Code is the class D felony81i offense of Assault While Participat-
ing in a Felony,88 which carries an indeterminate term of not more than five 
years. A better approach would have been to make a th!ee-tier level of mis-
demeanor assaults, rather than the two misdemeanor levels discussed above. 
Under a three-tier approach, an intermediate assaultive offense requiring an 
aggravated injury would be added, with an aggravated injury to be defined 
as an injury other than a "serious injury" which is greater than that which 
ordinarily results from a simple altercation between parties with the fists or 
60. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979). 
61. State v. Crandall, 227 Iowa 311, 288 N.W. 85 (1939). 
62. State v. Moon, 241 Iowa 1232, 1233, 44 N.W.2d 739, 740 (1950). 
63. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable, in the sentencing judge's discretion, by 
either a determinate or fixed period of confinement for any number of days up to two years or a 
fine in any amount not exceeding $5,000, or both (confinement and a fine). IOWA CODE § 
903.2(1) (1979). All of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a de-
ferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) are available in lieu of the prescribed 
allowable confinement or fine. [d. § 907.3. 
64. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
65. A class D felony is punishable by confinement for an indeterminate term not to ex-
ceed five years and a fine not to exceed $1,000. IOWA CODE § 902.9(4) (1979). If the particular 
offense is a "forcible felony," then the term of confinement must be imposed and cannot be 
suspended, and a fine apparently can be imposed only as a supplemental penalty (but cannot 
be imposed in lieu of mandatory confinement, notwithstanding § 909.1 of the Code). See text 
accompanying notes 70-102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). If the partic-
ular offense is not a "forcible felony," then confinement is not mandatory. Indeed, either a 
deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, o~ a suspended sentence of probation can be utilized as 
ameliorative "sentencing" devices in lieu of either confinement or a fine. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 
(1979). In addition, a fine clearly can be imposed in lieu of confinement or a suspended sen-
tence. See text accompanying notes 70-102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
66. See IOWA CODE § 708.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 70-106 infra. 
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the like. Thus, the former offense of Assault With Intent to Inflict Great 
Bodily Injury would be made into an aggravated battery offense punishable 
as a serious misdemeanor, with a one-year maximum penalty. An aggravated 
battery could encompass such conduct as striking another with an object, 
which extends considerably beyond the mere offensive touchings or threats 
which commonly constitute simple Assault. The proper offense for breaking 
someone's nose with one's fists illustrates the dilemma of having no interme-
diate misdemeanor assault offense. An "overreaching" prosecutor might at-
tempt to stretch such conduct into Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious 
Injury, whereas what would clearly have been an Assault With Intent to 
Inflict Great Bodily Injury under the prior law apparently will only be a 
simple Assault now. 
2. Lesser Included Offense 
Quite obviously, Assault87 is a lesser included offense88 of this crime. 
This is true since the only difference between the two crimes of assaultive 
conduct is the specific intent to commit a "serious injury" necessary for the 
greater crime.81l 
D. Assault While Participating in a Felony 
The former offenses of Assault With Intent to Commit a Felony,70 as 
well as various Assaults with intent to commit specific felonies,71 were incor-
porated into a single crime of Assault While Participating in a Felony.72 Un-
like its predecessor statute, however, this statute apparently "does not re-
quire any connection between the assault and the felony other than that the 
person committing the assault be at that time participating in a felony."78 
Under section 702.14 of the Code, a person is "participating74 in a felony," 
whether he is successful or not:76 
67. See id. § 708.2(2) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
68. See text accompanying notes 619-38 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
69. See State v. Redmond, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976) ("The difference between an 
assault and an assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury is the specific intent to inflict an 
aggravated injury"). 
70. See IOWA CODE § 694.5 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
71. Id. § 694.7. 
72. Id. § 708.3. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 805-06; J. YEAGER 
& R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 178. 
73. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 178. 
74. See State v. Johnson, 2~1 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 1980) which rejected the argument that 
participation means joint conduct and thus the complicity of two or more persons is not re-
quired in committing the crime of Assault While Participating in a Felony. 
75. See State v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 1980) which rejected the claim that the 
target felony must be completed in order for there to be a conviction for Assault While Partici-
pating in a Felony. 
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during part or the entire period commencing with the first act done di-
rectly toward the commission of the offense and for the purpose of com-
mitting that offense, and terminating when the person has been arrested 
or has withdrawn from the scene of the intended crime and has eluded 
pursuers, if any there be.78 
Accordingly, this term apparently includes "an attempt to commit the fel-
ony, the commission of the felony itself, and the escape from the scene of 
the felony."77 Criminal liability for inchoate criminal conduct vests "[o]nce a 
felony has progressed to the point where an assault is made~'l7s 
1. Attempt Liability -
This offense should encompass conduct such as a sexual assault when 
there is lacking a "sex act"78 (i.e., neither penetration nor the requisite sex-
ual contact) in order for the crime of Sexual Abuseso to be consummated. 
That is, attempted Sexual Abuse would be punishable under this offenseS1 
provided that an assault was actually committed and that the assault oc-
curred coterminous with a felonious intent. An example would be where the 
defendant has torn off the intended victim's clothing, with the obvious in-
tent to sexually abuse the victim, but for some reason or other is thwarted 
before making the requisite contact for a "sex act." Of course, the substan-
tive offense of Sexual Abuse would be completed if the attack had 
progressed to the requisite contact for a "sex act," notwithstanding the lack 
of the intended penetration, before the defendant was thwarted. 
The distinct possibility of certain inchoate criminal activity overlapping 
in the substantive crime provision and this statute has been recognized by 
the supreme court. In State v. Pierce,SI the court, in upholding the revised 
offense of Robbery88 against a due process attack, stated that the Robbery 
statute "is no less clear merely because the conduct proscribed may overlap 
conduct which is also proscribed under a separate statute,"1U referring to an 
unsuccessful robbery being punishable under either Robbery or Assault 
While Participating in a Felony.slI 
76. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). 
77. Yeager Note, supra note 52, at 517. 
78. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12. § 178. 
79. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979). 
80. rd. § 709.1. 
81. See J. ROEHRICK, THE NEW IOWA CRIMINAL CODE: A COMPARISON, 64 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as J. ROEHRICKj. 
82. 287 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
83. See IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1978) ("It is immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence 
of robbery that property was or was not actually stolen"). 
84. 287 N.W.2d at 574. 
85. Concerning prosecutorial discretion in charging when there are overlapping statutes, 
see note 1056 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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2. Felony-Assault Doctrine 
The scope of this provision apparently is not limited to attempted as-
saultive conduct. Professor Yeager reports that another intended purpose of 
this crime is to provide "an additional offense in those cases where the com-
mission of a felony is accompanied by an assault."8s Broadly interpreted, 
under this "felony-assault" doctrine it appears that an otherwise simply as-
sault87 can be "bootstrapped" into a felonious assault (specifically a class D 
felony),88 simply because it is committed during participation in any felony, 
other than a felony, such as Robbery,8S that includes an assault as an essen-
tial element of the underlying crime itself.so This could result, for example, 
in a person being charged with Assault While Participating in a Felony in 
addition to the underlying offense of False Use of a Financial InstrumentSI 
in a situation in which he offers a forged check, and in the process intention-
ally pushes aside a suspicious clerk who attempts to restrain him, or points a 
firearm at the clerk in order to effectuate his escape. The apparent public 
policy supporting this doctrine is that a simple assault is of a more serious 
nature when committed in the context of otherwise felonious conduct. Such 
a severe "bootstrapping" penalty should deter assaultive acts during other-
wise non-violent felonious conduct. 
3. Grading 
This not only is a class D felony,82 but is also, more importantly, a "fe-
lonious assault"S8 and thus a "forcible felony."s. Consequently, a person 
convicted of this offense apparently faces a mandatory prison term.so Appli-
cation of the so-called "felony-assault" doctrine96 (i.e., a simple Assault dur-
ing the commission or attempted commission of any felony becomes a class 
86. Yeager Note, supra note 52, at 517. 
87. See note 37 supra. 
,88. See note 65 supra. 
89. IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). 
90. The "integral part" doctrine enunciated in People v. Ireland, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 450 
P.2d 580 (1969), arguably is applicable here by analogy. This doctrine operates as a limitation 
on the felony murder rule by eliminating 8888ultive conduct as the basic underlying felony as 
the unlawful act to bootstrap an unpremeditated murder into first degree murder generally. In 
Ireland, the court specifically held that it was improper to apply California's second degree 
felony murder rule to a situation where the claimed felony in the course of which the homicide 
occurred was an assault with a deadly weapon. 
91. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979). 
92. See note 65 supra. 
93. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
94. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
95. See id. § 909.1 and text accompanying notes 184-86 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980). 
96. See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra. 
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D felony-assault) is especially harsh in these circumstances, but appears to 
be required. Moreover, the prescribed indeterminate term of five years for 
Assault While Participating in a Felony would become a fixed five-year term 
(minus good time97 and honor time)98 if a firearm is used or possessed dur-
ing the commission of this crime.BB Additionally, any murder committed 
during this offense would be Murder in the First Degree under the revised 
felony-murder rule. 100 
4. Lesser Included Offenses 
The only lesser included offense of this felony crime is Assault,IOI a sim-
ple misdemeanor. lOll The intermediate related crime of Assault With Intent 
to Inflict Serious Injury,1°s an aggravated misdemeanor,104 is not a lesser in-
cluded offense under the prevailing Iowa standard. This is because each of 
the crimes requires an element which the other does not. Assault While Par-
ticipating in a Felony requires that the requisite assault be committed dur-
ing the commission or attempted commission of a felony, or that the assault 
be at an inchoate stage in the completion of a felonious assault (e.g., Sexual 
Abuse). No such requirement is necessary for an Assault With the Intent to 
Inflict Serious Injury. On the other hand, the specific intent of the latter· 
offense obviously is not necessarily required for the more severe crime of 
Assault While Participating in a Felony. That is because, for example, an 
attempted sexual abuse punishable under Assault While Participating in a 
Felony does not require a specific intent to inflict "serious injury." The 
point becomes even stronger when considering application of the so-called 
"felony-assault" doctrineloli to Assault While Participating in a Felony.lOG A 
simple Assault during participation in the commission or attempted com-
mission of the property appropriation felony offense of False Use of a Fi-
nancial Instrument certainly would not require a specific intent to inflict 
"serious injury." 
97. See IOWA CODE § 246.39 (1979). 
98. See id. § 246.43. 
99. See id. § 902.7 and text accompanying notes 70-106 supra. 
100. See id. § 707.2(2) and text accompanying notes 1252-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 
DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1979). 
101. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 6-25 supra. 
102. See note 37 supra. 
103. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) and text accompllIlying notes 56-69 supra. 
104. See note 63 supra. 
105. See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra. 
106. Regarding Assault While Participating in a Felony being itself a lesser included of-
fense of Sexual Abuse, see text accompanying notes ~43-44 infra. 
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E. Willful Injury 
The pre-revised common law offense of Mayheml07 was not only 
renamed Willful Injury,I07.1 but was also changed in scope by designating a 
"serious injury"l08 as the tyPe of injury encompassed by this offense. The 
scope was broadened as to the type of injury caused to bodily limbs. Limbs 
no longer need to be "disabled," for now a protracted loss or impairment of 
function of any bodily organ is sufficient to invoke criminal culpability. On 
the other hand, Willful Injury now requires a "serious permanent disfigure-
ment" instead of merely permitting the cutting or slitting of certain bodily 
parts (e.g., tongue, ear, nose, or lip) as was the basis for Mayhem in the 
predecessor statute. I 011 
This is a specific intentllO crime, with the required intent being to cause 
a "serious injury." Of course, this also is a specific result crime, with inflic-
tion of a "serious injury" required. Thus, negligent infliction of a "serious 
injury" is not covered under Willful Injury.l11 Indeed, this type of conduct is 
not encompassed by the less serious related crimes of Assault While Partici-
pating in a Felony/Ill Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury,118 or 
even simple Assault.l14 This is because an assault (that is, specific intent 
conduct) is an integral part of each. Hence a civil action is the only legal 
remedy available. 
1. Specific Result Crim.e 
Willful Injury is a specific result crime. Its elements are: (1) doing any 
unjustified act (i.e., an Assault); (2) intended to cause "serious injury"; (3) 
which causes "serious injury" to another. So defined, this crime occurs when 
the lesser crime of Assault With Intent to Inflict a Serious InjurylUI is 
successful. 
107. See IOWA CODE § 694.7 (1977) (repealed 1975). 
107.1. IOWA CODE § 70S.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
807-0S; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 179. -
lOS. See IOWA CODE § 702.1S (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-11 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
109. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at IS7. 
110. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 4S0-509 
supra. 
111. A provision which was included in S.F. S5 as it was introduced in 1975, but was 
defeated in the legislative process, would have punished reckless inflictions of a "serious 
injury." 
112. See IOWA CODE § 70S.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 70-7S supra. 
113. See id. § 70S.2(1) and text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. 
114. See id. § 708.2(2) and text accompanying notes I-IS supra. 
115. See id. § 70S.2(1) and text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. 
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2. Lesser Included Offenses 
Both of the non-felonious classifications of assaultive crimes are lesser 
included offenses1l8 of Willful Injury. This is clear in light of the three ele-
ments of Willful Injury: (1) assault (2) with intent to inflict "serious injury" 
and (3) causing "serious injury." The first two elements, standing alone, 
constitute the aggravated misdemeanor of Assault With Intent to Inflict a 
Serious Injury,117 whereas the first element, by itself, constitutes the simple 
misdemeanor offense of Assault.1l8 
3. Grading 
The single grade of this felony is a class D felony.ll9 As a "felonious 
assault,"120 it is also a "forcible felony."ul 
4. Felony Murder Rule 
As a "forcible felony," this offense can be the underlying basis for Mur-
der in the First Degree under the felony murder rule.m Thus, no change has 
been effected as the related pre-revised offense of Mayhem applied in such a 
manner under prior law.u8 
. F. Administering Harmful Substances 
A new offense of Administering Harmful Substances124 was added to the 
Code to cover those situations in which a person is unlawfully administered 
certain harmful substances of such a non-lethal nature or quantity as to not 
approach Attempted Murder.JIII Yet, this type of activity is considered too 
grave to punish merely as simple Assault.128 The elements of this offense 
are: (1) administering to, or causing another to take; (2) substances with 
certain enumerated harmful effects; (3) in sufficient quantities to cause such 
harmful effects; (4) and for other than medicinal purposes, (5) withcut the 
other person's consent, or by threat or deception. 
116. For an extensive discussion of the standard for determining lesser included offenses, 
see notes 619-638 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
117. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) and text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. 
118. See id. § 708.2(2) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
119. See note 65 supra. 
120. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
121. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
122. See id. § 707.2(2) and text accompanying notes 847-48 infra. 
123. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
124. IOWA CODE § 708.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
810-11; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 180. 
125. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
126. [d. §§ 708.1, .2(2). 
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1. Grading 
The single grade of this offense is a class D felony.127 Whether this is a 
"forcible felony"118 is unclear. Because Administering Harmful Substances is 
not specifically enumerated in the statutory definition of "forcible felony," it 
must be considered a "felonious assault"JlIII in order to be treated as a "forci-
ble felony." Because of the judicial definition of the term "felonious as-
sault," ("an assault which is a felony"),lSO this crime will constitute a "forci-
ble felony" only if the statute defining this offense is interpreted such that 
an assault is necessarily included (required) within its essential elements. 
Nowhere on the face of that statute is there any requirement of a specific 
intent, unlike Assault.l81 Such omission suggests that Administering Harm-
ful Substances is not a "felonious assault" and thus not a "forcible felony." 
While this probably was not the legislative intent, it is nevertheless the leg-
islative result. This conclusion is buttressed by the canon of construction of 
strict construction of penal statutes.l8lI Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court 
in Emery v. Fenton188 has stated specifically in regard to the new Criminal 
Code that: [c]hanges made by revision of a statute will not be construed as 
altering the law unless the legislature's intent to accomplish a change in its 
meaning is clear and unmistakable. An intent to make a change does not 
exist when the revised statute is merely susceptible to two constructions.lS4 
The Emery v. Fenton limitation should apply to determining whether 
Administering Harmful Substances is a "forcible felony," especially since 
this is a new crime which was not included in the former Criminal Code. 
Instead, this type of conduct would have been punishable under the pre-
revised less severe offenses either as AsS8ultl86 or as Assault With Intent to 
InBict Great Bodily Injury.lss 
The one apparent argument that Administering Harmful Substances 
may be a specific intent crime is that the actus reus must have been done 
127. See note 65 supra. 
128. A "forcible felony" is not subject to any of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives 
(i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation). See IOWA 
CODE § 907.3 (1979). Thus, confinement is mandatory. Moreover, it appears that IOWA CODE § 
909.1 does not permit a fine as the sole sentencing alternative for a "forcible felony." See text 
accompanyint notes 92-102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). Moreover, 
being a "forcible felony," this offense is also subject to the mandatory minimum five-year sen-
tence if a firearm is used or possessed during its commission. 
129. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
130. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979). 
131. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.1, .2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
132. See State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). 
But see IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1979) (statutory abrogation of common law presumption of strict 
construction of statutes in derogation of common law). 
133. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). 
134. Id. at 10. 
135. See IOWA CODE § 694.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
136. See id. § 694.6. 
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"for other than medicinal purposes. "137 This could suggest that there is thus 
an implied intent to injure whenever such harmful substances are non-con-
sensually administered without a medicinal purpose. However, this offense 
can be committed by a person who does not harbor any intention to injure. 
Moreover, since knowledge of the harmful effects of these substances is not 
required, how can there be an implied intent to injure? The bottom line, of 
course, is that the statute does not impose a requirement that the prosecu-
tion prove beyond a' reasonable doubt as an essential element that the de-
fendant committed the proscribed act with the intent to injure. Rather, all 
that the prosecutor has to do under the statute is, in effect, to disprove that 
the act was motivated by medicinal concerns.138 Once this has been accoin-
plished, the prosecutor does not need to prove precisely why the proscribed 
act was committed. 
2. Lesser Included Offenses 
Assuming that an Assault is not required for this crime, there are 'no 
lesser included offenses1S9 of Administering Harmful Substances. 
3. Felony Murder Rule 
Assuming that this is not a "forcible felony,"l40 as discussed above, Ad-
ministering Harmful Substances cannot qualify as an underlying felony 
under the first-degree felony murder rule. l4 I This means that any death 
caused by this type of criminal activity will have to be prosecuted either 
under the second-degree felony murder rulel41 or under the applicable homi-
cide offense.143 The key point is that the felony murder rule would be inap-
plicable in making any wrongful death into Murder in the First Degree, ab-
sent premeditation. 144 
G. Terrorism 
The gravamen of the restructured crime of Terrorisml4& is the specific 
intentl46 "to injure or provoke fear or anger in another."l47 This offense can 
137. IOWA CODE § 708.5 (1979). 
138. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 810-11. 
139. For an extensive discussion of the standard for determining lessor included offenses, 
see text accompanying notes 619-638 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
140. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
141. See id. § 707.2(2) and text accompanying notes 847-48 infra. 
142. See id. § 707.3 and text accompanying notes 867-71 infra. 
143. See id. ch. 707 and footnotes 811-936 infra. 
144. See text accompanying notes 835-46 infra. 
145. IOWA CODE § 708.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
812-18; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 181. 
146. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
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be committed in either of two ways, the first being: (1) discharging a "dan-
gerous weapon";148 (2) at or into any occupied building or vehicle, and (3) 
placing the occupants thereof in reasonable apprehension149 of "serious in-
jury."uo Proof of the occupant's being placed in actual danger appears un-
necessary in light of the fact that the crime only requires that the dangerous 
weapon be discharged at an occupied building or vehicle. 
The second way that this crime can be committed is by: (1) threatening 
(2) to commit a "forcible felony,"Ul with (3) reasonable expectation of the 
threat being carried out. UII So defined, this threat (to commit a "forcible 
felony") is more seriously punished than a simple Assault.163 
1. Grading 
Indeed, Terrorism is a class D felony.I64 More importantly, the first of 
the two types mentioned above has been held to be l66 a "forcible felony"U8 
under the interpretation of a "felonious assault."167 Of course, an Assault168 
must be a necessary part of Terrorism, in order for Terrorism to be consid-
ered a "felonious assault." However, as to the second alternative type of 
terrorism, this test appears not to be met in light of the overt act require-
ments of an Assault.169 The latter offense heretofore has not been complete 
on the mere speaking of words (albeit threatening words). 
2. Felony Murder Rule 
If, as suggested above, Terrorism is a "forcible felony," then a murder 
occurring during an act of Terrorism will constitute Murder in the First De-
gree under the felony murder rule.180 Otherwise, an intentional, but unpre-
meditated, murder would only constitute Murder in the Second Degree,181 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
147. IOWA CODE § 708.6 (1979). 
148. See id. § 702.7 (1979). See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
813. 
149. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra noe 12, at No. 814. 
150. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-11 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
151. See id. § 702.11 and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 
DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
152. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 818. 
153. IOWA CODE §§ 708.1, .2(2) (1979). 
154. See note 65 supra. 
155. State v. Young, 293 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1980). 
156. See note 128 supra. 
157. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
158. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
159. [d. 
160. See id. § 707.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 847-48 infra. 
161. See id. § 707.3 and teyt accompanying notes 864-71 infra. 
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whereas an unintentional killing would be punishable merely as Involuntary 
Manslaughter .162 
3. Lesser Included Offense 
Assuming, as discussed above, that an assault is not an essential ele-
ment of Terrorism, there would be no lesser included offenses168 in a prose-
cution for Terrorism. On the other hand, if it is determined that an assault 
necessarily is inch,1ded in Terrorism, then of course Assault164 would be a 
lesser included offense. However, the aggravated misdemeanor offense of As-
sault With Intent to Inflict a Serious Injury1611 would still not be a lesser 
included offense of Terrorism since Terrorism does not require a specific 
intent to cause a "serious injury," but instead requires an intent merely to 
"injure" or, alternatively, to "provoke fear or anger" in another. 
H. Harrassment 
The gravamen of the new crime of Harrassment,166 which has been 
characterized as consisting of "an assortment of petty annoyances,"l67 is the 
specific intent168 "to intimidate, annoy or alarm another person."169 No par-
ticular harm need result, however, for this crime to occur. 
This single-grade simple misdemeanor offense17o can be committed in 
any of four ways. Harrassment by annoying communications (e.g., by tele-
phone) requires a showing of a lack of a legitimate purpose on the part of 
the person making such communications. l7l Harrassment by the placing of a 
simulated bomb in or near any occupied building or vehicle could criminal-
ize activities involving only practical joking devices such as smoke or whistle 
bombs. In Harrassment by falsely ordering merchandise in another's name 
must be shown to have been done without the harassed person's knowledge 
or consent.178 Harrassment can also be committed by knowingly174 and 
162. See id. § 707.5(1) and text accompanying notes 915-36 infra. 
163. See text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
164. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1-18 supra. 
165. See id. § 708.2(1) and text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. 
166. [d. § 708.7. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. See generally J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 182-86. 
167. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 182. 
168. For an extensive discussion of specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompany-
ing notes 480-509 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
169. IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1979). This crime of general application, unlike that of Harass-
ment of Public Officers and Employees (under section 718.4 of the Code), protects any person. 
170. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
171. IOWA CODE § 708.7(1) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 183. 
172. IOWA CODE § 708.7(2) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 184. 
173. IOWA CODE § 708.7(3) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 185. 
, 
174. For an extensive discussion of knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text-
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falsely accusing another of criminal activity, either when no crime has oc-
cur~ed or when the accused did not commit it.1711 This latter type of conduct 
also constitutes the crime of Making False Reports to Law Enforcement 
Authorities.178 
The Oregon Supreme Court177 has declared unconstitutional a Harass-
ment statute strikingly similar to section 708.7(1),178 which criminalizes an-
noying communications without legitimate purpose. The gravamen of the 
Oregon offense was considered to be that the offender communicated rather 
than that he subjected the victim to some defined injury. Finally, the pro-
scribed communication need not cause any harm, and only needs to have 
been "likely" to do so--whether defendant was aware of this likelihood or 
not. 
I. Going Armed with Intent 
( 
The only change made in the crime of Going Armed with Intent179 was 
to substitute the general terminology of "any dangerous weapon"l80 for the 
pre-revised lengthy listing of specific weapons. The practical effect could be 
to include more weapons within the province of this offense.181 
Specifically, this crime consists of: (1) going armedl81 (2) with a "dan-
gerous weapon,"l88 (3) with the intent to use it, without justification, against 
another person. This is a specific intent crime, thus differentiating it from 
the crime of Carrying Weapons/84 although the prosecution does not have to 
prove the particular person against whom the defendant intended to use the 
accompanying notes 572-601 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
175. IOWA CODE § 708.7(4) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 186. 
176. IOWA CODE § 718.6 (1979). See also IOWA CODE § 720.6 (1979) (Malicious 
Prosecution). 
177. State v. Blair, 601 P.2d 766 (Ore. 1979). 
178. The Oregon statute defines Harassment as "communicat[ingJ with a person, anony-
mously or otherwise, by telephone, mail or other form of written communication, in a matter 
likely to cause annoyance or harm." 26 Crim. L. Rptr. 2331 (Ore. 1979). 
179. IOWA CODE § 708.8 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
819-21; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 187. 
180. See IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). 
181. However, this expanded definition still is not broad enough to encompass a starting 
pistol. See State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747 (Iowa 1978). 
182. "Going armed" encompasses conscious and deliberate keeping of a dangerous 
weapon on or about the person, and available for immediate use. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 12, at No. 821. The distance that an armed individual has gone from his 
home is relevant upon the element of intent in appropriate cases. This is a matter for the jury, 
rather than a question of sufficiency of evidence (for a motion for judgment of acquittal). State 
v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
183. Under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 820, the jury is to 
decide if the particular weapon used by the defendant was a "dangerous weapon," as that term 
is defined in UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 218. 
184. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979). 
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dangerous weapon.1811 
1. Non-Assault 
Although this crime is included in the chapter on Assaults, an assault 
clearly is not an element of this crime. Going Armed with Intent is essen-
tially an inchoate attempted murder provision, applicable in a situation 
where there is not a sufficient overt act for an Attempted Murder charge.188 
Indeed, the crime of Going Armed with Intent "is complete without any 
attempt having been made to use the weapon. "187 
2. Grading 
This ~s a class D felony.188 Significantly, however, it is not a "forcible 
felony."189 This is because an assault is not a necessary element and thus 
Going Armed With Intent would not come within the interpretation of a 
felonious assault in State v. Powers. leo Because it is not a "forcible felony," 
this offense is not subject to the five-year mandatoryl91 minimum sentence 
for possession or Use of firearms,1811 and is not an underlying felony for appli-
cation of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree.19s 
J. Setting Spring Guns and Mantraps 
A new crime of Setting Spring Guns and Mantrapslll4 appears in section 
708.9 of the Code, partly in responsel911 to the well-publicized and highly 
contro~ersial civil liability case of Katko v. Briney.198 The elements of this 
offense are: (1) setting either a spring gun or mantrap (2) which is intended 
to be sprung by a person, and (3) which can cause such person "serious 
o injury."I97 
185. See State v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
186. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
187. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 49. 
188. See note 65 supra. 
189. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). 
190. 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
191. See also IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 184-86 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
192. See id. § 902.7 and text accompanying notes 734-53 infra. 
193. See id. § 707.2(2) and text accompanying notes 847-48 infra. 
194. IOWA CODE § 708.9 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 188; TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, 
at 49. 
195. Professor Yeager, the draftsman of the Iowa Criminal Code, reports that this provi-
sion was already included in early drafts of the proposed revised Code prior to the decision in 
Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
188. 
196. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). 
197. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-11 in Part I of this 
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The single grade of this offense is an aggravated misdemeanor,198 irre-
spective of whether or not the spring gun or mantrap is ever set off. Unlike 
several other offenses, this crime does not include a built-in higher penalty 
schedule for firing of the devices or for any resultant personal injury. This 
singular approach has the desirable effect of avoiding double punishment for 
any personal injury caused by a spring gun or a mantrap. Of course, any 
resultant harm caused to a person would be punishable as a separate sub-
stantive offense, either as a homicide offense or an aggravated type of as-
sault offense, depending upon the degree of injury and the particular sur-
rounding circumstances. 
II. SEXUAL ABUSE AND RELATED SEXUAL MORALITY OFFENSES 
A. Overview 
Unauthorized sexual activity and conduct involving proscribed sexual 
morality constitute thirteen offenses in the new Criminal Code. Five of these 
are new crimes. These include three new obscenity offenses (Sale of Hard 
Core Pornography,199 Public Indecent Exposure,2oo and Sexual Exploitation 
of Children),201 the prostitution-related offense of Pimping,202 and the "vis-
ual assault" offense of Indecent Exposure.2os The latter offense had not been 
punishable in Iowa since the pre-revised statute was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1974.1~ 
Major revisions were made in all of the pre-existing crimes, except for 
Detention in a Brothel.lOIi The only minor change made in this obscure of-
fense was to extend the coverage of involuntary prostitution in a brothel to 
males, instead of limiting it solely to females. 
1. "Sex Act" 
Only one of the revised "sex" crimes-Incest208-requires sexual inter-
course as an element of the offense. The newly-styled offense of Sexual 
Abuse207 (which replaces the pre-revised offenses of Rape,208 Statutory 
Rape,IOS and Carnal Knowledge of an Imbecile,21o as well as recriminalizes 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
198. See note 63 supra. 
199. IOWA CODE § 72804 (1979). See text accompanying notes 519-27 infra. 
200. [d. § 728.5. See text accompanying notes 442-65 infra. 
201. [d. § 728.12. See text accompanying notes 504-18 infra. 
202. [d. § 725.2. See text accompanying notes 413-21 infra. 
203. [d. § 709.9. See text accompanying notes 442-65 infra. 
204. State v. Kueny, 215 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1974). 
205. IOWA CODE § 709.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 434-41 infra. 
206. [d. § 726.2. See text accompanying notes 345-89 infra. 
207. [d. §§ 709.1-04. See text accompanying notes 232-343 infra. 
208. See IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
209. See id. 
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nonconsensual Sodomy)211 no longer requires sexual intercourse. The actus 
reus-a "sex act"212-of the new offense can be committed also merely by 
making unlawful sexual contact instead of penetration. Similarly, applica-
tion of the general term "sex act" to Prostitution21S (and its related offenses) 
has also broadened the scope of that offense, which previously had been lim-
ited to "commercial" sexual intercourse.2B 
Although neither a "sex act" nor actual sexual intercourse is required 
for any of the other sex-related crimes, nevertheless a "sex act" is, or can be, 
an integral part of these offenses. Solicitation of a "child"2UI to commit a 
"sex act" is one of the proscribed activities punishable as Lascivious Acts 
With a Child.218 Committing a "sex act" in the view of a third person is one 
of the two alternative ways to commit the offense of Indecent Exposure. m 
Finally, the five obscenity offenses include specialized definitions of "sex 
act" in their exhaustive enumerations of what constitutes obscene or porno-
graphic material.218 . 
2. Special Protections. of Children or Adolescents 
A major focus of attention in' this series of sexual-related crimes is upon 
protection of children. No less than three different cut-off ages219 for defin-
ing children (i.e., under 'eighteen, under fourteen, and under twelve) are 
used in the various offenses, however, with no apparent reason. The most 
serious of these offenses is statutory sexual abuse220 of a "child"221 either by 
sexual intercourse or by mere sexual contact. The most significant change 
was that the age of "consent" for purposes of statutory sexual abuse was 
lowered as part of the Criminal Code revision from sixteen to fourteen. 
Moreover, a higher penalty schedule, indeed a class B felony,m attaches 
210. See id. § 698.3. 
211. Iowa's pre-revised sodomy statute (IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1973» had been declared 
unconstitutional in State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976), as an invasion of privacy 
through its regulation of consensual sodomitical acts performed in private by adults of the 
opposite sex. 
212. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
213. [d. § 725.1. See text accompanying notes 397-412 infra. 
214. See text accompanying notes 397-412 infra. 
215. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 145-46 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980), and notes 219-28 infra. 
216. [d. § 709.8 (1979). See text accompanying notes 354-90 infra. 
217. [d. § 709.9. See text accompanying notes 442-65 infra. 
218. See text accompanying notes 489-90 infra. 
219. For a statement of the general computational rule in determining age, see UNIFORM 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No; 915. 
220. IOWA CODE § 709.4(3) (1979). See text accompanying notes 232-343 infra. 
221. [d. § 702.5. See text accompanying notes 145-46 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. 
REV. 239 (1980). 
222. Regarding the penalty schedules and sentencing options for a class B felony, see text 
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when the youthful victim is under twelve. IllS 
Sexual intercourse between an adult and an adolescent (defined here as 
a "minor" who nevertheless is not a "child," i.e., either fourteen, fifteen, 
sixteen, or seventeen years old) thus is not criminal except for limited spe-
cial circumstances. One of these is a familial relationship, and thus sexual 
intercourse between a parent and a "child" (or a stepparent and a 
"stepchild") would be punishable as Incest.m 
Certain (but not all) sexual activity with children stopping short of 
"sexual contact"2lI1i is punishable nevertheless as Lascivious Acts With a 
Child. liS The cut-off age for a "child" was lowered from sixteen to fourteen. 
Strangely, the offender must be eighteen or over, which makes this the only 
crime which cannot be committed by fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, and seven-
teen year old persons. 
A new obscenity crime-Sexual Exploitation of a Childllll7-focuses 
upon exploiting "child" models for pornographic materials. The upper age 
limit for a "child" is fourteen. Contrastingly, two other obscenity offenses 
regulating access to obscene materials relate to "minors" (i.e., under eigh-
teen) instead of merely to "children" (i.e., under fourteen).1I8 This has the 
anomalous result that fourteen to seventeen year old youngsters can legally 
be exploited as models for "child" pornography yet are "protected" against 
gaining access to obscene materials. 
3. Sexual Privacy 
Sexual privacy is recogriized only to a limited degree in the new Crimi-
nal Code. The crimes of Aduiteryllllil and SeductionliSO were eliminated, and 
consensual sodomitic acts between adults were not re-criminalized. Never-
• theless, Prostitutionll81 was not only retained as a crime but also was ex-
panded by changing the crux of the offense from sexual intercourse to mere 
sexual contacts. 
accompanying note 49 supra. As to those for the lower class C felony, see text accompanying 
note 120 supra. 
223. IOWA CODE § 709.3(2) (1979). 
224. [d. § 726.2. See text accompanying notes 344-53 infra. 
225. See State v. Baldwin, 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980), as discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 383-85, infra. 
226. IOWA CODE. § 709.8 (1979). See text accompanying notes 354-90 infra. 
227. [d. § 728.12. See text accompanying notes 504-18 infra. 
228. These offenses are Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Material to Minors and 
Admitting Minors to Premises Where Obscene Material Is Exhibited. See id. §§ 728.2-.3 (1979) 
and text accompanying notes 481-91 infra. . 
229. See IOWA CODE § 702.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
230. See id. § 700.1. 
231. IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 397-412 infra. 
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B. Sexual Abuse 
1. Circumstances Making Sexual Contact Illegal 
The gist of the newly-styled crime of Sexual Abuse232 is unwarranted 
sexual contact. Generically, the elements of this offense are: (1) a "sex 
act"233 (2) between two or more persons (3) either non-consensually by 
force234 or against the Willll3G of the other participant or consensually with 
certain types of other participants considered particularly vulnerable under 
the sexual abuse law. These .special circumstances or characteristics of the 
other participant include: (a) being mentally defective;lI38 (b) lacking "the 
mental capacity to know the right and wrong of conduct in sexual mat-
ters";lI37 (c) being a "child"1I38 (i.e., under fourteen); (d) being fourteen or 
fifteen and a member of the same household as the defendant;239 (e) being 
fourteen or fifteen and related to the defendant by blood or marriage to the 
fourth degree;24o (f) being fourteen or fifteen and being psychologically "co-
erced" into submission through the defendant's use of a position of author-
ity;1I41 and (g) being fourteen or fifteen and sexually participating, whether 
voluntarily or not, with a defendant who is at least six years older.242 
2. Actus Reus 
A "sex act"lI43 is conclusively defined in explicit detail in a general defi-
nitional clause, as either penetration ·or sexual contact with certain enumer-
ated body parts. This broad definition thus represents a. major change in 
232. Id. §§ 709.1-.4. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 901-12; J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 204-14; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 152-70. 
233. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980) and note 246 infra. 
234. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 911; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 12, §§ 203-04. 
235. Id. See also State v. Nathoo, 152 Iowa 665, 133 N.W. 129 (1911) (rape of woman 
rendered "insensible" by drugs); R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 163. 
236. See State v. Haner, 186 Iowa 1259, 173 N.W. 225 (1919); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 12, § 205; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 163-64. 
237. State v. Haner, 186 Iowa 1259, 173 N.W. 225 (1919). See also J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 12, § 205; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 163-64. 
238. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 145-46 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 912; J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 206, 210. 
239. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 210. 
240. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 909; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 12, § 212. 
241. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 910; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
. SON, supra note 12, §§ 210-11. 
242. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 210. 
243. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980), and note 246 infra. 
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this area of the criminal law by eliminating penetration as a required ele-
ment and by combining several pre-revised offenses. au 
3. Mental State 
Like its principal predecessor crime of Rape,24G Sexual Abuse is not a 
specific intent crime. All that is required is that the proscribed "sex act"246 
be performed either (1) by force or against the will of any person, (2) with a 
mentally-handicapped person, or (3) with persons under sixteen under vari-
ous circumstances.247 Thus, a specific intent to gratify sexual passions is not 
an element of the crime. Rather, as under the pre-revised crime of Rape, the 
only mental state required is a general criminal intent146 which is supplied 
by the unauthorized act of sexual contact.lI4e 
4. Special Age Circumstances 
As discussed above,lIIIo the revised crime of Sexual Abuse obviously pro-
vides special protection for children. Statutory sexual abuse in some in-
stances also involves consideration of the age of the offender. The four dif-
ferent situations involving age considerations of one or both parties are as 
follows. A "sex act" between an offender who is six or more years older than 
the victim constitutes Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree2111 if the victim is 
either fourteen or fifteen. If, however, the victim is fourteen or fifteen but 
the offender is less than six years older, then the crime of statutory Sexual 
Abuse does not occur. 
No considerations of a special minimal age of the offender are present, 
however, when the victim is a "child." Thus, an offender who is of the mini-
mal general criminal responsibility age of fourteen2llll can be prosecuted ulti-
mately for sexual abuse involving a "victim" who is only one year younger 
(i.e., thirteen). The particular age of the victim is important for grading pur-
poses: Sexual Abuse in the Third (or lowest) Degree2118 occurs with a victim 
who is either twelve or thirteen, whereas Sexual Abuse in the (higher) Sec-
ond Degreellll4 occurs if the victim is only eleven or younger. 
244. See text accompanying notes 206-17 supra. 
245. See IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
246. State v. York, 293 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 1980) (revised law); State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 
631, 637 (Iowa 1968). 
247. See text accompanying notes 232-42 supra. 
248. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE. L. REV. 239 (1980). 
249. State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 1968). 
250. See text accompanying notes 219-28 supra. 
251. IOWA CODE § 709.4(5) (1979). 
252. [d. §§ 232.8-.45. 
253. [d. § 709.4(3). 
254. [d. § 709.3(2). 
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The principle under the pre-revised lawlliG that mistake as to a child's 
age, albeit a reasonable mistake, was no defense to a charge of statutory 
rape is unchanged as to a new Code charge of Sexual Abuse with a Child. As 
explained in the Bar's Uniform Jury Instructions: "Lack of knowledge on 
the part of the person as to the actual age of the child would not be a de-
fense to the crime charged. Likewise, it would be immaterial whether the 
person, at the time of such sex act, if any, may have believed the child was 
14 [sic] years of age or older."11I6 
5. Spousal Immunity 
One of the most intriguing questions under the new Iowa Criminal Code 
is whether or not a husband can be convicted of sexual abuse of his wife (or 
theoretically, vice versa). No clear answer is apparent on the face of the 
statutell!!" in light of shoddy draftsmanship and an obvious political compro-
mise. Application of standard canons of statutory construction results in a 
literal stand-off. The bottom line, thus, is that the determining factor should 
be the apparent legislative purpose, coupled with a public policy stressing 
modern concepts of justice and sanctity of the individual instead of remain-
ing shackled to anachronistic sexual stereotypes of an age long gone by. 
Although the usual starting point in analyzing the meaning of a statute 
is the statute itself, nevertheless in this instance, it is necessary to start with 
the common law. This is because at common law a husband could not be 
convicted for raping his wife.lIlI6 Various rationales for this short sighted doc-
trine have been expounded, one of the more fundamental (albeit incredible) 
being that a wife was the property of the husband apparently to do with as 
he pleased, with or without her consent.lI!!8 Consequently, a wife was not 
considered to be a person within the protection of the early rape laws. 
The general approach in other jurisdictions has been that a rape statute 
255. See State v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 (1876) (Assault With Intent to Commit Statutory 
Rape). See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 168. See also Goodrow v. Perrin, 403 A.2d 
864 (N.H. 1979) (no constitutional infirmity via absence of a scienter requirement in state's 
statutory rape law). 
256. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 912. 
257. See IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1979). 
258. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977) and extensive authori-
ties therein. See generally J. Mn.!.ER, supra note 30, at 300; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 156-
57; Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1017, 1019 (1962). 
259. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386, 388 (1977), quoting Sir 
Matthew Hale, to wit: 
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. [1 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 629 (1847»). 
Perkins agrees, but argues that a more "modern" rationale would be that spousal rape does 
not meet the requisite of unlawful sexual intercourse, since sexual intercourse between spouses 
obviously is authorized by law. R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 156. 
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must expressly include husbands within its coverage (e.g., "Rape is having 
carnal knowledge of a female, including one's wife, without her consent").ltlO 
Absent such statutory enlargement, generally worded rape statutes have 
been held to not include a husband's non-consensual sexual attack on his 
wife.161 
This question was never decided by the Iowa Supreme Court under the 
pre-revised law. The only reference, although tangential at best, to this mat-
ter was made in State v. Morrison.IIt111 The following jury instruction defining 
rape was given by the trial court, without pertinent comment, in the opinion 
in Morrison: "Rape is the act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a 
female not the wife of the perpetrator, when she resists .... "168 
The central question then is whether the revised sexual abuse statute 
contains sufficient statutory enlargement to include husband-wife rapes. 
The only applicable mention is in section 709.4 which states that "[a]ny sex 
act between persons who are not at the time cohabiting as husband and 
wife is sexual abuse in the third degree by a person when the act is per-
formed with the other participant in any of the following circumstances 
•••• "284 This matter is not addressed in the definition of the generic of-
fense itself in section 709.1. 
An interesting twist is that section 709.1 as originally introduced in 
1975 defined sexual abuse as "[a]ny sex act between persons who are not 
husband and wife, or between a husband and wife who are not at the time 
cohabiting as husband and wife, is sexual abuse by either of the partici-
pants when he performs the act with the other participant in any of the 
following circumstances . . . . "1811 The italicized language was stricken by a 
conference committee. The import of this deletion266 is that the legislative 
intent certainly was not to exclude husband-wife rapes. The interpretational 
problem, however, is that the additional italicized phrase merely would have 
codified the existing common law. So viewed, the practical effect of deleting 
the proposed additional phrase would be meaningless in light of the com-
mon law. 
The General Assembly is presumed to know the state of the law, includ-
ing the common law, at the time that it passes legislation.1I67 Accordingly, 
260. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977). 
261. Id. 
262. 189 Iowa 1027, 179 N.W. 321 (1920). 
263. Id. at 1029, 179 N.W. at 322. 
264. IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1979) (emphasis added). 
265. H.F. 85, § 901 (1975). The genesis of this legislative proposal was the Criminal Code 
Revision Study Committee's report, which defined sexual abuse as U[a)ny sex act between per-
sons who are not man and wife .... " See Proposed Revision of Iowa Criminal Laws § 901 
(West pamphlet 1974). 
266. The italicized language was stricken in item 1 of H.F. 5682 and in item 92 of S.F. 
5603 during the legislative process in 1976. 
267. State v, Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1980); Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. 
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legislative failure to change- the common law leaves the common law princi-
ple in effect. Here, however, there is a strong indication that the General 
Assembly was not aware of the existing state of the law. Otherwise, why was 
the obvious stated in the italicized phrase set out above? A reasonable inter-
pretation is that the legislative intent in subsequently deleting this phrase 
was to eliminate spousal immunity rather than merely to "tidy up" the ter-
minology by eliminating surplus words. This deletion in section 709.1 was 
coupled with an amendment adding the co-habiting spousal immunity 
clause in section 709.4 which subsequently was passed. 
The apparent legislative intent not to exclude spouses from the sexual 
abuse statutes becomes more clear when sections 709.1-.4 are read, in pari 
materia, with sections 709.8-.9 which define the related offenses of Lascivi-
ous Acts With a Childs88 and Indecent Exposure,289 respectively. Complete 
spousal immunity is expressly included on the face of each of the latter two 
statutes. Thus, in S.F. 85, in its original form as introduced in 1975, com-
plete spousal immunity was expressly included in all three of the related 
sexual activity offenses.l7o By subsequently eliminating the spousal immu-
nity only as to the offense of Sexual Abuse, the General Assembly clearly 
intended to make husbands responsible for forcible rape (except for the cor-
responding limitation set out in section 709.4). 
Another key point in resolving this question is that the general common 
law presumption of strict construction of statutes in derogation of common 
law has been expressly abolished by statute in Iowa.271 Additionally, section 
4.3 of the Code provides that Code provisions "shall be liberally construed 
with a view to promote [the Code's] objects and assist the parties in ob-
taining justice." These dual statutory provisions aid considerably in resolv-
ing the matter squarely upon legislative intent rather than hypertechnically 
on the actual legislative result because of shoddy draftsmanship. Mter all, a 
simple additional phrase in section 709.1, ("Any sex act between persons, 
including husband and wife, is sexual abuse . . . .") would have left no 
doubt. 
With this legislative history and the underlying philosophical approach 
in mind, the following interpretation of this statute appears to be correct. A 
husband, whether or not co-habiting with his wife at the time, can commit 
Sexual Abuse in either the First or Second Degree on his wife; but only a 
husband who is not co-habiting can commit Sexual Abuse in the Third De-
gree on his wife. Thus, a non-cohabiting husband can be convicted of Sexual 
Abuse in any of the three degrees, just as if he no longer were married to his 
victim, whereas a co-habiting husband can only be convicted of Sexual 
Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 1976). 
268. IOWA CODE § 709.8 (1979). See text accompanying notes 354-90 infra. 
269. Id. § 709.9. See text accompanying notes 442-65 infra. 
270. See S.F. 85, §§ 901, 908, 907 (1975) (respectively). 
271. IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1979). 
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Abuse of his wife in the First or Second Degrees (i.e., when he does other 
aggravating acts than the mere forced "sex act"). 
The other possible statutory interpretation is that while a husband can 
never be convicted of Sexual Abuse in the First or Second Degrees, whether 
he is co-habiting with his wife at the time or not, nevertheless he can com-
mit Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree, but only if he is not co-habiting. 
Thus, a husband who is co-habiting with his wife at the time of the forced 
sexual assault can never be convicted of any degree of Sexual Abuse and a 
non-cohabiting husband can only be convicted of the lowest degree of Sex-
ual Abuse even though he has committed aggravating acts (e.g., caused "se-
rious injury") otherwise sufficient for Sexual Abuse of a higher degree.17I 
The second alternative certainly does not make sense from a public pol-
icy standpoint. It would be ridiculous for the General Assembly to include a 
non-cohabiting husband within the rubric of the lowest degre~ of Sexual 
Abuse, but then immunize him from the two higher degrees. The fundamen-
tal change occurred with including husbands, whether co-habiting or not 
with their wives-victims, at all. Once that legislative hurdle was crossed, it is 
unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended not to hold a non-co-
habiting husband also responsible for First or Second Degree Sexual Abuse. 
Several canons of statutory construction militate somewhat against the 
foregoing conclusion. Nevertheless, their consideration should not change 
the ultimate result. First and foremost, penal statutes are to be construed 
strictly, with doubts resolved against the state.278 Nevertheless, the obvious 
legislative intent should not be thwarted by giving strict adherence to this 
principle,lI74 in light of clear evidence that the legislature thought it had not 
established spousal immunity (except as to the limited circumstances dis-
cussed above). 
Secondly, because this revised statute purports to make a major change 
in the prior law (here, especially a principle of long standing) Emery v. Fen-
ton~iI7r' comes into play. In Emery, the supreme court characterized the new 
Criminal Code as "primarily a restatement" of prior law,1I78 and accordingly, 
at least indirectly, established a presumption of non-change. Accordingly, 
the following interpretational approach is used. "Changes made by revision 
of a statute will not be construed as altering the law unless the legislature's 
intent to accomplish a change in its meaning is clear and unmistakable. An 
intent to make a change does not exist when the revised statute is merely 
272. One commentator seemingly accepts this interpretation. See J. ROEHRICK, supra note 
81, at 100-101. Another's position is unclear. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 210. 
See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 908. 
273. State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970). 
274. See generally State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1973). 
275. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). 
276. [d. at 8. 
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susceptible to two constructions."Z?? Here, however, the legislature's intent 
to change the law was clear, as evidenced by the legislative history of the 
sexual abuse provisions as well as legislative action on related offenses. 
Finally, even the statutory organization of the sexual abuse statutes 
may be important. Recall that the only mention of spousal immunity is in 
section 709.4 granting immunity to a charge of Sexual Abuse in the Third 
Degree for a cohabiting husband. If the sole basis for interpreting sections 
709.2 and 709.3 to include cohabiting husbands within their coverage were 
that these two sections do not include comparable provisions, then Emery v. 
Fenton is applicable in another way. In Emery, the supreme court held that 
the pre-revised law denying bail in post-conviction relief proceedings was 
left unchanged in the revision process despite new Code section 811.1, which 
provides: "All defendants are bailable both before and after conviction,. . . 
except that a defendant convicted of a class 'A' felony shall not be admitted 
to bail while appealing such conviction [or seeking post-conviction 
relief]. "1I78 • 
Rejecting the petitioner's claim that this provision had the effect of au-
thorizing bail for class B, C, or D felons in post-conviction proceedings, the 
court said that "[i]t is unreasonable to believe that the legislature would 
impliedly create an affirmative right in one group of persons solely by lan-
guage expressly denying the right to another group."Z?S The flip-flop of-that 
principle may be that criminal liability can not be created passively or im-
pliedly in some circumstances solely by an affirmative exemption clause cov-
ering other circumstances. 
Even if this is a viable extension of Emery, nevertheless the legislative 
intent is clear that the amended section 709.1 provision included husbands, 
especially since a contrary provision was stricken. So viewed, then sections 
709.1-.3 affirmatively place criminal liability upon husbands, leaving section 
709.4 as a mere exceptions clause. 
Moreover, a New Jersey inferior court held280 in 1977 that a husband 
could not be convicted of raping his wife under a statute281 (similar to Iowa's 
pre-revised rape statute)282 which was determined to be 'essentially declara-
tory of the common law offense.18s That court examined the common law 
principles in detaill84 and correctly concluded that a husband was exempted 
277. [d. at 10. 
278. IOWA CODE § 811.1 (1979) (emphasis added). 
279. 266 N.W.2d at 10. 
280. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977). 
281. The pertinent part provides: "Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman 
forcibly against her will .... " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
282. The pertinent part provided: "If any person ravish and carnally know any female by 
force or aganst her will .... " IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
283. 148 N.J. Super. at _,372 A.2d at 391. 
284. This court observed: This common law principal appears to have its genesis in a 
statement in Sir Mathew Hale's Pleas of the Crown wherein it is stated: 
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at common law.1SO Invoking the principle of statutory interpretation that "if 
a change in the common law is to be effected by statute, legislative intent to 
accomplish the change must be clearly and plainly expressed,"288 the court 
determined that there was no statutory enlargement of the common law of-
fense. Additionally, the court recognized the general principle of strict con-
struction of statutes in derogation of common law, as well as that of strict 
construction of a penal statute "lest it be applied to persons or conduct be-
yond the [l]egislature's contemplation."1187 So construed, the court consid-
ered it immaterial that the statute referred to "carnal knowledge of a wo-
man forcibly against her will,"I88 without specifically excluding a wife-victim 
from its proscription. Because of the common law background, the court in-
timated that the statute would have had to affirmatively include a spouse in 
order for it to apply to forcible sexual intercourse with a spouse. 
This left one remaining perplexing question, to wit: "whether this court 
has the authority, power, or indeed the right to denounce and depart from 
existing law and, by [judicial] mandate, change it?"1I8t1 Although making its 
feelings clear that it rejected both the traditional rationale and supportive 
policy arguments for husband immunity, the court nevertheless concluded 
that it "[lacked] the authority to simply ignore the settled principles of law 
that bind us and depart from the common law rule because, in our judg-
ment, it is unfair and discriminatory, and thus create, with a sweep of the 
pen, criminal responsibility where none has heretofore existed."IIt1O 
Iowa's new Sexual Abuse statute is distinguishable from New Jersey's 
Rape statute, although Iowa's pre-revised Rape statute was not. As detailed 
above, the Iowa legislature manifested its intent to abolish spousal immu-
nity, unlike the New Jersey legislature. The bottom line, of course, is that 
the Iowa statute does expressly refer, albeitly inartfully, to spousal abuse, 
unlike New Jersey's statute. The exact extent of the spousal coverage in 
Iowa's Sexual Abuse statute is not entirely clear on the face of the statute 
itself, but (again as detailed above) it becomes sufficiently clear upon being 
analyzed according to the accepted standards of statutory construction. One 
significant difference between Iowa and New Jersey law in reaching the ulti-
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. [1 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 629 (1847»). 
Id. at _,372 A.2d at 388. 
285. This principle appears to have been universally accepted in the United States. See 
Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1017, 1019 (1962). 
286. 148 N.J. Super. at _, 372 A.2d at 392. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. (emphasis added). 
289. Id. at _, 372 A.2d at 391. 
290. Id. at _, 372 A.2d at 393. But cf. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979) 
(judicial abrogation of common law doctrine of interspousal immunity from tort liability). 
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mate conclusion is that Iowa has statutorily abolished the general (or com-
mon law) presumption of strict construction of statutes in derogation of 
common law. Indeed, section 4.2 of the Iowa Code mandates instead that a 
statutory provision "shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its 
objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice."2DI 
In conclusion, the logical interpretation of the sexual abuse provisions is 
that a husband no longer enjoys statutory immunity for raping his wife, ex-
cept for the one limited circumstance enumerated in section 709.4. That is, a 
husband has immunity from a charge of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree 
for an act of forced sexual intercourse with an unwilling wife with whom he 
is presently cohabiting. A non-cohabiting (or estranged) husband does not 
enjoy such immunity by express language of the statute itself. On the other 
hand, even a cohabiting husband-like a non-cohabiting husband-does not 
enjoy immunity from Sexual Abuse of his wife in either the First or Second 
Degrees, in light·of there being no accompanying immunity provisions in the 
corresponding sections 709.2 and 709.3. 
The net effect is to immunize a cohabiting husband from prosecution 
for a "sex act" by force with his wife, while criminalizing a cohabiting hus-
band's nonconsensual "sex acts" that are accompanied by severe aggravating 
circumstances. Moreover, complete protection from an estranged husband is 
afforded. This hybrid approach appears on balance to have been the result 
of political compromise between proponents of the total spousal immunity 
approach in the original bill and proponents of a total criminalization 
approach. 
The legislative judgment in immunizing a husband under any circum-
stances is open to question. After all, spousal immunity is not recognized in 
other violent crimes, and sexual violence should not be treated any 
differently. 
6. Felony Murder Rule 
The consolidation of many pre-revised offenses into the new crime of 
Sexual Abuse has the effect of broadening the scope of the application of the 
felony murder rule for Murder in the First Degree.lI92 Only Rape (which in-
cluded Statutory Rape) in this category of offenses was included as an un-
derlying felony for this purpose under the pre-revised law.lIDs 
7. Attempted Sexual Abuse 
Unlike the pre-revised Rape law,11H an attempted act of sexual abuse is 
included within the definition of the consummated offense of Sexual Abuse 
291. IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1979). 
292. IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979). See text accompanying notes 827-63 infra. 
293. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
294. See id. § 698.1. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 527 1979-1980
1979-80J Iowa Criminal Code 527 
itself-provided that there is the requisite sexual contact. This would seem 
to require actual physical touching of bare genitalia, as, for example, inter-
twining of pubic hair.11I1I Of course, the contact can be made via an artificial 
or substitute sexual organ. lee 
The crime of Sexual Abuse thus does not entirely encompass attempted 
sexual abuse within its definition. Although a "sex act"llI'1 does not require 
penetration, nevertheless "sexual contact" is required. To the extent that 
there is proof of such contact, the "attempt" is punishable identically to the 
consummated act. This, however, requires dangerous proximity to success. 
Absent the requisite "sexual contact," the act of attempted sexual 
abuse is only punishable under the general, less-serious crime of Assault 
While Participating in a Felony.IN This inchoate crime nevertheless requires 
an Assault.11III The requisite assault can occur at any time from the prepara-
tory stage to the escape stage,800 however, but must be coterminous with the 
requisite specific intent to commit Sexual Abuse.801 
This crime is the successor to the pre-revised offense of Assault With 
Intent to Commit a Felony.80I Unfortunately, there is no specific attempted 
sexual abuse crime similar to the pre-revised crime of Assault With Intent 
to Commit Rape.808 The result is that the maximum penalty for this type of 
conduct was reduced from twenty years, whether there was any collateral 
injury or not, under the pre-revised law to either ten years or five years 
depending upon whether any "serious injury"8CH was caused under the new 
Criminal Code. SOli A contrasting statutory change, however, has eliminated 
the availability under the pre-revised law of ameliorative sentencing alterna-
tives,3oa and confinement may be mandatory under the new Iowa Code. 3M 
295. See State v. Howard, 284 N.W.2d 201 (Iowa 1979), which is discussed in text accom-
panying notes 309 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
296. IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 44, which 
states: "The reference to a substitute for an artificial sex organ is puzzling. Probably what is 
meant is 'an artificial sex organ or a substitute for a sex organ.''' [d. 
297. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
298. [d. § 708.3. See text accompanying notes 70-106 supra. 
299. [d. § 708.2(2). See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. 
300. [d. § 702.13 (general definitional clause for "participating in a public offense"); State 
v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1980) and notes 74-76 supra. 
301. See State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 1968) (pre-revised offense of Assault 
With Intent to Commit Rape). 
302. See IOWA CODE § 694.5 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 
1980). 
303. IOWA CODE § 698.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
304. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 204-95 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
305. [d. § 708.3. 
306. That is, a deferred judgment, deferred sentence, or suspended sentence. See IOWA 
CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
307. This depends upon whether or not Iowa Code § 909.1 (authorizing a fine in lieu of 
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8. Incest Contrasted 
One form of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree can also constitute In-
cest:S08 viz. a "sex act,"80e consisting of actual intercourse, with a participant 
who is either 14 or 15 years old and related to the defendant by blood or by 
marriage to the fourth degree. Like all forms of Sexual Abuse in the Third 
Degree, S10 this is a class C felonysu and even more importantly is classified 
as a "forcible felony."sn 
Incest, on the other hand, is only a class D felonYS18 and quite signifi-
cantly is not a ·"forcible felony."814 Yet, Incest covers the same situation as 
part of a broader spectrum of criminalizing sexual intercourse between cer-
tain known relatives without any age restrictions as to the other participant. 
This apparently means that the legislature intended that an incestuous 
party (or parties) is to be punished more harshly for having a comparatively 
young (i.e., fifteen or sixteen) partner than for other older (i.e., seventeen 
and up) partners. In effect, this new twist creates a hybrid statutory sexual 
abuse-incest offense. 
9. Grading 
Sexual Abuse is graded into three degrees, ranging in penalties from 
class A to class C felonies. 
Sexual Abuse in the First DegreeS1 !! occurs only when "serious injury"Sl8 
confinement or a suspended sentence) applies to "forcible felonies." See text accompanying 
notes 75-102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
308. See IOWA CODE § 726.2 (1979) and text accompanying notes 345-53 infra. 
309. [d. § 702.17 and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980). 
310. [d. § 709.4. 
311. A class C felony is punishable by confinement for an indeterminate term not to ex· 
ceed ten years and a fine not to exceed $5,000. IOWA CODE § 902.9(3) (1979). If the particular 
offense is a "forcible felony," then the term of confinement must be imposed and cannot be 
suspended, and a fine apparently can be imposed only as a supplemental penalty (but cannot 
be imposed in lieu of mandatory confinement, notwithstanding § 909.1 of the Code). See text 
accompanying notes 70·102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L.REV. 239 (1980). If the particu-
lar offense is not a "forcible felony," then confinement is not mandatory. Indeed, either a de-
ferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation can be utilized as 
ameliorative "sentencing" devices in lieu of either confinement or a fine. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 
(1979). In addition, a fine clearly can be imposed in lieu of confinement or a suspended sen-
tence. See text accompanying notes 75-102 in Part I of this Article. 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
312. See note 128 supra. 
313. See note 65 supra. 
314. See note 128 supra. 
315. IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
903·04; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 208; J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 98. 
316. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979), and text accompanying notes 207-95 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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of another person is caused. B17 This refers to a collateral injury separate and 
apart from the pain of the forced "sex act" itself, although this does not 
require any separate act of violence. The general definition of "serious in-
jury" encompasses disabling mental illness818 that might accompany an es-
pecially brutal sexual assault or an attack on an especially mentally vulnera-
ble person. How protracted the disablement period must be is left to judicial 
interpretation. That it need not be permanent is clear by reading, in pari 
materia, the accompanying phrase making serious permanent disfigure-
mentB18 another type of "serious injury." Moreover, the "serious injury" ap-
parently can be suffered by any person, as long as it occurs "in the course of 
committing sexual abuse."8l1o An example of this could be a female victim's 
baby being seriously injured during the res gestae of the sexual abuse of the 
mother. 
Pregnancy, by itself, does not appear to constitute "serious injury," as 
that term is restrictively defined in the Criminal Code.821 Absent extraordi-
nary aggravating circumstances, pregnancy of a sexual abuse victim would 
neither: (1) create "a substantial risk of death,"S22 (2) cause "serious perma-
nent disfigurement,"8l1S (3) cause a "disabling mental illness,"BII4 or (4) cause 
"protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ. "321i 
Four aggravating circumstances render a sexual abuse to be in the Sec-
ond Degree,BB8 a class B felony.8lI7 Two closely-related circumstances involve 
317. It appears that the "serious injury" does not need to have been intentionally caused 
under this statute. C{. IOWA CODE §§ 708.4 (Willful Injury by act "intended to cause and does 
cause serious injury"); 711.2 (Robbery in the First Degree when offender "purposely inflicts or 
attempts to inflict serious injury") (1979) (emphasis added). 
318. See text accompanying notes 277-95 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
319. See text accompanying notes 228-65 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
320. IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979). 
321. The contrary result, reached in People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App. 3d 148, 150 Cal. 
Rptr. 113 (1978), is distinguishable based upon the ~ording of the applicable California statute 
which defines the phrase "great bodily injury" in these very general terms: "significant and 
substantial bodily injury or damage." This compares to the four specific components of "serious 
injury" in Iowa's restrictive code section 702.18. C{. People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 580 P.2d 
274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978) (mere act of forcible rape in and of itself does not constitute 
great bodily harm). 
322. IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 215-27 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
323. [d. (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 228-65 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
324. [d. (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 277-95 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
325. [d. (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 266-76 ill Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
326. IOWA CODE § 709.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
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violence or threatened violence: (1) displaying a "deadly weapon"328 in a 
threatening manner and (2) using or threatening to use force creating a sub-
stantial risk of death or "serious injury" to the victim or another person 
(e.g., threatening to harm the victim's infant unless the mother-victim coop-
erated). Equating use of serious force with mere threats to use serious force 
is inexplicable, and seems out of line with the general scheme of the new 
Criminal Code in focusing upon actual harm done. Moreover, the inclusion 
of threatened "serious injury" just about pre-empts the field, leaving little 
for the residual category of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree. 
A third aggravating circumstance occurs when the defendant is aided or 
abetted by one or more persons. This is based upon greater harm to, and 
greater fear by the victim, with a lesser chance for escape. However, the 
grading would be more meaningful if the standard were two or more assail-
ants. A prolonged gang attack definitely should be more harshly punished 
than an ordinary one-on-one, but should a single assailant and his lookout 
also ipso facto be subjected to very harsh penalties (i.e., an indeterminate 
sentence of twenty five years as opposed to ten years for an ordinary Sexual 
Abuse in the Third Degree). 
A fourth aggravating circumstance occurs when the victim is under 
twelve. On the other hand, if the victim of a statutory sexual abuse is either 
twelve or thirteen, then the crime is only Sexual Abuse in the Third De-
gree.s29 Presumably, the legislative concern was that the younger the child 
the higher the risk of physical or emotional injury. 880 
Sexual Abuse in the Third (or lowest) DegreeSS1 is a residual provision 
covering unlawful sexual contact without the presence of any of the aggra-
vating circumstances enumerated above. That is, this offense includes an 
ordinary rape of a nonconsenting adult, in addition to "sexual contact" with 
or without the consent of a person lacking in mental capacity, or with a 
"child," or with an adolescent of fourteen or fifteen years of age under lim-
905-06; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 209; J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 99. 
327. A class B felony is punishable by confinement for an indeterminate term not to ex-
ceed 25 years. No fines are authorized. IOWA CODE § 902.9(1) (1979). If the particular offense is 
a "forcible felony," then the term of confinement apparently must be imposed and cannot be 
suspended. If the particular offense is not a "forcible felony," then confinement is not 
mandatory. Indeed, either a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of 
probation can be utilized as ameliorative "sentencing" devices in lieu of confinement. See IOWA 
CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
328. See text accompanying notes 161-79 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
329. IOWA CODE § 709.4(3) (1979). 
330. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 209; J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 
99. 
331. IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
907-12; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 210-13; J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 100-
101. 
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ited enumerated circumstances.ssl Of course, these types of sexual abuse 
must not be accompanied by any of the statutory aggravating circumstances. 
For example, statutory sexual abuse of a "child" constitutes Sexual Abuse in 
the Second Degree888 if the defendant threateningly displays a "deadly 
weapon"884 during a non-consensual sexual assault. Moreover, the offense 
would be raised to the First DegreeSSII if either the "child" or a third person 
is caused "serious injury"888 during the sexual assault, apparently whether 
or not the act of intercourse or "sexual contact" was voluntary on the child's 
part. 
10. Penalty Schedules 
Considerable judicial discretion has been eliminated in the sentencing 
options available for Sexual Abuse under the new Criminal Code. Indeed, 
the options included for First and Second Degree offenses are tixed at life 
imprisonment and a twenty-tive year indeterminate term, respectively.887 No 
tines can be imposed and the options of a deferred judgment, a deferred 
sentence, and a suspended sentence are not available.88s A ten-year indeter-
minate term of imprisonment, without benetit of a deferred judgment, a de-
ferred sentence, or a suspended sentence, is prescribed for Sexual Abuse in 
the Third Degree, a class C felony.889 This term apparently is mandatory, 
but if not, then a tine could be imposed as the sole penalty.840 The sentenc-
ing judge may impose a tine in any amount up to a maximum of $5000, in 
addition to if not in lieu of the term of continement. No tines at all were 
authorized under the pre-revised law for Rape.8u 
One major change in the penalty aspects is that Sexual Abuse, unlike 
any of its predecessor offenses, now carries a mandatory term of imprison-
ment. A suspended sentence of probation was possible under the pre-revised 
law on Rape and Statutory Rape, although neither a deferred judgment nor 
a deferred sentence was. Neither of these two ameliorative sentencing op-
332. These are set out in text accompanying notes 219-28 supra. 
333. IOWA CODE § 709.3 (1979). 
334. See text accompanying notes 161-179 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
335. IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979). 
336. [d. § 702.18. See text accompanying notes 207-95 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980). 
337. A class A felony is punishable by mandatory confinement for life without parole. 
IOWA CODE § 902.1 (1979). Consequently, none of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., 
a deferred sentence, a deferred judgment, or a suspended sentence of probation) are available. 
[d. § 903.7. No fines are authorized. For class B felonies, see note 327 supra. 
338. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
339. See note 311 supra. 
340. As to the applicability of IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) to "forcible felonies," see text 
accompanying note 128 supra. 
341. See IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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tions is available for Sexual Abuse. An even more restrictive change has oc-
curred with offenses involving unlawful deviate sexual activity. For example,· 
both of these ameliorative sentencing options were available for the pre-re-
vised offenses of non-consensual Sodomy342 and Carnal Knowledge ofean Im-
becile,su but neither is available under the successor offense of Sexual 
Abuse. 
C. Incest 
IncestS44 remains as the only sexual activity which requires sexual inter-
course as an element, unlike related offenses which are satisfied by mere 
sexual contact8411 rather than requiring penetration. In other words, the gen-
eral definitional clause "sex act"846 does not apply to Incest. 
A few changes nevertheless were made in this crime. One change has 
restricted the number of relatives covered, with Incest extending only to 
sexual intercourse between persons related by consanguinity within the 
third degree, as opposed to the fourth degree under the former statute.847 
Moreover, the revised crime no longer extends to any relationships by affin-
ity, such as marriage. This restriction of the prohibited parties to "the im-
mediate family or blood reiatives00848 thus eliminates cousins as well as step-
parent-stepchild relations. The latter, however, would be punishable under 
the separate crime of Sexual Abuse,s49 if and only if the stepchild is under 
fourteen. 
Another change is that a mens rea component has been added, with the 
prosecution now required to prove that the defendant knew that the person 
with whom he was having sexual intercourse was related to him.sllo This sci-
enter element extends only to knowledge of the particular familial relation-
ship, and the defendant will not be excused for not knowing that sexual 
intercourse between such relatives is illegal. Scienter as to the familial rela-
tionship was not an element under the pre-revised statute, either on its face 
342. See id. § 705.1. But see State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976). 
343. IOWA CODE § 698.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
344. IOWA CODE § 726.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2607-10; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 587-88; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 383-
85. For a discussion of the background of the pre-revised law through the changes proposed in 
the 1974 bill, see Note, Protection of the Family, 60 IOWA L. REV. 560 (1977) [hereinafter Fam-
ily Note]. 
345. See text accompanying notes 206-18 supra. 
346. IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979). See text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
347. See IOWA CODE § 704.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
348. J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 81, at 366. 
349. See IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 232-343 supra. 
350. [d. See also id. § 726.2 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUcTIoNS, supra note 12, at No. 
2608. 
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or as interpreted. Sill This is a class D felony,8U but is not a "forcible 
felony. "8113 
D. Lascivious Acts With a Child8114 
The only change made in the pre-revised crime of Lascivious Acts With 
a Child81111 was the lowering of the cutoff age for a protected "child"811e from 
sixteen to fourteen. This change corresponds with the lowering of the age of 
discretion (i.e., legal consent) for Sexual Abuse.slI7 Consent of the child, of 
course, is immaterial. 
This crime can be committed in several ways, including the acts of (1) 
fondling or touching a "child's" pubes or genitals; (2) permitting a "child" 
to fondle or touch one's pubes or genitals; (3) soliciting a "child" to engage 
in a "sex act";SII8 (4) inflicting pain or discomfort upon a "child"; or (5) per-
mitting a "child" to inflict pain or discomfort upon oneself. These acts must 
be accompanied by the specific intent8119 of arousing the sexual desires of 
either the adult defendant or the "child" victim.seo This mens rea compo-
nent could be difficult to prove, unless the trial courts are liberal in applica-
tion of the idea of acts speaking for themselves. 
351. "Incest, as defined in the [pre-revisedl statute, appears to be a strict liability offense, 
not including any element of knowledge or intent which must be proved by the prosecution for 
conviction." Family Note, supra note 344, at 568. This authority states: 
It is not clear whether a lack of knowledge by the defendant of the familial relation-
ship is a defense to an incest conviction. The Iowa Supreme Court has dealt with the 
issue by stating that the state need not affirmatively allege and prove knowledge, and 
leaving the issue of lack of knowledge as a defense for future decision. 
[d. at 568 n.8O (citing State v. Rennick, 127 Iowa 294, 103 N.W. 159 (1905». Another commen-
tator states, "[ulnder the prior law, Incest was essentially a section of Strict Liability requiring 
only intercourse between two persons who could not validly marry. Under the adopted section, 
it appears that knowledge will be required, and therefore an intent as to intercourse occurring 
between the prohibited parties." J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 81, at 366. 
352. See note 65 supra. 
353. See note 128 supra. 
354. IOWA CODE § 709.8 (1979). See UND'ORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
913-16; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 216. 
355. IOWA CODE § 725.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
356. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 145-55 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
357. See id. §§ 702.5, 709.1. Ct. id. § 709.3(2) (age of consent lowered to 12 for more 
serious offense of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree). 
358. See id. § 702.17 and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this Article, 29 
DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
359. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
360. [d. § 709.8. See State v. Haines, 259 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 1977). 
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1. Age of the Offender 
This is the only offense in the Iowa Criminal Code which can be com-
mitted only by persons eighteen or 01der.861 This means that persons that 
are fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years old can inter alia fondle a 
"child" without committing this class D felony. Presumably this exemption 
was to immunize consenting teenage lovers "caught in the act." If so, the 
exemption paints with too broad a brush. After all, this unequivocal lan-
guage immunizes a complete stranger during a chance, brief "encounter." So 
viewed , this immunity has to be a casus omissus not intended by the legis-
lature. The alternative criminal offense in ordinary circumstances would be 
the simple misdemeanor86J offense of Assault.868 On the other hand, the 
comparable class D felonyB64 offense of Assault While Participating in a Fel-
onyB611 could be available in special circumstances where there is evidence 
that the act of fondling was coterminous with an intent to commit statutory 
sexual abuse. 
2. Marital Exception 
"Lascivious" acts with an offender's "child" spo\llle are expressly ex-
empted.866 While this exemption technically is necessary to protect an adult 
spouse from being persecuted for having a "child" bride, nevertheless it 
seemingly goes too far in certain respects. One type of "lascivious" act in-
volved infliction of pain upon a "child" with the intent of arousing the of-
fender's sexual desires. Whereas the marital exception precludes the adult 
offender from being convicted of this class D felony offense, nevertheless he 
or should could be convicted of AssaultS67 or an aggravated Assault if "seri-
ous injury" was either attemptedS66 or inflicted.869 
3. Lesser Included Offense 
There are no lesser included offenses87o for Lascivious Acts With a 
Child. This is because this crime can be committed in several alternative 
361. But see IOWA CODE § 709.4(5) (1979) which includes as one of five alternative ways of 
committing Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree a voluntary "sex act" between a 14 or IS-year 
old person and a defendant who is six or more years older. 
362. See note 37 supra. 
363. [d. § 708.2(2). See text accompanying notes 1-197 supra. 
364. See note 65 supra. 
365. [d. § 708.3. See text accompanying notes 70-106 supra. 
366. [d. § 709.8. 
367. [d. § 708.2(2). See text accompanying notes 1-198 supra. 
368. [d. § 708.2(1) (Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury). See text accompanying 
notes 56-69 supra. 
369. [d. § 708.4 (Willful Injury). See text accompanying notes 107-23 supra. 
370. For a discussion of the standard for Lesser Included Offenses, see text accompanying 
notes 619-38 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
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ways, thus not requiring either an assault or a solicitation (both of which 
otherwise constitute complete lesser crimes). 
4. Interrelationship With Other Crimes 
The proscription in this offense against soliciting a "child" to engage in 
a "sex act" is an example of a specific solicitation statute. As such, the less-
serious general crime of Solicitation871 is not applicable here.372 Moreover, if 
the solicited "sex act" is for compensation, then this offense would take pre-
cedence over the less serious crime of Prostitution,373 an aggravated misde-
meanorS74 which includes soliciting for prostitution. Of course, the more se-
rious crime of Sexual Abuse8711 would occur if the solicited "sex act" is 
completed either by penetration or "sexual contact." 
Attempted, but unsuccessful, sexual contact of the offender's pubes or 
genitals with a "child's" could constitute the crime of Assault While Partici-
pating in a FelonyB78-provided that an assault had occurred. While the lat-
ter is punishable as a class D felony,877 the same as Lascivious Acts With a 
Child, nevertheless it is a "forcible felony"378 unlike Lascivious Acts With a 
Child. Consequently, the "felonious assault"379 offense, with its accompany-
ing unavailability of all ameliorative sentencing alternatives, could be used 
for obtaining mandatoif80 confinement for unauthorized sexual activity 
with a thirteen-year old. In contrast, a suspended sentence is available for 
the lascivious offense, whereas a deferred judgment and a deferred sentence 
are barred only when the child victim is under twelve.881 
Mere exposure of the offender's pubes or genitals to a child, however, is 
not a lascivious act. This misconduct would be punishable under the less 
severe general crime of Indecent Exposure,882 and then only if the act of 
exposure was accompanied by the requisite intent. 
Merely taking indecent liberties with children, however, does not con-
371. IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 757-830 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
372. For an example of application under the new Criminal Code of the general principal 
that the specific statute controls the general, see State v. Thompson, 253 N.W.2d 608, 609 
(Iowa 1977). IOWA CODE § 4.7 (1979). 
373. IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 397-412 infra. 
374. See note 37 supra. 
375. IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.4 (1979). See text accompanying notes 232-343 supra. 
376. Id. § 708.3. See text accompanying notes 70-106 supra. 
377. See note 65 supra. 
378. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and note 128 supra. 
379. See text accompanying notes 326-345 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
380. See text accompanying notes 70-74 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
381. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
382. Id. § 709.9. 
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stitute Lascivious Acts With a Child when the improper conduct does not fit 
within the rubric of the statute. In State v. Baldwin,3s8 a conviction for this 
offense was reversed even though the evidence showed an assault in that the 
defendant kissed an unwilling girl on the forehead and put his "hand down 
the front of her shirt."884 The case was charged and prosecuted on the only 
possible basis of solicitation of a child to engage in a "sex act"-in light of 
there being no evidence of touching her genitals or of inflicting pain or dis-
comfort upon her. The supreme court pointed out that the human breast is 
not one of the specifically-enumerated bodily parts within the statutory def-
inition of "sex act" and held that the term "genitalia" (being limited only to 
the reproductive organs)881i within the definition of "sex act" does not in-
clude a human breast. In such situations, the offense of Assault,3S8 a simple 
misdemeanor,887 clearly occurs. Whether or not this course of conduct would 
constitute the much more serious offense of Assault While Participating in a 
Felony,8SS a class D felony8811 and a "forcible felony,"8110 is an open question. 
5. Grading and Sentencing Options 
As a class D felony,8111 this crime carries a maximum penalty of an inde-
terminate term of five years imprisonment and a fine of up to $5,000. These 
maxima are the same as those under the pre-revised law.8l1s Nevertheless, 
one major change was made. 
Because this crime is riot a "forcible felony,"8118 a deferred judgment or 
a deferred sentence is a sentencing alternative, except in cases in which the 
child is twelve or under.894 This means that a deferred judgment is available 
only when a thirteen year old child is involved since a "lascivious act" with a 
fourteen year old is not a crime. This limited distinction seems unnecessary. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the criminal activity, it appears unwise to 
authorize a deferred judgment under any circumstances. Indeed, a sus-
pended sentence is available under all circumstances and thus is an ade-
quate ameliorative provision. Legislative oversight is the probable explana-
tion for the twelve to thirteen age dichotomy. The provision barring a 
deferred judgment for lascivious acts with a child of twelve or under is a 
383. 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980). 
384. Id. at 339. 
385. Id. at 340. 
386. IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979). 
387. See note 37 supra. 
388. IOWA CODE § 708.5 (1979). 
389. See note 65 supra. 
390. See notes 180-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
391. See note 65 supra. 
392. See IOWA CODE § 725.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
393. See notes 180-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV: 239 (1980). 
394. See IOWA CODE § 907.3(I)(a) (1979). 
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carryover from the pre-revised sentencing law,31111 whereas the pre-revised 
statute on Lascivious Acts With a Child encompassed children through the 
age of fifteen. 396 
E. Prostitution and Related Offenses 
1. Prostitution 
Prostitution8117 has been defined in the new Criminal Code as selling or 
purchasing services as a partner in a "sex act,"3I1S or offering (i.e., attempt-
ing) to do so. The new definition has resulted in sev~ral changes in this 
laW.SIlIl 
The former female-only4°o crime of Prostitution has been extended not 
only to male customers, but also to male prostitutes and homosexual prosti-
tution.401 The concept of prostitution has also been expanded with the pro-
hibited activity consisting of participation in a "sex act" which includes 
"sexual intercourse and certain sodomitic and homosexual activities"402 (but 
not masturbation by hand)408_in other words, "most of the more active per-
versions."404 The applicable terminology of "carnal knowledge" and "lewd-
ness" in the former statutes4011 was much narrower in being limited to sexual 
intercourse and thus did not include deviate sex. On the other hand, the 
newly defined crime of Prostitution clearly is limited on its face to pecuniary 
type prostitution.406 
This statute also encompasses soliciting done directly by the prostitute 
herself or himself,407 but not solicitation done by a third party. The latter 
situation is included in the more serious separate offense of Pimping,40S as 
395. See id. § 789A.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
396. See id. § 725.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
397. IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2501-03; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 561-63; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 392-
96. 
398. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying note 246 supra. 
399. See IOWA CODE §§ 724.1-.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
400. See State v. Gardner, 174 Iowa 748,156 N.W. 747 (1916) (men could not be guilty of 
prostitution, but could be guilty of resorting to a house of ill fame for purposes of lewdness, 
under the forerunner to the since repealed IOWA CODE § 724.1 (1977». 
401. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 563. 
402. State ex reI. Clemens v. Toneca, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Iowa 1978). 
403. 1d. 
404. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 563, at 141. 
405. See IOWA CODE §§ 724.1-.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
406. C{. State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1974) (nonpecuniary promiscuity included 
in common law meaning of prostitution); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1976) Uudicial 
gloss limiting Iowa's statute to prostitution for pecuniary gain). 
407. See State v. Walton, 195 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1972) (former IOWA CODE § 724.2 (1977), 
applied to solicitations made directly by prostitute and not to those just by third parties). 
408. IOWA CODE § 725.2 (1979). 
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discussed below.40B Of course, any act of solicitation must proceed from the 
prostitute to an intended patron, rather than from a potential patron (albeit 
an undercover agent) to the prostitute, in order for the prostitute to be pun-
ished.410 Under the revised Code, however, a solicitation via an offer to 
purchase a "sex act" made by a patron makes the patron guilty of the of-
fense of Prostitution itself. 
Prostitution is an aggravated misdemeanor.4l1 This penalty compares 
favorably to the pre-revised felony. Nevertheless, the penalty level still is 
ridiculously high for a "victimless crime," especially in light of one grade of 
Involuntary Manslaughter4lll also being an aggravated misdemeanor. Equat-
ing recklessly causing the death of a person with a male soliciting a decoy 
"prostitute" or even a prostitute actually plying her trade is totally beyond 
reason. 
2. Pimping 
The new crime of Pimping413 attaches, inter alia, to third party solicita-
tion of patrons for a prostitute or to a third party knowingly sharing in the 
earnings of a prostitute. This crime can also be committed by knowingly'14 
furnishing a place to be used for prostitution, whether or not for compensa-
tion. The breadth of this provision is evident in this comment by Professor 
Yeager: "A bar owner or bartender who permits prostitutes to solicit cus-
tomers on the premises furnishes a place to be used for an act of prostitu-
tion, since the mere soliciting is such an act."4111 
This provision does not make sense when viewed in the context of the 
entire Code chapter on Prostitution. Pimping is a "non-forcible"418 class D 
felony;U7 whereas Prostitution is only an aggravated misdemeanor.418 One 
plausible explanation for treating soliciting by a pimp more harshly than 
direct soliciting by the prostitute is that the pimp "is not only furthering 
409. See text accompanying notes 413-21 infra. 
410. State v. Walker, 247 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1976). 
411. See note 63 supra. 
412. See IOWA CODE § 707.5(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 915-36 infra. 
413. IOWA CODE § 725.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2504-08; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 564. 
414. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 230 and text accompanying 
notes 572-601 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
415. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 564. 
416. A non-forcible felony is subject to a full range of ameliorative sentencing alternatives 
(i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) in lieu of 
the prescribed confinement or fine. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). Moreover, it appears than 
whenever neither a deferred judgment nor a deferred sentence is granted (and thus a sentence 
is imposed) a fine can be the sole sentence instead of confinement or a suspended sentence. See 
IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this Article, 29 
DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
417. See note 65 supra. 
418. See note 63 supra. 
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the prohibited activity, but is also victimizing the prostitute."4l9 However, 
an unanswered question remains regarding how a cooperative bartender 
"victimizes the prostitute," so long as he is not getting his cut. A more logi-
cal crime to bring the bartender's non-compensated activity within the ru-
bric of the law would be Leasing Premises for Prostitution,420 which is 
merely a serious misdemeanor."l 
3. Pandering 
The gist of the newly constituted and renamed crime of Pandering422 is 
recruiting "prostitutes," .. a maintaining a "brothel,""· or "knowingly"·25 
sharing in the income of a brothel.42l1.l As such, it combines several former 
statutes4ll8 into one crime with a uniform penalty, a "non-forcible"4I? class D 
felony.418 One change has eliminated any age restrictions in defining the 
crime or in grading the penalty upward when minors are involved. The po-
tential breadth of this crime is evident in the feasible observation by Profes-
sor Yeager that Pandering could be applied to "a landlord who rents prem-
ises with the knowledge that the tenant is keeping a brothel, particularly 
when he is collecting rent which would be considered grossly excessive if the 
premises were being put to any lawful use. "419 
4. Leasing Premises for Prostitution 
Two changes were made to the statutory forerunner48o to the crime of 
Leasing Premises for Prostitution.481 One involves broadening of the place 
covered from a "house" under the former statute to "premises," defined as 
any building, boat, trailer, or other place offering shelter or seclusion. The 
principal change, however, as explained by Professor Yeager, is that "this 
section places the duty to act on the landlord as soon as he is aware of the 
419. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 564. 
420. IOWA CODE § 725.4 (1979). See text accompanying notes 397-412 supra. 
421. See note 40 supra. 
422. IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 565. 
423. [d. § 702.15. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 42. 
424. [d. § 702.4. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 25. 
425. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 230, and text accompanying 
notes 572-601 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
425.1. This crime "does not apply to one who recruits active prostitutes to work in a 
particular brothel or elsewhere." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 565. 
426. See IOWA CODE §§ 724.3, .7, .9-.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
427. See note 416 supra. 
428. See note 65 supra. 
429. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 565. 
430. See IOWA CODE § 724.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
431. IOWA CODE § 725.4 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 566. 
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use of the premises [for prostitution], and also requires him to be alert to 
signs that the premises are being used for prostitution. "482 As already noted, 
this is a serious misdemeanor. 488 
F. Detention in a Brothel484 
This is an obscure offense which, although it is included in the chapter 
on Sexual Abuse and related offenses, nevertheless actually is an aggravated 
form of False Imprisonment48G arising out of involuntary prostitution.488 
This crime can be committed in either of two ways, both equally punishable 
as a "non-forcible"487 class C felony.48s One form includes: (1) using force, 
intimidation, or false pretense (2) to entice another person (3) who is not a 
"prostitute"4S9 (4) to enter a "brothel"440 (5) with the intent to cause that 
person to become an inmate thereof. The other alternative consists of: (1) 
detaining another person whether a "prostitute" or not, (2) in a "brothel," 
(3) against his or her will, (4) with the intent that the person engage in 
prostitution therein. Both modes thus are specific intent crimes, and both 
apply to detention of males for prostitution in light of the neutral or 
genderless statutory definition of "prostitution. "441 
G. Indecent Exposure 
The crime of Indecent Exposure44Z was resurrected in the new Criminal 
Code, after its predecessor version448 had been voided for vagueness in 
1974.444 The actus reus of the revised crime can consist, in the alternative, of 
either (la) exposure of one's genitals or pubes to another person other than 
one's spouse or (lb) commission of a "sex act"44G in the presence or view of a 
432. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 566. See J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, 
which states: "[lIt appears that the failure to terminate will provide a presumption of allowance 
or knowing continuation." Id. at 352. 
433. See note 40 supra. 
434. IOWA CODE § 709.7 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 215. There 
are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this offense. See note 12 supra. 
435. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 215. 
436. See IOWA CODE §§ 702.15, 725.1 (1979). 
437. See note 416 supra. 
438. See note 311 supra. 
439. See IOWA CODE § 702.15 (1979); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 42. 
440. See IOWA CODE § 702.4 (1979); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 25. 
441. See text accompanying notes 397-412 supra. 
442. IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
917-18; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 217. 
443. IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
444. State v. Kueny, 215 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1974). 
445. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980), and note 246 supra. 
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third person;H8 with the additional dual mens rea elements of both (2) in-
tending to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either party and (3) know-
ing (or having reasonable basis for knowing) that such conduct is offensive 
to the viewer.44? Indecent exposure thus is essentially a visual assault crime. 
This new statutory version should pass constitutional scrutiny. Its pred-
ecessor had made it a crime for any person to "designedly make an open and 
indecent or obscene exposure of his or her person,448 without defining "inde-
cent" or statutorily providing any "descriptions of proscribed ultimate crim-
inal conduct."449 Voiding the pre-revised statute, the Iowa Supreme Court 
considered the above quoted statutory language to be "so indefinite and un-
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence are given inadequate notice as 
to what conduct is thereby prohibited."4I10 Moreover, the supreme court saw 
"no plausible basis upon which peace officers, judges or juries may reasona-
bly ascertain, with any degree of certainty, guidelines essential to a determi-
nation of the legislatively intended application of the statute here in ques-
tion. "4111 All doubt should be removed in the new statutory version, 
especially with the statutory definition of "sex act."4112 
1. Mens Rea 
The scope of the prohibited activity under this section is restricted 
drastically by the dual particularized mens rea components. For example, an 
entertainer in an establishment with a liquor or beer license who performs 
acts prohibited under the section on Public Indecent Exposure4118 cannot be 
punished for Indecent Exposure in the face of the element of being offensive 
to the viewer. Moreover, a strip-in protest demonstration has already been 
held under the predecessor statute as not constituting Indecent Exposure 
because of the intent not being to arouse sexual desires of either party.4114 
Likewise, either a drunk urinating in public or a "mooner" certainly should 
446. Note that the marital exception does not apply to this second alternative. See UNI-
FORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 918. 
447. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 917 (definition of Indecent 
Exposure), 918 (elements). 
448. IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
449. State v. Kueny, 215 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 1974). 
450. Id. at 219. The court pointed out that its earlier interpretations of section 725.1 had 
not dealt with "facial constitutional construction," but instead with applicability of section 
725.1 to specific conduct. See State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 923 (1971) (disrobing at public meeting as a means of social protest); State v. Mitchell, 149 
Iowa 362, 128 N.W. 378 (1910) (conspiracy to induce virtuous females to meet males with intent 
to cause them to commit adultery and lewdness and to become prostitutes). 
451. Id. 
452. See IOWA CODE § 702.17 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980), and note 246 supra. 
453. See id. § 728.5. 
454. State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970). 
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know that his despicable conduct would be offensive to any viewer, intended 
or not, but certainly nobody's sexual desires 3hould be aroused.4I11 On the 
other hand, public nudity while not per se being criminalized4l8 nevertheless 
under certain circumstances might come within the rubric of Indecent Expo-
sure. Finally, the prosecution will, of course, have to prove intentional expo-
sure as opposed to careless disrobing in the public view, as where a neighbor 
or passerby sees what appears to be an exhibitionist in front of a window in 
his or her own residence.4I7 . 
2. Relationship to Other Crime 
The gravamen of this offense is exposure of one's own genitals or pubes. 
If the actus reus consists instead of fondling or touching the genitals or pu-
bes of another, then, of course, this crime does not occur. Rather, this would 
constitute the crime of Lascivious Acts With a Child4118 if done so with the 
requisite sexual desire, intent and with a victim under fourteen. The crime 
would either be simple Assault4l9 or Assault While Participating in a Fel-
ony480 (i.e., attempted Sexual Abuse),481 depending upon the surrounding 
circumstances, if either of these two requisites is missing. Of course, if the 
defendant's pubes or genitals actually touch the victim's pubes or genitals, 
the extremely more serious crime of Sexual Abuse482 would be complete 
even without penetration. 
Unlike the offenses of Sexual Abuse and Lascivious Acts With a Child, 
this crime does not make special provision for children. That is, exposing 
oneself to a "child"488 (e.g., a thirteen year old) is not per se a crime. In 
order to make this conduct punishable, it may be necessary to create a doc-
trine of implied offensiveness similar to implied consent under the statutory 
sexual abuse (Statutory Rape) provision. Otherwise, what if a "worldly" 
thirteen year old girl encourages a male flasher and thus is not at all of-
fended by his performance? To avoid a possible casus omissus, an amend-
ment making exposure to a minor an express way of committing this crime 
would be in order. Alternatively, the crime of Lascivious Acts With a Child 
could be amended to include exposure of one's genitals or pubes to a child. 
455. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
456. "Exposure per se is not prohibited by § 709.9." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 
12, § 217. 
457. See State v. Perry, 224 Minn. 346, 28 N.W.2d 851 (1947). 
458. See IOWA CODE § 709.8 (1979) and text accompanying notes 354-90 supra. 
459. See id. § 708.2(2) and text accompanying notes 1-198 supra. 
460. See id. § 708.3 and text accompanying notes 70-106 supra. 
461. See id. § 709.1 and text accompanying notes 294-307 supra. 
462. See id. §§ 709.1-.4 and text accompanying notes 232-343 supra. 
463. See id. § 702.5 and text accompanying notes 144.1-155 in Part I of this Article, 29 
DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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3. Grading 
There is only one grade of this offense, which is a serious misde-
meanor.·" Unlike for the sex related offenses of Sexual Abuse and Lascivi-
ous Acts with a Child, a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a sus-
pended sentence are available sentencing options in all cases of Indecent 
Exposure .• S8 
H. Obscenity Offenses·ss 
1. Generally 
Three new obscenity offenses have been added to the new Criminal 
Code, joining the two pre-revised offenses which were re-enacted verbatim. 
The latter two offenses consist of Knowingly Disseminating or Exhibiting 
Obscene Material to a Minor.s7 and Knowingly Admitting a Minor to Prem-
ises Where Obscene Material is Exhibited.·s8 Like these two offenses, one of 
the new crimes-Sexual Exploitation of Children·s9-is concerned only with 
protection of non-adults. no On the other hand, the two other new of-
fenses-Sale of Hard Core Pornographynl and Public Indecent Expo-
surent-relate to adults also. A widely varying statutory standard of objec-
tionable material or conduct is included within the rubric of the "obscenity" 
chapter, including but not limited to, depiction of a "sex act,"·78 as that 
term is specially defined in chapter 728. Indeed, no fewer than three differ-
ent specific definitions of "sex act" are used in these five obscenity offenses 
collectively. Each of these specific definitions is much broader than the same 
term as defined in the general definitional clause in section 702.17, using the 
latter's underlying penetration or "sexual contact" merely as the definitional 
foundation. 
The basic specific definition in this chapterm includes both actual and 
464. See note 40 supra. 
465. Id. 
466. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these five crimes. See J. YEAGER 
& R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 621·40. 
467. IOWA CODE § 728.2 (1979). See text accompanying note 481 infra. 
468. Id. § 728.3. See text accompanying notes 499-503 infra. 
469. Id. § 728.12. See text accompanying notes 504-18 infra. 
470. There are age differences even as to these offenses. For purposes of the two offenses 
relating to making obscene material available to minors, a "minor" is a person under the age of 
18. See id. § 728.1(6). Contrastingly, a child is defined in the provision on Sexual Exploitation 
of a Child as a person under the age of 14. See id. §§ 702.5,728.12 and text accompanying notes 
144.1·55 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
471. Id. § 728.4. See text accompanying notes 519·27 infra. 
472. Id. § 728.5. See text accompanying notes 582·38 infra. 
473. Id. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296·313 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE. 
L. REv. 239 (1980), and note 246 supra. 
474. Id. § 728.1(7). 
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simulated sexual contact similar to that in the general definitional clause in 
section 702.17, in addition to digital manipulation, bestiality, and oral-anal 
contact. This basic definition is used in the offenses of Dissemination and 
Exhibition of Obscene Material to Minors4711 and Admitting Minors to 
Premises Where Obscene Material Is Eihibited.476 
A more restrictive definition of "sex act" is contained in the crime of 
Sale of Hard Core Pornography.477 Herein, depiction of the requisite "sex 
act" as defined in section 728.1(7) must involve "sadomasochistic abuse, ex-
cretory functions, a child, or bestiality."·78 
The specific term "prohibited sexual act"m is extremely broad as the 
central factor in the crime of Sexual Exploitation of Children. uo This spe-
cific term includes six separate acts in addition to a "sex act" as generally 
defined in section 702.17. 
2. Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Material to Minorsm 
The elements of this serious misdemeanorm offense are: (1) knowingly 
(2) disseminating or exhibiting (3) obscene material (4) to a minor (5) by a 
person other than the minor's parent or guardian. This provision was re-
enacted in the same form as its original passage in 1973 . .s8 
a. "Obscene." An unusual definition of obscenity is included in the 
new Criminal Code, as follows: 
'Obscene material' is any material depicting or describing the genitals, 
sex acts, masturbation, excretory functions or sado-masochistic abuse 
which the average person, taking the material as a whole and applying 
contemporary community standards with respect to what is suitable ma-
terial for minors, would find appeals to the prurient interest and is pa-
tently offensive; and the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
scientific, political or artistic value.4M 
Although this definition incorporates the Roth-Mille~8r. definition (the 
un italicized portion of the above quote) for first amendment purposes, it 
also contains two additional limiting features (in the italicized portions). 
One is that obscenity is to be determined by "what is suitable material for 
475. Id. § 728.2. See text accompanying notes 481-98 infra. 
476. Id. § 728.3. See text accompanying notes 499-503 infra. 
477. Id. § 728.4. See text accompanying notes 519-27 infra. 
478. Id. § 728.1(7). 
479. Id. § 728.1(8). 
480. Id. § 728.12. See text accompanying notes 504-18 infra. 
481. Id. § 728.2 (1979). See YEAGER & R. CARLSON. supra note 12. § 631. 
482. See note 40 supra. 
483. See IOWA CODE § 725.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
484. IOWA CODE § 728.1(1) (1979) (emphasis added). 
485. See Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). modified sub nom .• Miller v. Califor-
nia. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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minors. "488 The other is that obscene material per se is not prohibited; 
rather only that obscene material relating to "the genitals, sex acts,.87 mas-
turbation, excretory functions or sado-masochistic abuse."488 This enumera-
tion appears all-encompassing, but any activity or depiction beyond this 
listing would not be proscribed notwithstanding its obscene character under 
the Roth-Miller standard. 
b. Material. "Material" is statutorily defined narrowly to include 
printed or written material (e.g., books, magazines, and newspapers), picto-
rial representations (e.g., photographs, pictures, drawings, and motion pic-
tures), statues, and recordings.4811 So defined, this does not include oral com-
munications and live performances.4l1o 
c. Exhibiting. The act of exhibiting is quite broad under this provi-
sion, since it includes exhibiting obscene material "so that it can be ob-
served by a minor on or off the premises where it is displayed."4111 This pro-
vision thus places an affirmative duty on a merchant to keep this material 
"under wraps," especially in terms of a display open to public view. It is not 
clear whether this provision is meant to include any person (other than the 
minor's parent or guardian) who merely shows ("exhibits") obscene material 
to minors in private, as opposed to a commercial "exhibition" in a store or 
pornography shop. This provision is not limited to a commercial setting in 
light of the broad language of "any person." The gravamen of this offense is 
exposure of minors to objectionable or harmful material, and the setting of 
the exhibition, whether private or commercial, should be of no consequence. 
Nevertheless, parents or guardians are expressly exempted from the reach of 
this statute, while interestingly, spouses are not. 
d. Dissemination. The act of disseminating consists of a mere physical 
486. The concept of addressing obscenity standards to material suitable for minors was 
upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). However, as made clear in Pinkus v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), children are not to be included as part of the local commu-
nity in applying "contemporary community standards" under an obscenity statute of general 
applicability (i.e., to both adults and minors). There is no Pinkus-type problem with IOWA 
CODE §§ 728.2-.3 (1979), of course, in light of their application being limited to minors. 
487. A specific definitional clause defining "sex act" for purposes of the obscenity offenses 
appears at IOWA CODE § 728.1(7) (1979). See also text accompanying note 246 supra. 
488. See id. § 728.1(5) (1979). 
489. [d. § 728.1(2) (1979). See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (nonpictoral rep-
resentation of conduct can be obscene under first amendment standards). 
490. "The exclusion of oral obscenity would appear to be a practical one, but the failure 
to include live performances was in all probability an oversight." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 12, § 631. The anomoly of this is pointed out by Professor Yeager, in his discussion 
of IOWA CODE § 728.3 (1979), to-wit: "Note that because of the definition of obscene material, it 
is a violation of this section to sell to a minor a ticket to a theater exhibiting a sexually explicit 
moving picture, or to admit him to the premises, but it is not a violation to sell him a ticket or 
to admit him to a carnival show exhibiting the same acts in a live performance." J. YEAGER & 
R. CARLSON § 632, at 157. 
491. IOWA CODE § 728.2 (1979). 
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transfer of possession. Thus, no consideration is necessary, nor is it neces-
sary for the transferee to receive permanent possession.492 
e. Knowledge. Scienter is an element of the crime, with the defendant 
statutorily (and constitutionally)498 required to be "aware of the character of 
the matter"494 which he is charged 'with disseminating or exhibiting. 
Whether actual knowledge of the obscene contents of the materials will need 
to be proven, or whether such culpable knowledge can merely be inferred, 
could depend upon the reputation of the particular medium (e.g., magazine), 
the type of business and experience of the defendant, and the nature of the 
advertising involving the medium.4911 
f. Specific Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense496 that not 
only did the defendant reasonably believe that the minor involved was not 
underaged, but also that the minor either (a) exhibited false proof of his age, 
or (b) was accompanied by an adult parent or an adult spouse.497 Thus, a 
seller of obscene material must only make a good faith attempt to prevent 
sales (or exhibiting) to minors in order to come within the protection of this 
defense. However, the burden is upon the seller to establish his good faith 
attempt based upon the bi-partite test set out above. Strangely, this defense 
applies only to this offense and not to the related offense of Admitting Mi-
nors to Premises Where Obscene Material is Exhibited.498 
3. Admitting Minors to Premises Where Obscene Material is Exhibited496 
The elements of this serious misdemeanorlloo offense are: (1) knowingly; 
(2a) admitting or (2b) providing a pass for; (3) a minor; (4) to premises 
where obscene material is exhibited. This provision was re-enacted verbatim 
from the prior code.1I01 
The gist of this offense is the act of admitting minors onto premises 
where obscene material is exhibited. The concept of admitting is quite 
broad, including providing a pass for admittance. Thus, ticket sellers at X-
492. "'Disseminate' means to transfer possession" with or without consideration. [d. § 
728.1(3). 
493. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
494. IOWA CODE § 728.1(4) (1979). 
495. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 631. 
496. This is the only defense denominated as an "affirmative defense" in the entire Crim-
inal Code. This lends some support to the argument that the legislative intent is that all of the 
other "defenses" are to be considered differently than this one "affirmative defense." That all-
important difference can very well be in allocation of the burden of proof (with defendant bear-
ing the burden of proof only as to an "affirmative defense"). 
497. See IOWA CODE § 728.10 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 
12, § 639. 
498. IOWA CODE § 728.3 (1979). See text accompanying notes 499-503 infra. 
499. [d. § 728.3. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 631-32. 
500. See note 40 supra. 
501. See IOWA CODE § 728.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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rated movies are within the provision's proscription. Concomitantly, actual 
exposure to the obscene material is not a sine qua non of this offense.602 
Unlike the offense of Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Material 
to Minors,603 there is no exemption for parents or guardians of the minors 
involved. This means that parents or guardians could be guilty of providing 
a pass to their minor children or minor wards for entry into a place for or 
including exhibition of obscene material. Moreover, an operator of a "porn 
shop" cannot legally admit his minor child or minor ward onto his premises. 
On the other hand, the term "premises" seemingly should be read as being 
limited to commercial premises. Clearly, the legislative intent was to include 
X-rated theaters and porno book shops, and not a private residence. That is, 
a parent or guardian would not be guilty of this offense merely by having 
obscene material on the premises. A more difficult question arises when a 
legitimate business (e.g., a drug store) incidentally sells obscene magazines. 
Obviously, the manager of a drug store could not be prosecuted for the mere 
admittance of a minor onto the premises. On the other hand, such a man-
ager could very well have a duty to take certain precautions to see that ob-
scene material is not made available to minors. This could include special 
packaging as well as tight restrictions on browsing. 
4. Sexual Exploitation of Children 
The new crime of Sexual Exploitation of Children6cu was passed in 
1978,6011 as an addition to the new Criminal Code. With its focus upon "chil-
dren"l108 rather than "minors,"I107 this provision only protects persons under 
age fourteen. 
The gravamen of the offense is commercially photographing a child in-
volved in a "prohibited sexual act" or a simulated "prohibited sexual act." A 
"prohibited sexual act"l108 is statutorily defined much more broadly than 
"sexual act"l108 is defined for purposes of either of the two obscenity offenses 
relating to minors or for Sexual Abuse. Any of the following constitute a 
"prohibited sexual act": (1) a "sex act" as defined in the general definitional 
clause applicable to the entire Criminal Codell10 (and thus to Sexual 
502. "It is not necessary that the minor actually receive or observe the obscene material. 
This offense is complete when he is admitted to any place where obscene material is exhibited." 
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 632. 
503. IOWA CODE § 728.2 (1979). See text accompanying notes 481-98 supra. 
504. [d. § 728.12. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 641. 
505. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1188. 
506. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 144.1-55 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980), and notes 219-28 supra. 
507. [d. § 728.1(6). 
508. [d. § 728.1(8). 
509. [d. § 728.1(7). 
510. [d. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980), and 246 supra. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 548 1979-1980
548 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
Abuse)lIll rather than as defined specifically in the two obscenity offenses 
relating to minors; (2) acts of bestiality involving a child; (3) acts of sado-
masochistic abuse involving a child; (4) "lascivious" -type actslill of fondling 
or touching of the pubes or genitals of a child or of another person by a 
child; or (5) nudity of a child.1l8 
An offender can commit this crime either by being involved in the 
photographing itself, or by being a child's parent or guardian and knowingly 
permitting or otherwise' causing the child to engage in the prohibited acts 
while knowing or intending that the act or simulated act will be photo-
graphed for commercial purposes. The legislative intent to prohibit the re-
portedly growing business of child models for pornography magazines is ap-
parent in the limiting language in the statute itself, which refers to the sex 
act or simulated sex act being "photographed, filmed, or otherwise preserved 
in a negative, slide, book, magazine, or other print or visual medium."lIl4 
Unlike the offense of Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Material 
to Minors,1I11i this offense does not recognize a defense of reasonable mistake 
as to age of the child. This differentiation is explainable in light of the grav-
ity of the offense of Sexual Exploitation of Children, similar to the essen-
tially strict liability approach of the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Child. IllS 
This is a class C felony,lI17 but is not a "forcible felony."lIls It is the only 
obscenity offense which is a felony. 
5. Sale of Hard Core Pornography lil8 
Unlike the two pre-revised offenses relating to merely obscene material 
which applied only to exhibition or distribution to minors, and the new of-
fense of Sexual Exploitation of Children, the new Code criminalizes the sale 
of hard core pornography to anyone', including adults. The elements of this 
simple misdemeanorlilo offense are: (1) knowingly;1i2l (2) selling or offering 
for sale; (3) material depicting a "sex act";m (4) which involves either 
511. [d. § 709.1. See text accompanying notes 232-343 supra . 
. 512. [d. § 709.8. See text accompanying notes 354-90 supra. 
513. Public nudity per se is not a crime, however. 
514. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1188, § 1. 
515. IOWA CODE §§ 728.2, .10 (1979). See text accompanying notes 481-98 supra. 
516. See text accompanying notes 221-23 supra. 
517. See note 311 supra. 
518. See text accompanying note 128 supra. Because this offense is not a "forcible fel-
ony," it appears that IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) (authorizing a fine as an alternative penalty) 
definitely applies. 
519. IOWA CODE § 728.4 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 633. 
520. See note 37 supra: 
521. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-601 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
522. IOWA CODE § 728.1(7) (1979). See text accompanying note 246 supra. 
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"sado-masochistic abuse,"1i18 excretory functions, a "child"liu (i.e., under 
fourteen), or bestiality; and (5) which also is obscene under the Roth-Miller 
"contemporary community standards" test.1i21i 
The prohibited activity is sale or offering for sale, and thus mere posses-
sion itself will not be illegal-either by the customer or apparently by the 
distributor who has not at least impliedly offered hard core pornography for 
sale (e.g., in storage but not on the display for sale counter). Moreover, 
"[mJaking such material available on a non-remuneration basis does not vio-
late this section, nor does it appear that the rental of this material is 
prohibited. "1116 
Unlike Justice Stewart's imprecise, albeit perceptive, standard of know-
ing pornography "when he sees it,"lill7 this statute contains a detailed tri-
partite defintion. First and foremost, there must be a "sex act," as specifi-
cally defined in section 728.1(7) of the Code. Secondly, not all "sex acts" 
qualify, but rather only those involving either sado-masochistic abuse, excre-
tory functions, a child or bestiality. Finally, there unbelievably also must be 
a finding of obscenity under the Roth-Miller standards. This suggests that 
there could be material depicting a "sex act" involving either sado-maso-
chistic abuse, excretory functions, a child, or bestiality which is not obscene. 
6. Public Indecent Exposureli1l8 
The other new crime in chapter 728 of the new Criminal Code is Public 
Indecent Exposure, which is a serious misdemeanor.lille It is not tied to any 
obscenity standard whether for minors or adults. As Professor Yeager points 
out: "The performance, exhibition or display need not appeal to the pruri-
ent interest, be patently offensive, nor must it lack serious literary, scien-
tific, political or artistic value."1i30 In fact, he notes that this section was 
included in chapter 725 on Vice, instead of chapter 728, in the Criminal 
Code bill as passed by the General Assembly in 1976. The transfer was made 
in the editing process by the Legislative Service Bureau. The substantive 
problem with this transfer is that one aspect of this crime involves a "sex 
act" and chapter 728 contains a specific definitional clause whereas chapter 
725 does not. As passed, the legislature used the general definition of "sex 
act" in section 702.17 of the Code by using the general term "sex act" with-
out providing a special definition. The two definitions differ in that the gen-
523. Id. § 728.1(5). 
524. Id. § 702.5. See text accompanying notes 144.1-55 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980). 
525. See note 489-90 supra. 
526. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 633. 
527. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion). 
528. IOWA CODE § 728.5 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 634. 
529. See note 40 supra. 
530. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSI)N, supra note 12, § 634. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 550 1979-1980
550 Drake· Law Review [Vol. 29 
eral definition does not include simulated sexual contact in any form, besti-
ality, digital manipulation, or oral-anal contact. Unfortunately for the 
practitioner, the Code makes no reference to this transfer in the "scope 
notes" following each section in the Criminal Code. 
The subject of this offense is limited to the owner or operator of a 
premises with a liquor or beer license. The prohibited activity is allowing or 
permitting any of the following acts by performers or patrons: (1) actual or 
simulated public performance of any "sex act" upon the premises; (2) expo-
sure of the genitals, buttocks or female breast of a waiter/waitress; (3) expo-
sure of the genitals or female breast nipple of any entertainer (whether paid 
or not); (4) allowing any person who publicly exposes his or her genitals, 
pubic hair or anus to remain on the premises; or (5) displaying of films or 
pictures depicting any "sex act" or display of pubic hair, anus, or genitals. 
These very activities can legally occur on premises which do not have a li-
quor or beer license. 
The license-holder and manager thus have a duty to prevent any of 
these prohibited activities and exhibitions from occurring on the prem-
ises-whether by entertainers, waitresses or waiters, or even patrons. Of 
course, strict liability should not attach, in light of the statutory language 
"allow or permit." This does mean, however, that the supervisory person 
must take decisive corrective action to prevent recurrence of any such 
incidents. 
This section does not speak at all to the nude entertainer, etc. Because 
there is no general public nudity crime in Iowa, any criminal responsibility 
of an entertainer, etc., would have to come under the crime of Indecent Ex-
posure."81 However, a prosecution under this offense would be impractical 
because of the element of specific intent "to arouse or satisfy the sexual 
desires of either party," as well as the actor knowing that "the act is offen-
sive to the viewer.""81 
One definitional problem with this new statute has surfaced already. 
This involves what "nudity" is, when "viewed" in the context of small 
patches of scotch tape over a stripper's nipples. Moreover, the exact con-
tours of what constitutes a nipple present a problem of proof under this 
provision."88 
a. Constitutionality. The constitutionality of this section has been up-
held by the Iowa Supreme Court. In Three K.C. v. Richter,"1U the court fol-
531. IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1979). 
532. ld. (emphasis added). 
533. An example of this definitional problem can be found in a recent arrest reported in 
the Des Moines Tribune, 12-22-78, p. 23. The story read: "Magistrate George Stein Thursday 
found Diana Neubauer, 24, a Des Moines go-go dancer, innocent of a charge of indecent expo-
sure. Tama Police officer Dennis Purdy filed the charge after watching Neubauer perform at 
Bill's place in Tama this week. The dancer denied the charge." ld. 
534. 279 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1979). 
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lowed the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States6S6 in declaring 
that a state's general police power in regulating the sale of liquor outweighs 
any first amendment interest in nude dancing and that a state can therefore 
ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license program.63S Accordingly, the 
statute was upheld against the contention that it constituted deprivation of 
property without due process of law even though "cover up" compliance 
with the new regulation was shown to cost the owners "substantial profits." 
b. Exceptions. Section 728.5 excepts from its coverage "a theater, con-
cert hall, art center, museum, or similar establishment." The constitutional-
ity of this exceptions clause was upheld in Three K.C. v. Richter6s7 against 
contentions of denial of equal protection and void for vagueness. 
At first blush, these exceptions appear unnecessary in light of the prac-
tical consideration that the requisite specific intent would generally be lack-
ing in a legitimate theatrical performance involving nudity. The practical 
result of this legislation's stating of the obvious in this exceptions clause 
may be to legitimatize public nudity, in its barest essentials, in such enter-
prises as burlesque theaters and nude model encounter establishments.638 
And, of course, any of these exempted businesses can promote acts of public 
indecent exposure even if they have liquor licenses. 
III. KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES 
A. Kidnapping6s9 
The pre-revised crimell40 of KidnappingMl has been changed in several 
respects, although still essentially maintaining its common law character of 
being an aggravated form of False Imprisonment.642 The actus reus of the 
revised offense expressly can consist either of confining a person or remov-
ing a person "from one place to another" (either within or outside of 
Iowa),II4S with the attendant circumstance of knowinglyM4 doing so without 
535. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
536. [d. at 118-19. 
537. 279 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1979). 
538. A Des Moines municipal ordinance tracking section 728.5 of the Code has been inter-
preted by a district associate judge as not applying to live on-stage stripping in a triple-X 
movie theater. The ruling concludes that it is not public exposure to dance nude in a licensed 
theater in Des Moines. City of Des Moines v. Sandee Sedlacek, Polk County Crim. No. 43-
36595 (complaint dismissed 11/13/79). 
539. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 232-38. See also R. PER-
KINS, supra note 12, at 176-81. 
540. IOWA CODE §§ 706.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
541. IOWA CODE §§ 710.1-.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 
Nos. 1001-09. 
542. R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 176. 
543. "Kidnapping as defined in § 710.1 differs from the common law, and the former 
statute [repealed Code § 706.11, in that the definition no longer refers to secret confinements or· 
to forcibly carrying another out of the state." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 232. 
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authority or consent to do so. "II Without more, the crime merely would be 
False Imprisonment."' The aggravating circumstances which upgrade the 
crime to Kidnapping consist of the particular accompanying specific· in-
tent."7 Formerly, Kidnapping was not a specific intent"8 crime at all,1I4s but 
now requires proof of anyone of six specific intentions accompanying the 
actus reus. 11110 
1. Confinement 
The alternative actus reus of unlawful confinement no longer requires 
that the confinement be secret (unlike under both the former statutellll! and 
common law).11111 Requiring that the unlawful confinement also be a secret 
confinement was felt to be too limiting in the modern context.1III8 For exam-
ple, at least two of the types of kidnapping, as re-defined, necessarily involve 
acting in the open (if not even being well publicized).'I" Moreover, secret 
confinement is not required in three of the other four modes of conducting 
kidnapping, as re-defined, thus leaving only one such mode-the specific in-
tent to secretly confine-requiring the confinement to be secret. 
"Confinement" is not defined in the statutory provisions expressly cov-
ering Kidnapping. However, "confinement" is defined in the related, albeit 
lesser included ofi'ense,lI1111 of False Imprisonment,1I116 as that a person is con-
544. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
545. IOWA CODE § 710.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
1009. 
546. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). 
547. See note 52 supra. 
548. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980) . 
. 549. State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 145 N.W.2d 615 (1966) (jury instruction defining 
kidnapping as "the willful and forcible confining of any other person within the state against 
such person's will and without lawful authority" is adequate and need not add "with the intent 
either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned"). 
550. That is, the intent to hold the victim for ransom, the intent to use the victim as a 
shield or hostage, the intent to inflict serious injury on the victim, the intent to subject the 
victim to sexual abuse, the intent to secretly confine the person, or the intent to interfere with 
the performance of any governmental function. See IOWA CODE §§ 710.1-.4 (1979). 
551. IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
552. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 231 at 64: 
The common law designated certain states of mind which were aggravating cir-
cumstances, the intent to secretly confine or the intent to remove the victim from the 
state. In present day America, the intent to remove one from the state has lost much 
of its former significance, and the intent to secretly confine, which still significant, 
does not adequately cover the field. 
553. 1d. 
554. That is, Kidnapping with either the intent to use the victim as a shield or hostage or 
the intent to interfere with the performance of any governmental action. 
555. See text accompanying notes 619-38 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
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fined when his "freedom to move about is substantially restricted by force, 
threat or deception."oo7 Under the standard interpretational guide of in pari 
materia, this definition should be also used for Kidnapping, in the absence 
of any legislative intent to the contrary. Indeed, the Bar's Uniform Jury In-
structions on Kidnapping include an instruction on "confinement"OO8 which 
is "partially derived from Section 710.7."11118 As amplified in this instruction, 
the confinement can be "either in the place where the restriction commences 
or in a place to which he has been removed" and "need not exist for any 
particular length of time, as long as it is for the purpose of restricting the 
person's freedom to move about."oeo 
The specific intent to secretly confine is defined in Uniform Jury In-
struction No. 1008 as "something more than to restrict the movement of 
[the victim]. Such intent means an intent to secrete, conceal, hide, or pre-
vent [the victim's] discovery."081 
2. Other Objectives 
In addition to the intent to secretly confine his victim, the kidnapper 
may have one of five other specific intents. The intent of holding his victim 
for ranson is a carryover from the pre-revised law.oes Two other, closely-
related situations arise when a person is confined (or removed) with the in-
tent to use the victim as a hostage or-in an act of poll tical terrorism-to 
seize public personnel with the intent to interfere with a governmental func-
tion.088 The other two aggravating circumstances occur when the kidnapping 
is done for the purpose either of inflicting "serious injury"l164 or of commit-
ting "sexual abuse."080 
3. Grading 
Kidnapping is graded into three degrees. Each is classified as a "forcible 
felony," thus carrying a mandatory term of imprisonment. 
(1980). 
556. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). 
557. Id. See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCI'lONS, supra note 12, at No. 1007. 
558. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCI'lONS, supra note 12, at No. 1007. 
559. Id. See explanatory note. 
560. Id. 
561. Id. at No. 1008. 
562. IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
563. "This is apparently set forth so as to have political terrorism or the holding of wit-
nesses and judicial officers constitute kidnapping." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 110. 
564. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-95 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
565. See id. § 709.1 and text accompanying notes 232-343 supra. John Roehrick queries: 
" 'Does sexual abuse also constitute kidnapping,' since there must be confinement without con-
sent?" J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 81, at 110. See text accompanying notes 597-604 infra. 
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Kidnapping is of the first-degreell88 in any of these three situations: the 
victim suffered "serious injury,"1187 or was intentionallyll88 subjected either to 
"sexual abuse"689 or to "torture."1170 Thus, these three situations require a 
specific result of injury as opposed to the more inchoate situation of unlaw-
ful confinement or removal merely with the intent to injure. This· grading 
makes sense, as the gravest type of kidnapping is reserved for acts based 
upon injury to the victim. 
The decision to categorize Kidnapping in the First Degree as a class A 
felony671 (i.e., punishable by automatic life imprisonment) appears to be out 
of proportion. The absurdity is most apparent in light of Murder in the 
First Degreell7l1 also being a class A felony. The ultimate harm caused in 
Murder is so much greater than in a non-homicidal kidnapping. Downgrad-
ing the latter to a class B felony678 (punishable by an indeterminate term of 
25 years) as the Criminal Code bill was originally recommendedm and intro-
duced in 1974,575 would be preferable. 
The absurdity continues when one considers the infliction of either "se-
rious injury," sexual abuse, or torture separately without benefit of the addi-
tional aspect of a kidnapping. Infliction of a "serious injury," standing 
alone,1I78 is at best677 only a class C felony678 (punishable by an indetermi-
nate term of 10 years). Because the infliction of torture could very well not 
even result in a "serious injury," it's entirely possible that torture, by itself, 
would be punishable merely as Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious In-
juryll78 (only an aggravated misdemeanorll8o with maximum confinement of 
566. IOWA CODE § 710.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
1003. 
567. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-95 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
568. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
569. See id. § 709.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 232-343 supra. 
570. "Torture" is the only one of these three terms left undefined in the new Criminal 
Code. Thus, its ordinary meaning should be given, viz. "the intentional infliction of pain (ei-
ther] mental or physical." Moreover, sometimes "the manner of confinement may amount to 
torture." TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 54. 
571. See note 337 and accompanying text supra. 
572. IOWA CODE § 707.2 (1979). See text accompanying notes 827-63 infra. 
573. See note 327 and accompanying text supra. 
574. See SUBSTANTIVE CRIM. LAW SUBCOMM. OF THE CRIM. CODE REVIEW STUDY COMM., 
1002 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1974) (hereinafter cited as STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
575. See S.F. 1150, § 1002 (1974). But·see S.F. 85, § 1002 (1976). 
576. See IOWA CODE § 708.4 (1979) (Willful Injury). 
577. Willful Injury is limited by requiring a specific intent to inflict a "serious injury," 
thus excluding negligently or even recklessly caused "serious injury." See id. and text accompa-
nying notes 107-18 supra. 
578. See note 311 and accompanying text supra. 
579. IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). See text accompanying notes 56-69 supra. 
580. See note 63 and accompanying text supra. 
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two years). Finally, Sexual Abuse in the First DegreellS1 (a class A felony) is 
limited to sexual assaults resulting in a "serious injury" to a person, with an 
ordinary sexual assault being merely a class C felony. Yet, an ordinary sex-
ual assault upon a kipnap victim bootstraps this into a class A felony. Mere 
confinement or removal from one place to another should not be equated 
with infliction of "serious injury." 
The two types of aggravating circumstances which constitute Kidnap-
ping in the Second Degreell8l1 are being armed with a "dangerous weapon"IIS3 
and intending to hold the victim for ransom.lI84 The former is a new concept 
in Iowa law,lI811 and would appear to limit the new, lesser crime of False Im-
prisonmentll88 to unlawful confinements by unarmed offenders. The latter 
was the only aggravating circumstance under the pre-revised law.1I87 Being 
the product of the time of the post-Lindbergh baby kidnapping hysteria, the 
old Kidnapping for Ransom offensellll8 carried an automatic penalty of life 
imprisonment. The ridiculousness of that penalty level was evident in the 
interpretation of "ransom" as including sexual favors (albeit deviate) in 
State v. Knutson.II8' 
Kidnapping in the Third DegreelleO is the residual section, which will 
not encompass very many kidnappings in light of "the broad scope" of First 
and Second Degree Kidnapping.II'1 Nevertheless, it appears that this cate-
gory would include those kidnappings when the specific intent was one of 
the following, whether the intent was actually carried out or not: to secretly 
confine the victim, to use the victim as a hostage or shield, or to interfere 
with the performance of a governmental function. Additionally, Kidnapping 
581. IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979). See text accompanying notes 232-343 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). ~ 
582. 1d. § 710.3_ 
583. See id. § 702.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 161-179 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
584. That this type of kidnapping need only be carried out with the intent to hold the 
victim for ransom, without requiring payment thereof, is made clear in UNIFORM JURY INSTRUC-
TION No. 1005, to wit: "Where one detains another for the purpose of obtaining money from 
him or another as the price of release, whether the victim is actually released without payment 
is immaterial." See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 1005. It also appears 
that a demand for payment is not even required, although a conviction without such evidence 
could be difficult to obtain. 
585. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 237. 
586. See IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 656-71 infra. 
587. IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
588. 1d. 
589. 220 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1974). 
590. IOWA CODE § 710.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
1006. 
591. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 238. Accord, J. ROEHRICK, supra note 12, 
at 113: "This is the least serious form [of Kidnapping] and will be used where there is no 
injury, ransom or dangerous weapon involved. However, it is hard to conceive when this could 
be charged, although it is felt it will constitute a lesser included offense." 
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is in the Third Degree when the unconsummated intent was either to inflict 
a "serious injury" (when it was not actually inflicted) or to subject a person 
to sexual abuse (when the sexual abuse was not actually committed).G92 In 
most of these situations, it is logical to expect that the offender would be 
armed (with a "dangerous weapon") and the offense ipso facto would consti-
tute Kidnapping in the Second Degree. In other words, the Third Degree 
offenses would involve only unarmed kidnappers. 
4. Felony Murder Ruler,sa 
. Inclusion of Kidnapping in the classification of a "forcible felony"r,H has 
the effect of making Kidnapping one of the underlying felonies for applica-
tion of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree,r,sr, unlike under 
pre-revised law.r,M Moreover, this applies to all three degrees of Kidnapping, 
since they are all classified as "forcible felonies." 
5. Merger 
One fundamental question to be answered by the Iowa Supreme 
Court,r,97 absent any legislative guidance, is whether a defendant can be con-
victed of both Kidnapping and another offense, e.g., Robbery or Sexual 
Abuse, committed coincidental with the Kidnapping. The bald statutory 
language provides that Kidnapping occurs when a person "either confines a 
person or removes a person from one place ·to another . . . . "r,ss Because a 
victim of a Robbery or of a Sexual Abuse necessarily is confined at least 
temporarily;'99 it would appear that both Kidnapping and Robbery or Sex-
ual Abuse would lie in these circumstances. At least there is nothing on the 
face of the statute indicating a legislative intent to prevent this double 
charging.800 Iowa's Kidnapping statute is somewhat unique in its inclusion 
592. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 1002. 
593. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 12, § 71; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, 
at 37-45; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 139. 
594. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203, in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
595. See IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979) and text accompanying notes 827-63 infra. 
596. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978) (felony murder rule application to 
first-degree murder limited to underlying felonies of arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, or bur-
glary). Accordingly, the felony murder rule as to Kidnapping applied only to second-degree 
murder under the pre-revised law. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 139. 
597. In the only case of this nature under the pre-revised law, the supreme court men-
tioned but did not decide the issue in State v. Knutson, 220 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1974). But see J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 233. "[T)here is some suggestion in that case that there 
must be more than merely confining a rape victim at or near the spot where she was accosted 
and where the rape was attempted or commitied." 
598. IOWA CODE § 710.1 (1979). 
599. J. Yeager, TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 54. 
600. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 235 at 65: "Because of the wording of 
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of confinement as an alternative mode of the offense being committed. The 
more common Kidnapping statute requires moving the victim from one 
place to another.eol Two opposing views exist in other states as to whether 
Kidnapping and other offenses incidental thereto are both punishable.e02 
One view is that detention of the victim, together with any amount of ac-
companying coerced movement of the victim of a robbery or sexual abuse is 
necessarily sufficient to constitute the separate crime of Kidnapping. This 
theory is based upon "the fact of a forcible removal, and not the distance of 
the forcible removal."eG8 The opposing view is that movements merely inci-
dental to the commission of a robbery or sexual abuse "and which did not 
substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that risk which was 
necessarily present"8CM in the Robbery or Sexual Abuse did not constitute 
the separate crime of Kidnapping. These latter jurisdictions require that the 
victim be moved a substantial distance from the original scene of the crimi-
nal confrontation. 
In the absence of any pronouncement by the Iowa Supreme Court,SOIi 
this question is open. There clearly are precedents from many jurisdictions 
supportive of either position.sOII 
The better view is that the requisite confinement or removal must be 
more than merely incidental to effectuate another crime in order for both 
crimes to be punishable. As pointed out by Professor Yeager: "Unless sec-
tions 709.3 and 709.4 [Sexual Abuse in the Second and Third Degrees] are 
to become surplusage, it will be necessary to require some confinement or 
movement of the victim beyond that which is a normal incident of sexual 
abuse, and considering the severity of the penalty imposed by this section, 
the acts of the kidnapper should be required to add substantially to the 
heinousness of the sexual abuse, if this section is to apply. "e07 
Kidnapping essentially is an inchoate crime designed to effectuate some 
other purpose including commission of another crime, since one does not 
wrongfully confine or remove another just for the sake of confining or re-
moving another. For example, a kidnapper uses his incidental act of kidnap-
ping to "secure" his intended sexual abuse victim. Thus, a kidnapper should 
be punishable both for Kidnapping and Sexual Abuse only when he prolongs 
the wrongful confinement of a sexual abuse victim well beyond the period of 
subsection 3, the question will arise where the other offense is a homicide, assault or sexual 
abuse." But see TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 54: "However, it is not the intent of the 
code that all or most felonies against the person also be kidnapping, merely because some se-
cret confinement is involved." 
601. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 42, at 177-81. 
602. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 699, 701 (1972). 
603. [d. 
604. [d. 
605. See note 597 supra. 
606. See note 602 supra. 
607. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 236. 
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time of the sexual attack. Thus, two counts should not be permissible for a 
mere 15-20 minute "quick trip" into the country or to a nearby deserted 
park (i.e., within a few blocks or even miles of the original site of the kid-
napping) in order to consumate a sexual abuse. In contrast, a ten-hour pe-
riod of continued wrongful confinement of a sexual abuse victim should 
clearly warrant two counts, in light of the significant incremental harm done 
over and above the sexual abuse. For example, the victim is left anguished 
over a prolonged period as to whether she will be released unharmed or 
eventually killed to prevent her identification of the defendant. Situations 
falling in between cloud the issue, with the preferred resolution to be left to 
a case-by-case basis. The legal standard should be something akin to Profes-
sor Yeager's suggestion, viz. the kidnapping, in order to be punishable sepa-
rately, must have "add[ed] substantially to the heinousness of the sexual 
abuse"608 or other target crime. Alternatively, the prosecutor, in his discre-
tion, can always elect to charge either Kidnapping or the consummated tar-
get crime itself (e.g., Sexual Abuse).609 The open issue is whether he can 
charge both. 
Under the prevailing Iowa law as to lesser included offenses61o and the 
related principle of double jeopardy,611 multiple convictions for Kidnapping 
and another intertwined offense (e.g., Sexual Abuse) are permissible. Thus, 
an ordinary kidnapping is punishable in the lowest of three degrees if the 
objective of the kidnapping (e.g., Sexual Abuse) is not achieved. On the 
other hand, a "successful" kidnapper who actually subjects his victim to sex-
ual abuse is subject both to Kidnapping in the First Degree and to Sexual 
Abuse (in one of three degrees depending upon varying circumstances sur-
rounding the unlawful "sex act").6llI These multiple counts (and, more im-
portantly, dual convictions) are permis!!ible even though the sexual abuse 
was the sole factor bootstrapping an ordinary Kidnapping in the Third De-
gree (a mere class C felony) into Kidnapping in the First Degree (a class A 
felony). Thus, Sexual Abuse is an integral part of the charge of Kidnapping 
in the First Degree, since the latter offense (in this situation) consists of (1) 
a kidnapping and (2) a sexual abuse committed during the duration of the 
kidnapping. Accordingly, it seems logical that Sexual Abuse is a lesser in-
cluded offense of the crime of Kidnapping in the First Degree (by commis-
sion of sexual abuse upon the kidnapping victim). However, committing a 
sexual abuse upon a kidnapping victim is not required for Kidnapping in 
608. [d. 
609. Regarding prosecutorial discretion in charging, see note 1056 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
610. See State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975), 
and text accompanying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
611. See id. and text accompanying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. 
REV. 239 (1980). 
612. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.4 (1979) and text accompanying notes 315-36 supra. 
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the First Degree. That is, two other circumstances can raise an ordinary 
Kidnapping into Kidnapping in the First Degree. Consequently, Sexual 
Abuse is not a lesser included offense under the elemental test of State v. 
Stewart,618 and multiple convictions accordingly would not constitute 
double jeopardy as applied also under State v. Stewart. s" 
6. Lesser Included Offenses 
a. Kidnapping in the Second or Third Degrees. It appears that while 
Kidnapping in the Second and Third Degrees may be lesser included of-
fenses of Kidnapping in the First Degree, nevertheless one or the other may 
not necessarily be so. Thus, lesser included offense instructions on these two 
degrees need not, indeed can not, be given in all cases of Kidnapping in the 
First Degree. The law requires that a lesser included offense meet the dual 
legal and factual test. Thus, an instruction on Kidnapping in the Second 
Degree should not be given, even though an instruction on the lesser in-
cluded offense of Kidnapping in the Third Degree would be required, where 
there was no evidence in the record to show either that the defendant was 
armed with a "dangerous weapon" or that the defendant's purpose was to 
hold the victim for ransom. On the other hand, if there was sufficient evi-
dence of just one of these circumstances-e.g., being armed with a "danger-
ous weapon"-then a lesser included offense instruction on Kidnapping in 
the Second Degree should be given, but only as to being armed with a "dan-
gerous weapon" and not to the alternative basis of holding the victim for 
ransom. 
Kidnapping in the Third Degree, on the other hand, appears to be a 
lesser included offense to be submitted in every case of kidnapping, whether 
the principal offense is Kidnapping in the First or Second Degree. Being the 
residual category, Kidnapping in the Third Degree seems to meet both the 
legal and factual tests of a lesser included offense, as it would encompass the 
situations in which the enumerated aggravating circumstances constituting 
either first or second degree kidnapping are not proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
b. Child Stealing and Violating a Custodial Order. Neither Child 
Stealing8Ui nor Violating a Custodial Orders1s can ever be a lesser included 
offense of Kidnapping (in any of the three degrees). This is because neither 
offense can meet the legal test, since each of these offenses requires one or 
more elements that the principal crime of Kidnapping does not. 
c. False Imprisonment. It appears that False ImprisonmentS1" neces-
613. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975). See also text accom-
panying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
614. Id. 
615. See IOWA CODE § 710.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 620-42 infra. 
616. See id. § 710.6 and text accompanying notes 643-55 infra. 
617.' See id. § 710.7 and text accompanying notes 656·71 infra. 
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sarily will be a lesser included offense in all cases of Kidnapping (irrespec-
tive of the degree of the principal crime). This is because False Imprison-
ment basically is merely an unlawful confinement crime whereas 
Kidnapping (as an aggravated form of False Imprisonment) is an unlawful 
confinement (or removal) crime that is accompanied by several types of spe-
cific intent. The fact that False Imprisonment requires a confinement 
whereas the actus reus of Kidnapping can be satisfied either by a confine-
ment or a removal should not preclude the legal test of a lesser included 
offense being met. This is because a removal can not be effected without 
confining the victim during the time of removal. Consequently, a confine-
ment is, in effect, necessarily included (i.e., required) for the Kidnapping 
offenses. Of course, if confinement is not read into removal,61B then False 
Imprisonment is not a lesser included offense under the present standard.61B 
This is because, under such an interpretation, Kidnapping could be commit-
ted in either of two ways while False Imprisonment can only be committed 
in one way. However, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will take such a 
narrow view. 
B. Child Stealinlf20 
The offense of Child StealingeJl supplements the kidnapping offenses 
"by prohibiting unprivileged acts which are not defined as kidnapping."611 
The elements of this crime are: (1) forcibly or fraudulently; (2) taking or 
enticing away; (3) any "child"·lI! (i.e., under fourteen); (4) with the specific 
intent624 to detain or conceal such child from its lawful custodian; and (5) 
having knowledge61t1 of no authority to do so. So defined, this crime differs 
from Kidnappinge'6 by not including any of the specific intent requirements 
of Kidnapping, as well as not requiring confinement of the victim.627 The 
618. Some support for this interpretation is strongly implied at J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 14, § 241: "[False Imprisonment) differs from kidnapping in two ways, first, a con-
finement is required, whereas kidnapping requires either a confinement or a removal of the 
person of the victim . . . ." 
619. See text accompanying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
620. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 239. See also R. PERKINS, 
supra note 12, at 181-82. 
621. IOWA CODE § 710.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1013-15. 
622. Yeager Note, supra note 52, at 527. 
623. IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). 
624. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
625. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
480-509 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
626. [d. § 710.1. 
627. "Child stealing differs from kidnapping in that there is no need of proving anything 
other than that the child was taken from its parents or guardian with the intent that the child 
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gist of this crime thus consists of wrongful usurpation of custody of a 
child.slIS Two minor changes in the revised crimeS29 include lowering the age 
of the victim from sixteen to fourteen and eliminating the pre-revised re-
quirement that the taking be done maliciously.sso 
1. Parental Exception 
A major change was made in the revised crime with the addition of an 
exception exculpating parents or other relatives involved in a dispute over 
the stolen child's custody, but only when the taking was for the sole purpose 
of assuming custody of the child.ssl If neither of these two components, rela-
tive of child or specific intent of assuming custody, is absent, then the de-
fense is not applicable. The burden of disproving this defense is apparently 
upon the state. SSII 
"This section is directed at the outsider, a person having no color of 
claim, either legal or moral, to the custody of the child, who usurps the posi-
tion of the rightful custodian," Professor Yeager explains.ss8 However, rela-
tives are not exculpated completely as their conduct can constitute the less 
serious new offense of Violating a Custodial Order,ss4 as discussed below. 
2. Grading 
There is only one grade of Child Stealing. This is a class C felony,S811 but 
is not a "forcible felony."s8s In contrast, roughly similar illegal conduct pun-
ishable as Kidnapping in the Third Degree,SS7 also a class C felony, is sub-
ject to the special penalties of a "forcible felony." 
One major change in the penalty ranges has been made, however. Under 
the new Criminal Code, a sentencing judge imposing a term of imprison-
ment is limited to the regular class C felony penalty of an indeterminate 
term of ten years. Contrastingly, under the pre-revised law, a sentencing 
judge could, in his judicial discretion, either impose the ten-year term or a 
one-year term.S88 Of course, a sentencing judge can accomplish approxi-
not be returned." TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 55. 
628. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 239. 
629. Cf, IOWA CODE § 706.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
630. Regarding malice as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 549-65 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
631. IOWA CODE § 710.5 (1979). 
632. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 1015. 
633. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 239, at 66-67. 
634. IOWA CODE § 710.6 (1979). See text accompanying notes 643-55 infra. 
635. See note 311 and accompanying text supra. 
636. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
637. See text accompanying notes 539-619 supra. 
638. See IOWA CODE § 706.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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mately the same type of alternative "short" term under the new Criminal 
Code by exercising his right under Code section 902.4 to reconsider the sen-
tence to imprisonment within ninety days (and thus grant "delayed" 
probation).88e 
Because Child Stealing is not a "forcible felonY,"8.o unlike all three de-
grees of Kidnapping, the full range of ameliorative sentencing alternatives 
(i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence) is 
available in lieu of confinement. Moreover, a fair reading of Code section 
909.1 authorizes the sentencing judge to impose a sentence of a fine only, 
instead of being limited to a sentence of confinement or a suspended sen-
tence, once he has determined not to defer judgment or to defer sentenc-
ing.841 Finally, it should be noted that there are no lesser included offenses 
of this crime.84l1 
C. Violating a Custodial Order 
As noted above, a new offense of Violating a Custodial Order848 was ad-
ded to the Criminal Code to deal more leniently with what heretofore had 
been punishable as child stealing committed by relatives embroiled in child 
custody disputes,84. instead of treating them under the more serious offense 
of Child Stealing.8411 The elements of the most serious of the three modes of 
committing this general intent offense,848 as amended in 1978,847 are: (1) any 
relative; (2) taking a child (i.e., under fourteen); (3) and removing him from 
Iowa; (4) and concealing the child's whereabouts; (5) without consent of the 
child's lawful custodian; and (6) in violation of a court order fixing custody 
of the child in another. This is a class D felony,848 but of course, not a "for-
639. See State v. Wrage, 279 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1979). 
640. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 184-86 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
641. See text accompanying notes 75-102 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
642. For an extensive discussion of the standard for determining lessor included offenses, 
see text accompanying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
643. IOWA CODE § 710.6 (1979). The Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime-Nos. 1016 
and 1017-are outdated because of the 1978 legislative amendments. See note 12 supra. See 
generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 240. 
644. "The exception [in the Child Stealing section] was included because the [drafting] 
Committee felt that the penalty which should be assessed for child stealing in the ordinary case 
would be entirely inappropriate if applied to a parent or other relative who is involved in a 
dispute over the child's custody. In these custody disputes, the person so acting is usually con-
cerned with the well-being of the child, and his identity is known. Yeager Note, supra note 52, 
at 527-28. 
645. IOWA CODE § 710.5 (1979), as discussed in text accompanying notes 620-42 supra. 
646. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
647. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1029, § 49. 
648. See IOWA CODE § 702 (1979) and text accompanying notes 144.1-55 in Part I of this 
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cible felony."849 Less serious penalties apply to a parent of a child living 
apart from the other parent who either (1) takes and conceals that child 
from within the State in violation of a custodial order and without the other 
parent's consent or (2) conceals that child in violation of a court order 
granting visitation rights and without the other parent's consent. Both of 
these offenses are serious misdemeanors.8l1o 
These provisions certainly are not consistent. The most serious offense 
covers "any relative," whereas the other two misdemeanor offenses are lim-
ited to "a parent." Thus, it appears that wrongful concealment of another's 
child within the State by a relative of the child other than one of its parents 
is not criminalized. No logical reason for this casus omissus is apparent. On 
the other hand, a parent is included under all three offenses, with the key 
determining factor being whether the child is kept in Iowa or is removed 
therefrom. At first blush, the significant differential in the penalty schedules 
for the parent's wrongful act in these three roughly similar instances seems 
illogical. The gravamen of each of the offenses is the wrongful usurpation of 
de facto custody, with the mere removal of the child from Iowa seemingly 
not warranting the penalty jump from a serious misdemeanor to a class D 
felony. This approach is especially suspect in light of the evolution of the 
related crime of Kidnapping8111 from its early origins (when removal from 
the territory was an essential element).8112 No other crime in Iowa requires 
removal of the victim from the State as an element of the offense or even 
considers this factor in grading a multiple-classification offense for sentenc-
ing purposes. The harsh reality of current extradition practices appears to 
be the only logical explanation for making the removal-from-Iowa situation 
a class D felony. A more sound approach would be to realistically extend the 
practice of extradition procedures to certain misdemeanors, including this 
type of activity. 
Another apparent inconsistency is that the class D felony expressly ap-
plies to a custodial order. whether permanent or temporary in nature. In 
contrast, one of the serious misdemeanor offenses refers to "a custodial or-
der," without any qualifying language.8118 This suggests that the latter of-
fense can only be committed in violation of a permanent custodial order. 
Otherwise, the phrase "permanently or temporarily" in the class D provision 
is superfluous. If this interpretation is correct, then another casus omissus 
arises as there would be no provision covering a parent who violates a tem-
porary custodial order as long as the child is not removed from Iowa. 
In the final analysis, the whole offense seems superfluous, except for its 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
649. See id. § 702.11 (1979). 
650. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
651. See IOWA CODE §§ 710.1-.4 (1979) and text accompanying notes 539-619 supra. 
652. See R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 176. 
653. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 240. 
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one positive contribution of providing an alternative, less-severe punishment 
for parents other than that existing under Child Stealing.8114 These familial 
child-custody disputes have been, or will continue to be, punishable under 
contempt of court81111 for violation of a court's orders granting custody and 
visitation rights (whether permanent or temporary in nature). 
D. False Imprisonment 
The new crime of False Imprisonment8118 consists of these elements: (1) 
intentionally;8117 (2) confining another person; (3) against his will; (4) having 
no reasonable belief of a right or authority to do so. The gravamen of this 
offense is the illegal confinement. A person is to be considered confined, by 
terms of the statute, when his "freedom to move about is substantially re-
stricted by force, threat, or deception. "8118 
1. Substantiality 
The explicit statutory requirement that the restriction upon a person's 
movement be substantial indicates a legislative intent that False Imprison-
ment be given a stricter interpretation under the Iowa Criminal Code than 
under the common law.eIi' That is "a serious interference with another's 
personalliberty"880 appears necess8I'Y for a violation of Code section 710.7, 
as compared with a violation of the common law crime being predicated 
merely upon "any unlawful restraint of a person's liberty."881 
So interpreted, False Imprisonment would require more than a tempo-
rary, albeit intentional, blocking of another's path. Actual, prolonged re-
straint should be necessary, as, for example, wrongfully locking someone in a 
room for an appreciable time. Another example would be either to force a 
person into one's vehicle or to effectively restrain a passenger from alighting 
(either through force or through making it impractical to alight from a 
speeding vehicle), in either instance in order to shower unwanted affections 
on the other. Of course, such an encounter would constitute at least Kidnap-
654. See IOWA CODE § 710.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 620-42 supra. 
655. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 240. 
656. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1010-12; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 241; J. Miller, supra note 30, at 315-16; R. 
PERKINS, supra note 12, at 171-76. 
657. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 528-42 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
658. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). 
659. See generally J. MILLER, supra note 30, at 315-16; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 171-
76. 
660. See note 52 supra. 
661. J. MILLER, supra note 30, at 315. But cf. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 55: 
"This offense consists of merely restraining another's freedom to move about, without authority 
or color of authority." 
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ping in the Third Degree"1I if the requisite specific intent of committing 
sexual abuse could be proved. 
2. Mental State 
This is not a specific intent"a crime. All that a prosecutor has to prove 
is that the defendant intentionallYS" (as opposed to recklessly or negli-
gently)88!! wrongfully confined another person. The particular purpose for 
doing so is not material. This lack of a specific intent element is what princi-
pally differentiates this offense from the much more serious kidnapping 
offenses. 
3. Reasonable Belief 
An essential element of False Imprisonment is that the offender had no 
reasonable belief that he had a right or any authority to restrain the other 
person.888 This reasonable belief of authority is defined in the Uniform Jury 
Instructions as "whether the defendant, under the facts and circumstances 
existing at that time, had reasonable grounds to believe that he did have the 
authority or right to confine (the victim)."887 
4. Grading 
The single grade of this offense is a serious misdemeanor.N8 The neces-
sity of this offense at all, especially in light of it being a serious misde-
meanor, is questionable. Arguably more serious conduct is punishable under 
other offenses merely as a simple misdemeanor.88e For example, Assault870 
includes a battery of such a nature as to. not qualify under the more serious 
aggravated assaults.871 A broken nose is punishable as a simple misde-
meanor, whereas mere wrongful confinement without any violence or even 
threatened violence can be punished as a serious misdemeanor under this 
offense. The corresponding tort of false imprisonment is a sufficient deter-
rent to petty wrongful acts of this nature, and the aggravated assaults and 
kidnapping offenses cover any aggravated instances of False Imprisonment. 
662. See IOWA CODE § 710.4 (1979) and text accompanying notes 590-92 supra. 
663. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 485-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
664. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 528-42 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
665. Regarding recklessness and negligence as states of mind, see text accompanying 
notes 471-79 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
666. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). 
667. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 1012. 
668. See note 40 supra. 
669. See note 37 supra. 
670. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1-198 supra. 
671. See text accompanying notes 1-55 supra. 
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This leaves no significant purpose for the criminal offense of False 
Imprisonment. 
IV. WEAPONS AND WEAPONS-RELATED OFFENSES 
A. Introduction 
1. Gravamen of the Offenses 
The new Criminal Code contains multitudinous weapons, weapons-re-
lated, and weapons-aggravation offenses672 covering a broad spectrum of 
proscribed conduct constituting the gravamen of the offense(s). The acti rei 
of these divers offenses range from mere representation of being armed with 
a firearm67s to discharging a firearm.674 Incredibly, the most minor actus 
reus-that of mere representation of being armed with a firearm-shares in 
carrying the most onerous penalty.6711 
2. Types of Weapons 
No fewer than seven different terms are used in the various weapons 
and weapons-related offenses. This definitional proliferation is incredulous 
in light of the so-called "uniform" approach in the new Criminal Code. Of 
course, the broadest term is "dangerous weapon,"676 which fortunately is in-
cluded in the general definitional chapter (as is the more restrictive term 
"offensive weapon").677 Surprisingly, two other related weapons terms-i.e., 
"deadly weapon"678 and "firearm"679-are not statutorily defined, although 
both had well-defined meanings under the pre-revised law which control in 
the absence of any statutory modifications in the new Criminal Code. Three 
other statutorily-undefined phrases are likewise used in various weapons of-
fenses, viz., "pistol or revolver," "spring gun," and "any weapon." 
3. Unloaded Weapons 
The majority of the weapons and weapons-related offenses can be com-
672. See text accompanying notes 711-23 infra, as to step-up penalty schedules because 
of the involvement of weapons. 
673. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979) (mandatory minimum five-year sentence for certain in-
volvement of firearms in commission of "forcible felonies"). See text accompanying notes 692-
710 infra. 
674. IOWA CODE § 708.6(1) (1979). See text accompanying notes 797-803 infra. 
675. See note 673 supra. 
676. See IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 128-354 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
677. See IOWA CODE § 724.1 (1979). 
678. See text accompanying notes 128-34 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
679. See text accompanying notes 128-354 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
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mitted even though the particular weapon used was unloaded. Additionally, 
the weapon involved in the five non-weapons offenses with step-up penal-
ties880 because of possession or use of weapons during their commission need 
not be loaded. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that under the new Crimi-
nal Code,881 like under the pre-revised -1aw,882 the prosecution "is not re-
quired to establish that a pistol was loaded at the time of the offense to 
prove its character as a dangerous weapon in a prosecution for robbery in 
the first degree. "888 Thus, it was held proper for the trial court to instruct 
the jury that a pistol is a "dangerous weapon" notwithstanding the lack of 
any prosecutorial evidence that the pistol was loaded at the time of its use 
in the robbery. 
The particular weapon involved in the following crimes need not be 
loaded: Assault (by pointing a "firearm" toward another),884 Going Armed 
with Intent,881i Possession of Offensive Weapons,8S8 Possession of Firearms 
or Offensive Weapons by a Felon,887 and two of three types of Carrying 
Weapons.888 Contrastingly, one type of Carrying Weapons-viz., going 
armed with "any loaded firearm of any kind" within a city's lim-
its-expressly requires that the weapon be loaded.B89 Additionally, the Code 
contemplates that two other weapons offenses-viz., Terrorism (by dis-
charging a "dangerous weapon")B90 and Setting a Spring Gun891-involve 
loaded weapons. 
4. Firearms During Forcible Felonies 
The change in weapons law with the greatest impact was the addition of 
a provisionB92 setting a mandatoryB98 minimum sentence of five years for 
680. See text accompanying notes 711-23 infra. 
681. State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979). 
682. State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 145 N.W.2d 910 (1966). 
683. 276 N.W.2d at 417. 
684. IOWA CODE § 708.1(3) (1979). 
685. [d. § 708.8. 
686. [d. § 724.3. 
687. [d. § 724.26. 
688. [d. § 724.4 (carrying dangerous weapon concealed on or about person and transport-
ing pistol or revolver in a vehicle). 
689. [d. (carrying any loaded firearm within a city's limits). 
690. [d. § 708.6(1). 
691. [d. § 708.9. 
692. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
220-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 1628. 
693. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979), in which it is stated in obiter 
dictum: "Here, the obvious legislative purpose of section 902.7 is to deter the use of firearms by 
~ imposition of mandatory minimum penalties," and text accompanying notes 70-102 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). But cf. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
1628 (concerning section 902.7 of the Code) and § 1772 (concerning section 909.1 of the Code). 
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possession,s8. representation of possession,s811 display,S9S or useS87 of a "fire-
arm"S98 during commission of any "forcible felony."s89 Read in pari materia 
with the statutory ban on probation for "forcible felonies," the "firearms" 
provision means that anyone convicted of a "forcible felony" involving a 
"firearm" must serve a minimum of five years imprisonment (i.e., no proba-
tion and no parole eligibility for at least five years subject, however, to re-
ductions via both good time and honor time). This provision does not create 
a separate crime, nor does it increase the maximum penalty on the underly-
ing felony conviction. Moreover, its application is limited to involvement of 
firearms during crimes constituting "forcible felonies." 
a. Procedure for Invoking. Two requisite findings to be made beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the trier of fact are necessary before the minimum five-
year sentence can be imposed under section 902.7: "[1] that the person is 
guilty of a forcible felony and [2] that the person represented he or she 
possessed a firearm at that time or displayed or was armed with a firearm 
while participating in the forcible felony."7oo The supreme court made it 
clear in State v. Matlock7Ol that these requisite findings must be made at 
trial by the trier of fact, when it vacated a sentence imposed under section 
902.7 after these findings were incorporated in the sentencing order instead 
694. Being in possession of or being armed with a firearm means that the defendant "had 
a firearm on his person at the time of the offense." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, 
at No. 220. 
695. The representation must be that the defendant (or an accomplice) is "in the immedi-
ate possession and "Control of a firearm" which means to 
state, or act as if, a firearm were in the defendant's possession. It is not necessary 
that there actually was a firearm, or that it was shown or displayed. However, there 
must be such action or statements, by the defendant, as would lead one to reasonably 
believe the defendant did have a firearm in his possession and control. The belief 
must be reasonable and may not be founded merely on speculation or conjecture. 
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 222. See State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d 625, 
629 (Iowa 1980) (trial court's findings of fact in bench trial for Robbery that defendant "put his 
hands inside his shirt, and said he wanted money" determined upon appeal to be inadequate on 
this record to justify invocation of section 902.7 by sentencing judge, with case apparently turn-
ing on the fact that the fact finder had not made the requisite finding of fact that defendant 
had represented that he was in possession of a firearm). 
696. The displaying of the firearm must be "in a threatening manner" which means to 
"show or make the existence of a firearm apparent in such a manner as to intimidate the vic-
tim." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 221. 
697. An extremely broad spectrum of activity is encompassed in this provision-from 
mere representation of possession to actual use of a firearm. How these two situations can be 
equated for purposes of a uniform penalty is not readily clear to this author. This divergence 
certainly points up the unreasonableness of this being a mandatory sentencing provision. 
698. See text accompanying notes 346-50 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
699. See Iowa Code § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-83 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
700. State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d 625, 629, (Iowa 1980). 
701. 289 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1980). 
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of being part of the findings and conclusions of the trier of fact. 
The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended, effective 
July 1, 1980, to require a special pleading in the indictment or trial informa-
tion whenever the state plans to seek invocation of section 902.7.702 Simi-
larly, if such an allegation is supported by the evidence at trial, the trial 
court must submit to the jury a special interrogatory on this matter. 70S Of 
course, in a bench trial the court as the trier of fact would record its findings 
on this matter in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
b. Use of Firearm as Element of Underlying Substantive Offense. 
The spurious claim that the firearm provision is inapplicable when use of a 
firearm is an element of the underlying substantive offense itself rather than 
merely incidental to it was rejected outright in State v. Young. 704 "Section 
902.7 makes the use of a firearm in committing a forcible felony equally 
culpable without regard to whether proof of its use is necessary under the 
definition of the offense or merely accompanies its commission,"70I1 the su-
preme court concluded. 
c. Complicity. As discussed extensively and critically above,706 section 
902.7 was interpreted in State v. Sanders707 as applying to a mere aider and 
abettor (here, in a Robbery) who did not personally have the firearm. Focus-
ing on the language in section 703.1 that all persons involved in a criminal 
act shall be "punished as principals," the supreme court noted that this sec-
tion "deals with both guilt and punishment."708 
d. Constitutionality. Section 902.7 has already withstood several con-
stitutional challenges. One of these unsuccessful contentions went to the 
substantive content of the provision itself on the due process ground of void 
for vagueness.709 The other focus of attack has been upon the mandatory 
feature of the sentence to be imposed under section 902.7, with unsuccessful 
federal constitutional challenges being based upon grounds of equal protec-
tion, due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and separation of 
powers.710 
5. Step-Up Penalty Schedules 
Possession or use of weapons, even without causing any physical injury, 
is the basis for higher degrees of five crimes. This includes the following four 
702. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 6(6) (1979) (amended 1980). 
703. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21(2) (1979) (amended 1980). 
704. 293 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1980). 
705. [d. at 8. 
706. See text accompanying notes 398·405 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
707. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
708. [d. at 377. 
709; State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
710. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
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serious felonies which are thereby raised from class C felonies71l to class B 
felonies: 712 Burglary,713 Kidnapping,7l4 Robbery,7ltl and Sexual Abuse.7l8 Ac-
cordingly, the corresponding penalty schedule in the form of an indetermi-
nate term of imprisonment is increased from ten years to twenty-five years. 
More importantly, "armed" burglary becomes a "forcible felony"717 and thus 
not subject to the ameliorative sentencing options of a deferred judgment, a 
deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence.718 Similarly, a fine-only sen-
tence is not authorized for Burglary in the First Degree although it appar-
ently is for Burglary in the Second Degree.719 On the other hand, the other 
three aforementioned offenses are "forcible felonies" irrespective of the de-
gree. The fifth offense with weapons causing a step-up penalty sched-
ule-Interference with Official Acts7lO-involves increasing the basic penalty 
of a simple misdemeanor711 to an aggravated misdemeanor.711l1 Incredibly, 
however, pointing a firearm at another is treated merely as one of the alter-
native modes of commiting simple Assault,723 a simple misdemeanor. 
B. Possession of Offensive Weapons 
There were no significant changes made in the crime of Possession of 
Offensive Weapons,7lI4 which makes unlawful knowing possession of offen-
sive weapons by anyone except for certain classes of persons. The scope of 
the devices or instrumentalities included in the definition of "offensive 
weapon"72t1 was broadened, basically being patterned after federal laW.'lI' 
There also were additions made to the list of persons authorized to possess 
offensive weapons because of being required or permitted to do so by the 
duties or lawful activities of such persons.727 One other change is the elimi-
nation of the exception for "innocent" possession by a person who finds an 
711. See note 311 supra. 
712. See note 327 supra. 
713. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979) (in possession "of a dangerous weapon"). 
714. Id. § 710.3 ("armed with a dangerous weapon"). 
715. Id. § 711.2 ("armed with a dangerous weapon"). 
716. Id. § 709.3(1) ("displays in a threatening manner a deadly weapon"). 
717. See note 128 supra. 
718. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
719. See id. §§ 713.2, .3, 909.1. See also text accompanying notes 957-1037 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
720. IOWA CODE § 719.1 (1979). 
721. See note 37 supra. 
722. See note 63 supra. 
723. IOWA CODE § 708.1(3) (1979). See text accompanying notes 797-803 infra. 
724. Id. § 724.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 2401-04; 
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 512-16. 
725. IOWA CODE § 724.1 (1979); see UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2403; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 512. 
726. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1976); 26 U.S.C.A. § 5847 (1980). 
727. IOWA CODE § 724.2 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 513. 
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offensive weapon. As Professor Yeager cautions, a person finding what ap-
pears to be an offensive weapon should "leave it where it is and notify the 
appropriate police agency."718 
Mere possession7111 per se is not a crime under this statute, however, 
since the offender must "knowingly possess an offensive weapon."780 This 
means, according to Professor Yeager, that the offender must have knowl-
edge both of his possession of the weapon and of the offensive weapon quali-
ty, and futhermore that "proof that one knowingly possesses one of these 
permits an inference that he knows that it is an offensive weapon. "781 
The simple grade of this offense is a class 0 felony.m It, of course, is 
not a "forcible felony."788 
C. Possession of Firearm or Offensive Weapon by Felon 
This new crime,784 which is patterned after federallaw,7S11 is comprised 
of: (1) the act of either possession;788 receiving, transporting, or causing to be 
transported, (2) a "firearm''787 or an "offensive weapon;"788 (3) by a person 
previously convicted of a felony (in ariy state or federal court). It is reasona-
ble to assume that this statute, like the comparable pre-revised Carrying 
Concealed Weapons statute,7811 will be interpreted as requiring an additional 
element of knowledge740 (that a weapon was being possessed, etc.). More-
over, whenever applicable, the state will have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the offender had not at the time either been pardoned or had his 
728. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 516. 
729. Possession is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions as "the having or keeping of a 
[weapon] by the defendant. It must be a conscious possession and control of the [weapon]; and, 
he must exercise dominion and control over it or have the actual care and management of it." 
UNlFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2404. 
730. IOWA CODE § 724.3 (1979). 
731. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 515 at 129-30. But cf. UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2402 which limits knowledge to the element of having 
possession. 
732. See note 65 supra. 
733. See note 128 supra. 
734. IOWA CODE § 724.26 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2410-12; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 538-40. 
735. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-25 (1976). 
736. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2404 ("Possession"). 
737. See text accompanying notes 347-51 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
738. See IOWA CODE § 724.1 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2403; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 512. 
739. See IOWA CODE § 695.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
740. See State v. Krana, 246 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1976); State v. Williams, 184 Iowa 1070, 
169 N.W. 371 (1919), and text accompanying notes 587-91 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. 
REv. 239 (1980). See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2411. But see J. 
ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 345 (appears to be no requirement that there be knowledge or 
intent on behalf of of accused). 
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rights restored (by the President or Governor) as well as that he had not 
been expressly authorized (by the President or Governor) to handle ·such 
weapons.HI 
What constitutes a "felony" is spelled out in the Code, viz. "any offense 
punishable in the jurisdiction where it occurred by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year."'u The legislature was wise in clearly setting out what it 
meant by a convicted felon. However, the wisdom of its specific definition 
can be questioned. As Professor Yeager has noted,m a due process problem 
(i.e., of notice) can arise when this section is applied to a person whose con-
duct constituted a misdemeanor under the prevailing law at the time but 
which nevertheless carried a penalty of a term of potential imprisonment 
exceeding one year. The apparent rationale for this definition is a legislative 
decision that uniform criteria should be applied to persons convicted of a 
crime serious enough to warrant potential imprisonment in excess of one 
year, notwithstanding the felony-misdemeanor classification of the crime. 
Strangely, the legislature in this same Code raised the minimal level of fel-
ony criminal conduct to the five-year punishment level.7U Concomitantly, it 
created a new classification of an aggravated misdemeanor, which is punish-
able by a determinate maximum term of two years·imprisonment.HII Read in 
pari materia with the aforementioned definition of a felony, this raises the 
question of whether an aggravated misdemeanor constitutionally can pro-
vide the underlying felony conviction for this offense of Possession of Fire-
arm by Felon. 
Two constitutional challenges concerning section 724.26 have already 
been resolved in favor of the statute. In State v. Rupp,'48 the supreme court 
held that this statute is a reasonable regulation of the non-fundamental 
right to bear arms under the second amendment and that it is not overbroad 
by including within its prohibition those convicted of non-violent as well as 
violent felonies. A similar statute has been upheld in Colorado747 against a 
constitutional attack on including non-Colorado convictions as the underly-
ing or predicate felony conviction. The unsuccessful argument was that by 
permitting federal convictions as well as convictions in other states (in addi-
tion, of course, to Colorado) this amounted to legislative delegation to an-
other jurisdiction the power to define Colorado crimes. The court empha-
sized that the existence of a prior felony conviction is merely a fact to be 
741. See IOWA CODE § 724.27 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2411. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 538-40. 
742. IOWA CODE § 724.25 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2412; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 538. 
743. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 538. 
744. See IOWA CODE § 902.9(4) (1979) (class D felony). 
745. Id. § 903.1(1) (aggravated misdemeanor). 
746. 282 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1979). . 
747. People v. Tenorio, 590 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1979). 
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proved at trial. 748 
The United States Supreme Court has held748 that a felon charged 
under the comparable federal statute cannot contest the validity of the 
predicate felony conviction. The six-three majority held that "Congress 
could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly inva-
lid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a fire-
arm,"7110 after determining that the Congressional intent was to "focus not 
on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in or-
der to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons."7111 This deci-
sion and underlying rationale is unreasonable, especially in light of the as-
serted invalidity of the prior felony conviction being violation of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel. The same legislative-intent justification should 
apply to recidivist statutes, yet a prior counselless felony conviction in viola-
tion of Gideon v. Wainwrightm cannot-indeed, should not-be used.71i8 
D. Carrying Weapons 
The former single-facet crime of Carrying Concealed Weapons7114 was 
reconstituted into three types of related conduct comprising the new crime 
of Carrying Weapons.7li1l The three alternative means of committing this of-
fense are: (1)(a) going armed, (b) with a "dangerous weapon,"7116 (c) con-
cealed on or about one's person;7117 or (2)(a) going armed, (b) with a pistol, 
revolver, or any kind of loaded "firearm,"7116 (c) within a city's limits;7118 or 
(3)(a) knowingly carrying or transporting, (b) a pistol or revolver, (c) in a 
vehicle.760 Of course, these weapons can be carried lawfully, even in the 
above-mentioned circumstances, provided that one or more of the eight stat-
utory exceptions exists.761 The state has the burden of negating the applica-
tion of the exceptions.76J 
748. Id. at 955. 
749. Lewis v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980). 
750. Id. at 921. 
751. Id. at 922. 
752. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
753. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 
754. See IOWA CODE 695.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
755. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2405-09; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 517-22. 
756. IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 161-79 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
757. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2407. 
758. See text accompanying notes 347-51 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
759. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2409. 
760. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 240S. 
761. IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 51S-22. 
762. See State v. Baych, 169 N.W.2d 57S (Iowa 1969); State v. Burns, lSI Iowa 109S, 165 
N.W. 346 (1917); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2407. Note, however, that 
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The first alternative is basically a restatement of the former offense 
prohibiting the carrying of a concealed dangerous weapon anywhere in Iowa. 
Presumably, former caselaw dealing with the issue of concealment remains 
viable, with the term "concealed" essentially meaning "not in plain view."768 
Moreover, the revised statutory language should not change the pre-revised 
interpretation requiring proof of conscious or intentional carrying of what 
was known to be a dangerous weapon,764 although this remains merely a 
general intent crime.761i 
The concept underlying the second alternative is new to Iowa law. Con-
cealment is not an element of this offense, since it is a violation to go armed 
in any manner with the specified weapons. Note that this crime can only be 
committed within any city's corporate limits. The philosophy being that "no 
one should go armed in areas of relatively dense population,''766 with the 
city limits chosen as an effective way for anyone to identify restricted areas. 
This crime is committed if the individual is armed with a "pistol or re-
volver" whether or not such weapon is loaded. However, if the charge is 
based upon carrying a "firearm," other than a pistol or revolver, the prose-
cution must establish that such weapon was loaded. The reason for this dis-
tinction is unclear. 
The final alternative represents an expansion of prior law by not being 
limited to the operator of the vehicle.767 The weapon need not be loaded. 
Finally, the single grade of this offense is an aggravated misdemeanor.766 
E. Going Armed With Intent 
The only change made in the crime of Going Armed with Intent769 was 
to substitute the general terminology of "any dangerous weapon"770 for the 
pre-revised lengthy listing of specific weapons. The practical effect could be 
unlike in instruction No. 2407 (carrying a dangerous weapon concealed upon person), no men· 
tion is made in Uniform Jury Instructions Nos. 2408 (carrying a firearm in a vehicle) and 2409 
(carrying a weapon within the city limits) of negating these exceptions as an element of the 
State's case. This, of course, is an oversight that requires revision of these two instructions. 
763. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 517. 
764. [d. See State v. Watts, 223 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 1974); State v. Williams, 184 Iowa 
1070, 169 N.W. 371 (1918). 
765. State v. Davidson, 217 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1974); State v. Baych, 169 N.W.2d 578 
(Iowa 1969). But cf. State v. Juergens, 240 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 1976) (defendant's purpose or 
motive in carrying a knife which was not included in the statutory listing of per se dangerous 
weapons is material element of offense). 
766. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 517. 
767. [d. 
768. See note 63 supra. 
769. IOWA CODE § 708.8 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
819·21; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 187. 
770. See IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 161·79 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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to include more weapons within the province of this offense.771 
Although this crime is included in the Code chapter on Assaults, an 
assault is not an element of this crime. Going Armed with Intent is essen-
tially an inchoate attempted murder provision,772 applicable in a situation 
where there is not a sufficient overt act for an Attempted Murder charge.773 
Indeed, the crime of Going Armed with Intent even "is complete without 
any attempt having been made to use the weapon. "774 
Specifically, this crime consists of: (1) going armed;77C1 (2) with a "dan-
gerous weapon;"778 (3) with the intent to use it, without justification, against 
another person. This is a specific intent777 crime, thus differentiating it from 
the crime of Carrying Weapons,778 although the prosecution does not have to 
prove the particular person against whom the defendant intended to use the 
dangerous weapon.778 
The single grade of this offense is a class D felony.780 However, it is not 
a "forcible felony."781 This is because an assault is not a necessary element 
and thus Going Armed with Intent would not come within the interpreta-
tion of a "felonious assault"7811 in State v. Powers.783 
F. Setting Spring Guns and Mantraps 
A new crime of Setting Spring Guns and Mantraps78. appears in section 
771. However, this expanded definition still is not broad enough to encompass a starting 
pistol. See State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747 (Iowa 1978). 
772. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 49. 
773. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 872-93 infra. 
774. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, at 49. 
775. "Going armed" encompasses conscious and deliberate keeping of a dangerous 
weapon on or or about the person, and available for immediate use. See UNIFORM JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 821. The distance that an armed individual has gone from his 
home is relevant to the element of intent in appropriate cases. This is a matter for the jury, 
rather than a question of Bufficiency of evidence (for a motion for judgement of acquittal). State 
v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
776. Under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 820, the jury is to 
decide if the particular weapon used by the defendant was a "dangerous weapon," as that term 
is defined in section 702.7 of the code and in UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
218. See text accompanying notes 161-79 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
777. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
778. IOWA CODE 724.4 (1979). See text accompanying notes 754-68 supra. 
779. See State v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
780. See note 65 supra. 
781. See note 128 supra. 
782. See text accompanying notes 326-45 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
783. 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
784. IOWA CODE § 708.9 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 188; TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 14, 
at 49. 
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708.9 of the Code, partly in response7811 to the well-publicized and highly 
controversial civil liability case of Katko v. Briney.788 The elements of this 
essentially inchoate-type offense are: (1) setting either a spring gun or man-
trap; (2) which is intended to be sprung by a person; and (3) which can 
cause such person "serious injury."787 This is a specific intent crime.788 
The single grade of this offense is an aggravated misdemeanor,789 irre-
spective of whether or not the spring gun or mantrap ever is set off. Unlike 
several other offenses, this offense thus does not include a built-in higher 
penalty schedule for firing of the devices or for any resultant personal in-
jury. This singular approach has the desirable effect of avoiding double pun-
ishment for any personal injury caused by a spring gun or a mantrap. Of 
course, any resultant harm caused to a person would be punishable as a 
separate substantive offense (either as a homicide offense or an aggravated 
type of assault offense, depending upon the degree of injury and the particu-
lar surrounding circumstances). 
G. Assault 
One mode of committing the simple misdemeanor79o crime of Assault791 
is by either intentionally791 pointing a "firearm"798 toward another person or 
displaying in a threatening manner794 any "dangerous weapon''7911 toward an-
other person. There is no requirement that the victim not be aware that it is 
unloaded.798 
785. Professor Yeager, the draftsman of the IOWA CRIMINAL CODE, reports that this provi-
sion was already included in early drafts of the proposed revised code prior to the decision in 
Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
188. 
786. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). 
787. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207·11 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
788. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
789. See note 63 supra. 
790. See note 37 supra. 
791. IOWA CODE § 708.1(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
804; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 175. 
792. "Intentionally" is defined as "consciously and not accidentally or inadvertently." 
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 804. Regarding intentionally as a state of 
mind, see text accompanying notes 528-42 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 
(1980). 
793. See text accompanying notes 347-51 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
794. This phrase means "to show or make the existence of a dangerous weapon apparent 
in such a manner as to intimidate another." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
804. 
795. See IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 161-79 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
796. See State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 577 1979-1980
1979-80J Iowa Criminal Code 577 
H. Terrorism 
The discharging of certain weapons under certain limited circumstances 
constitutes one of the two types of Terrorism,787 which is included in the 
chapter on Assault in the new Criminal Code. The elements of this new 
crime are: (1) discharging a "dangerous weapon;"798 (2) at or into any occu-
pied building or vehicle; and (3) placing the occupants thereof in reasonable 
apprehension799 of "serious injury."800 Proof of the occupants being placed 
in actual danger appears unnecessary in light of the fact that the crime only 
requires that the dangerous weapon be discharged at an occupied building 
or vehicle. 
This offense is a class D felony.801 Moreover, this particular type of Ter-
rorism has been interpreted80ll to be a "felonious assault" and thus a "forci-
ble felony."80s 
I. Miscellaneous Weapons Distribution Offenses 
Six minor offenses804 relating to permits and unlawful transfers of di-
vers types of weapons also appear in Chapter 724. Unfortunately, the re-
mainder of this chapter is comprised of an elaborate scheme for the admin-
istrative function of issuing and recording permits for weapons.8011 The 
administrative procedure for issuing weapons permits was not included in 
the fourth tentative draft of S.F. 85. It was noted in the accompanying com-
mentary: "The suggestion is that such matters ought to be taken out of the 
criminal code and placed back in that part of the code which deals with the 
duties of the sheriff as such." The message did not get through, however. 
Purchasing a pistol or revolver without a valid permit (or selling a pistol 
797. IOWA CODE § 708.6(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 
Nos. 812-14; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 181. 
798. See IOWA CODE §.702.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 161-79 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
799. The phrase "reasonable apprehension of serious injury" means "whether, under the 
facts and circumstances existing at the time, a reasonable person in the position of the victim 
would be placed in fear or apprehension of serious injury." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 12, at No. 814. 
800. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-11 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
801. See note 65 supra. 
802. State v. Young, 293 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1980). 
803. See note 128 supra. 
804. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these six offenses. See generally 
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 524-40. 
805. Although the permit provisions were included within the pre-revised Criminal Code 
itself (see IOWA CODE §§ 695.4-.29 (1977) (repealed 1978», they were omitted in early legislative 
drafts. As explained in the commentary to the Fourth Tentative Draft of S.F. 85: "The proce-
dure for issuing permits to carry dangerous weapons are [sic) not included in the draft. The 
suggestion is that such matters ought to be taken out of the criminal code and placed back in 
that part of the code which deaL'l with the duties of the sheriff as such." [d. at 109. 
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or revolver to a person without a valid permit)808 constitutes the only new 
offense in this grouping. This new criminalization is wise, as a measure to 
aid in regulating the proliferation of handguns, although surprisingly it is 
graded merely as a simple misdemeanor.807 Note that this offense cuts both 
ways, by criminalizing the actions of both the seller and the purchaser. 
Thus, a legitimate handgun dealer has the duty of ascertaining that a cus-
tomer has what appears to be a valid permit for the purchase of a handgun. 
Of course, the seller should not be held strictly liable for fraudulently-ob-
tained permits. However, a seller arguably has a duty of making reasonable 
inquiry when presented with a permit with alterations on its face as well as 
a requirement to determine that the prospective purchaser and the permit 
holder are the same person. Moreover, a seller certainly would be remiss in 
selling a handgun to a person who falsely alleges to have a valid permit but 
fails to have it in his possession at the time.808 
Three pre-revised offenses8011 were changed, although not substantially. 
Two others810 were re-enacted verbatim. 
806. IOWA CODE § 724.16 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
534. 
807. See note 37 supra. 
808. IOWA CODE § 724.16 (1979) reads in pertinent part: "[A]ny person who transfers own-
ership of a pistol or revolver to a person who does not haue in his or her possession a valid 
annual permit to acquire pistols or revolvers is guilty .... " (emphasis added). 
809. The revised crime of Failure to Report Sale or Other Transfer of Firearms, a simple 
misdemeanor, is "somewhat more limited" than prior law by being limited to pistols and re-
volvers. IOWA CODE § 724.15 (1979). Cf. IOWA CODE § 695.21 (1977) (repealed 1978). See gener-
ally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 534. 
The revised crime of Giving False Information When Purchasing Firearms, an aggravated 
misdemeanor, has been expanded by specifying that it can be committed either through the 
giving of: (1) a false name; (2) false identification; or (3) other false information. IOWA CODE § 
724.21 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 534. The pre-revised 
crime was limited to giving of a false or fictitious name. See IOWA CODE § 695.23 (1977) (re-
pealed 1978). 
The revised crime of Making Firearms Available to Minors, a simple misdemeanor, is 
somewhat more extensive than prior law by applying to firearms generally (instead of merely to 
pistols and revolvers) and by "further delineat[ing] the prohibited conduct." J. ROEHRICK, 
supra note 81, at 341. See IOWA CODE § 724.22 (1979). Cf. IOWA CODE § 695.26 (1977) (repealed 
1978). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 535. Moreover, exceptions were 
added for minors to have firearms legitimately provided for recreational uses as well as for 
national guard duties. See id. 
810. These two unchanged offenses are Failure of Armed Persons to Carry a Permit, a 
simple misdemeanor (see IOWA CODE § 724.5 (1979); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
523) and Making a False Statement in Application for Permit, an aggravated misdemeanor (see 
IOWA CODE § 724.10 (1979); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 529). 
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1. Overview 
Iowa Criminal Code 
V. HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
A. Murder Offenses 
579 
No substantive change was made in what constitutes murder under the 
Criminal Code, the definition continuing to be the killing of another person 
"with malice aforethought either express or implied."811 Doubtlessly, there 
remains "one crime called murder in Iowa,"812 now defined in section 707.1, 
and "the degrees of the offense are but graduations of the crime devised to 
permit punishment to be varied according to circumstances of greater or less 
enormity characterizing the act. "818 The major change has been to expand 
the scope of first degree murders'4 at the expense of the residual offense of 
second-degree murder.8lD It appears that second-degree murder has also 
been cut back by the reach of the involuntary manslaughter provision.818 
. Malice aforethought817 remains the specific state of mind necessary to 
make an unlawful killing, murder, instead of merely manslaughter. It is de-
fined in the the Uniform Jury Instructions as being: 
A fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which 
exists prior to the act committed. It need not exist for any particular 
length of time and requires only such deliberation as would make a per-
son appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its conse-
quences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion.818 
Malice aforethough may be inferred from the intentional use of a 
deadly weapon upon the victim.818 Indeed, willful use of a deadly weapon or 
other instrument likely to cause death when accompanied by an opportunity 
to deliberate before it is used has been held to constitute evidence of malice, 
deliberation, premeditation and intent to kill.B20 These mens rea compo-
nents must be inferred by the fact finder from the totality of circumstances 
811. IOWA CODE § 707.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
703; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 132, 136. . 
812. State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 1976) (pre-revised Code). Feticide of-
fenses, which are minor offenses, are not covered in this Article. For an extensive discussion of 
those offenses see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, at Nos. 722-27. 
813. State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d at 604. 
814. IOWA CODE § 707.2 (1979). 
815. ld. § 707.3. 
816. ld. § 707.5(1). For a discussion of the application of the lesser included offenses doc-
trine to homicide see text accompanying notes 647-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE LAW 
REviEw 239 (1980). 
817. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 135-36. 
818. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 702. 
819. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 704; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 12, § 136. 
820. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758 
(Iowa 1975); State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 580 1979-1980
580 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
rather than being presumed from the mere use of a deadly weapon.821 In 
State v. Lass,822 the supreme court held that to instruct that an Assault 
with a Deadly Weapon implies malice and that a presumption of malice 
aforethought is warranted if death ensues does not place the burden of prov-
ing absence of malice upon the defendant. Similarly, it noted therein that an 
instruction that the presumption of malice "may be overcome by contrary 
evidence"823 does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant, because 
this was only a prima facie fact presumption which was rebuttable.82• 
Motive for a killing, of course, is not an essential element in a prosecu-
tion for murder. Consequently, the supreme court has rejected outright a 
claim that the senselessness of the particular multiple murders detracted 
from the state's required showing of deliberation and premeditation, noting 
that murder is always senseless.8lG Nevertheless, the court has stated that 
the absence of a motive "may be considered in determining whether an as-
sailant acted with malice aforethought. "828 
2. First Degree Murder 
The Criminal Code retains the traditional language of "willfully, delib-
erately, and with premeditation"817 as aggravating elements making a killing 
done with malice aforethought first-degree murder. It did eliminate, how-
ever, the archaic phraseology making a killing first-degree murder if "perpe-
trated by means of poison, or lying in wait."828 Of course, this deletion is 
inconsequential since such a killing falls within the traditional elements re-
tained in the Criminal Code as a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing 
with malice aforethought. 
Three other types of murder are considered to be in the first degree 
under the new Criminal Code. These include two entirely new con-
cepts-killings during an escape or attempted escape829 from lawful custody 
and most (but not all) killings by prisoners.83o Additionally, the third type, 
the felony murder rule,881 underwent considerable revision. Each of these 
three circumstances merely substitutes for premeditation, but not for malice 
aforethought. The fact that the word "kills" is used in each of the four sub-
sections in the revised Code does not portend a change in Iowa law that has 
821. State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Iowa 1975). 
822. 228 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1975). 
823. 1d. at 767 (quoting State v. Anstine, 91 Idaho 169, _, 418 P.2d 210, 214 (1966». 
824. State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 767 (Iowa 1975). 
825. State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 1975). 
826. State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Iowa 1976). 
827. IOWA CODE § 707.2(1) (1979). 
828. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
829. IOWA CODE § 707.2(3) (1979). See text accompanying notes 854-56 infra. 
830. 1d. § 707.2(4). See text accompanying notes 857-62 infra. 
831. 1d. § 707.2(2). See text accompanying notes 847-53 infra. 
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required malice aforethought as an element of murder (whether of the first 
or second degree) even under the felony murder rule.882 This is because the 
first main section in the first degree murder statute refers to "murder,"888 
which term has been previously defined as killing another person with mal-
ice aforethought.834 
a. Premeditation. A so-called "straight" first-degree murder occurs 
when the killing is done "with malice aforethought, willfully, deliberately, 
premeditatedly and with a specific intent to kill. "8311 "Willfully" means "in-
tentional or by fixed design or purpose and not accidental,"888 or a killing 
"done intentionally and without legal justification."8s7 To "deliberate" is "to 
weigh in one's mind, to consider, to contemplate, or to reflect."8s8 To "pre-
meditate" is "to think or ponder upon a matter before acting. "88& Absent a 
specific intent to kill, a "straight" murder would be only of the second de-
gree840 (at least when the murder is not also committed during a forcible 
felony, escape or attempted escape or by a prisoner).841 
Deliberation and premeditation may not be presumed, but instead are 
subject merely to a permissive inference to be drawn or rejected by the fact 
finder.8411 Nevertheless, neither needs to exist "for any particular length of 
time before the act."848 For example, in finding deliberation and premedita-
tion a jury may consider the fact that the defendant selected a deadly 
weapon with an opportunity to deliberate (even for a short time) as to where 
he will use it thereafter in a deadly manner.844 
Deliberation and premeditation can be shown by circumstantial evi-
dence through, for example: "(1) evidence of planning activity of the defen-
dant which was directed toward the killing; (2) evidence of motive which 
might be inferred from prior relationships between defendant and the vic-
tim; and (3) evidence regarding the nature of the killing."8411 All three of 
these are not necessary, however, in making a requisite showing of 
premeditation.848 
832. State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1979). 
833. IOWA CODE § 707.2 (1979). 
834. [d. § 707.1. 
835. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 708. 
836. [d. at No. 702. 
837. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 138. 
838. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 702. 
839. [d. 
840. State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Iowa 1976). 
841. IOWA CODE §§ 707.2(2), (3), (4) (1979). 
842. State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975). 
843. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 705; see State v. Fryer, 226 
N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975). 
844. See, e.g., State v. Frazer, 267 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Iowa 1978); State v. Smith, 240 N.W.2d 
693, 695 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Iowa 1975). 
845. State v. Harrington, 284 N.W.2d 244, 247-48 (Iowa 1979). 
846. [d. 
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b. Felony Murder Rule. Killing another person during participation in 
a "forcible felony" constitutes Murder in the First Degree.847 This substitu-
tion of the phrase "forcible felony"S4S for the five enumerated crimes under 
the pre-revised law has changed the felony murder rule in several respects, 
all of which are discussed extensively in individual sections of this Article.s49 
The felony murder doctrine "must be based on a causally related felony 
and acts causing death."slIo The requisite causal relationship between the 
underlying felony and the death can be shown even though the deadly as-
sault had been completed before the underlying felony occurred.8IIl A causal 
relationship was found in State v. Taylorsll2 where the evidence established 
that defendant had gone into a tavern with the intent to rob, was rifting the 
cash register when the operator returned, and then fatally assaulted the op-
erator "in order to effect his escape and avoid later identification."8&3 The 
operator's purse also was taken, which presumably was the basis of the fel-
ony murder application, since rifling a cash register in the absence of anyone 
else would constitute mere Theft, the court's unfortunate reference to de-
fendant's robbing the place notwithstanding. 
c. Escape. One of the two new types of first-degree murder provided 
for in the new Criminal Code is a killing during an escape or attempted 
escape from lawful custody.sM The elements are: (1) killing any person (2) 
with malice aforethoughtSlI1I (3) while either escaping or attempting to es-
capeSM (4) from lawful custody. 
d. Killings by Inmates.8117 The other completely new type of first de-
gree murder can only be committed by an inmate who is at the time impris-
onedslIs in a state, county, or city correctional facility. The victim must be 
847. IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979). 
848. [d. § 702.11. See text accompanying notes 180-203 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE 
L. REV. 239 (1980). 
849. See text accompanying notes 197-203, 539-670, 884-86, 992-96, 1321-22 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980); notes 107-18, 223-343, 539-670 supra. 
850. State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 577 (Iowa 1980). 
851. [d. at 578. 
852. 287 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1980). 
853. [d. at 577. 
854. IOWA CODE § 707.2(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 
Nos. 710-11; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 140. 
855. See text accompanying notes 817-26 supra. But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 12, § 140, as to possible problems in implying malice when the particular grade of the 
underlying escape or attempted escape is merely a misdemeanor. . 
856. Regarding what constitutes an escape, see IOWA CODE § 719.4 (1979). See also UNI-
FORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 711. 
857. IOWA CODE § 707.2(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
712; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 141. 
858. Because of the express, restrictive statutory language, "[t]he person intentionally 
kills ... while such person is imprisoned .... " IOWA CODE § 707.2(4) (1979), it is clear that 
offenders free on bail, probation, or parole are not covered. Whether inmates who intentionally 
kill while on work release or under custodial hospitalization or while being transported from 
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either a peace officer, correctional officer, public employee, or hostage-but 
not another inmate (except when the latter is killed while being held 
hostage). 
Only intentional85e killings are included under the express terms of the 
statute itself.880 Thus, the malice aforethought component will be satisfied 
by actual proof of the man-endangering state of mind of an intent to kill, 
but without requiring deliberation and premeditation. 
Of course, an unintentional killing of a prison guard by an inmate could 
still constitute Murder in the First Degree if done under either of the other 
two above-mentioned circumstances (other than premeditation). Otherwise, 
such a killing would constitute either second degree murder88l if done with 
malice aforethought or if not then Involuntary Manslaughter.8811 Murder in 
the First Degree is a class A felony.883 
3. Second Degree Murder 
a. Generally. The pre-revised Code concept of second-degree mur-
der84U being statutorily defined as a residual provision was retained in the 
new Criminal Code. Therefore, Murder in the Second Degree88r. is all other 
murder which is not Murder in the First Degree. This includes deaths 
caused either intentionally or unintentionally, with malice aforethought be-
ing based upon: (a) intent to inflict serious bodily injury (but the victim 
nevertheless died); or (b) a depraved heart (i.e., intentional doing of an un-
called-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on others); or 
(d) intentional "felony murders" involving felonies other than forcible felo-
nies or escape (or attempted escape). The supreme court has stated that the 
absence of a specific intent to kill reduces an unlawful killing with malice 
aforethought from first degree murder to second degree murder.898 
b. Felony Murder Rule. The scope of the application of the felony 
one place of confinement to another are covered is not clear. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 12, § 141. Certainly these latter circumstances all fit within the obvious legislative 
intent to discourage killings by prisoners under any circumstances. It would be unreasonable to 
apply this provision to prisoner X who is either in his cell or at least somewhere within the 
penitentiary or jail at the time of the killing but not to his cellmate Y who was temporarily 
hospitalized in a private facility, but still in custody. A better statutory approach would have 
been to specify that the offender "is in custody" rather than "is imprisoned" at the time of the 
killing. 
859. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 70-102 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
860. IOWA CODE § 707.2(4) (1979). 
861. See id. § 707.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 915-36 infra. 
862. See id. § 707.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 915-36 infra. 
863. See note 337 supra. 
864. See IOWA CODE § 690.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
865. IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
703, 713; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 143. 
866. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Iowa 1977). 
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murder rule to second-degree murder has been sharply curtailed in the new 
Criminal Code in two respects. First, as already discussed above,867 the 
scope of the first-degree felony murder rule has been broadened considera-
bly. Secondly, the new Code created a separate crime of Involuntary Man-
slaughters68 based upon unintentionally causing deaths during the commis-
sion of public offenses other than "forcible felonies" and escape (or 
attempted escape). Thus, accidental second-degree felony murder66• is no 
longer recognized in Iowa, in contravention of common law. This crime is a 
class B felony,870 and more importantly, it is a "forcible felony."871 
4. Attempted Murder 
The separate crime of Attempted Murder87s consists of these elements: 
(1) without justification, (2) doing an act expected to set in motion a force or 
chain of events which will cause or result in the death of another person, (3) 
with the intent to cause such death.878 In essence, the state has to prove the 
concurrence of the requisite overt act and a specific intent to kill,874 and 
additionally has to negate justification for the intended homicide.87!! 
a. Overt Act. The overt act requirement embodied in this provision 
(viz. "does any act by which he or she expects to set in motion a force or 
chain of events which will cause or result in the death of such other per-
son")878 is quite different than the prevailing common law standard followed 
by the Iowa Supreme Court: . 
The overt act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment, to-
ward the desired result, to amount to the commencement of the consum-
mation, not merely preparatory. It need not be the last proximate act to 
the consummation of the offense attempted to be prepetrated, but it 
must approach sufficiently near it to stand either as the first or some 
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the 
offense after the preparations are made. Whenever the design of a person 
to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of that 
design will constitute an attempt .... an 
The unfortunate reference in this new Code provision to setting in mo-
867. See text accompanying notes 847-49 supra. 
868. See IOWA CODB § 707.5(1) (1979) and text accompanying notes 915-36 infra. 
869. See State v. Kelley, 195 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1972). 
870. gee note 327 supra. 
871. See note 128 supra. 
872. IOWA CODB § 707.11 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
728-30; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 161-63. 
873. IOWA CODB § 707.11 (1979). 
874. State v. Barney, 244 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1976). 
875. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 161. 
876. IOWA CODB § 707.11 (1979). 
877. State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 1042, 188 N.W. 709, 714 (1922). 
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tion a chain of events designed to cause or result in death could have the 
effect of criminalizing mere preparatory conduct as opposed to minimally 
requiring some prepetrating act. Such an approach would fly in the face of 
accepted common law principles as well as common sense. Indeed, the very 
essence of such less severe offenses as Going Armed With Intent,878 Ad-
ministering Harmful Substances,8711 and Setting Spring Guns and Man-
trapsSSo appears to be criminalizing dangerous conduct which nevertheless 
does not constitute Attempted Murder.ssl Professor Yeager's interpretation 
seems correct in determining that mere preparation is insufficient since what 
is required is that the act "do whatever is necessary, in the light of the facts 
as he perceives them, to bring about the death of another-pull the trigger, 
strike out with the knife, put poison into food which the other is expected to 
ingest, or the like. "S88 Thus, either merely purchasing or arming oneself with 
a firearm, knife, or poison would not be sufficient to satisfy the overt act 
requirement for the serious offense of Attempted Murder. 
b. Impossibility as Defense. A specific provision is included in the At-
tempted Murder section888 which seemingly makes it clear that impossibility 
is not a defense to this charge. However, the proviso is included in the stat-
ute that the actor's expectations must not have been unreasonable in the 
light of the facts known to the actor. The emphasis is thus placed on the 
expectations accompanying the overt act with a requirement, however, that 
those expectations be reasonable. As Professor Yeager recognizes, "[iJf it is 
unreasonable to expect that the acts will cause the death of another, there is 
some doubt that death was intended."slU The upshot of this requisite rea-
sonableness seemingly is to detract from the requisite specific intent to kill. 
c. Grading. Attempted Murder, a class C felony,SSIi has been inter-
preted as being a "forcible felony,"888 and thus the ameliorative sentencing 
options of a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sen-
tence are not available.887 In State v. Powers,sss the supreme court held that 
the term "felonious assault"88t in the definitional clause on "forcible fel-
ony"StO includes "any assault the commission of which constitutes a fel-
878. IOWA CODE § 708.8. See text accompanying notes 769-83 supra. 
879. [d. § 708.5. 
880. [d. § 708.9. 
881. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 180 (Administering Harmful 
Substances). 
882. [d. § 162. 
883. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note'i2, § 163. 
884. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 163. 
885. See note 311 supra. 
886. See note 128 supra. 
887. See IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
888. 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
889. See text accompanying notes 326-45 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
890. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 296-313 in Part I of this 
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ony,"891 and that Attempted Murder is a felony which necessarily includes 
an assault.891 The court thus rejected defendant's claim that the term "felo-
nious assault" was limited to "those felonies listed in the assault chapter"898 
(while Attempted Murder is included in the homicide chapter). 
B. Manslaughter Offenses 
1. Overview 
The generic definition of Manslaughter as an unlawful killing of another 
person without malice aforethought has remained unchanged from pre-re-
vised law94 (including the common law derivation). Unlike the pre-revised 
law, however, the new Criminal Code contains its own statutory definitions 
of this crime instead of merely incorporating the common law by refer-
ence.891 Nevertheless, the statutory definitions essentially follow the com-
mon law, as discussed below. 
Unlike the singular crime of Manslaughter under the pre-revised law, 
the revised crime is split into Voluntary896 and Involuntary Manslaughter.897 
The key difference is that the former is an intentional killing whereas the 
latter is an unintentional killing. Additionally, Involuntary Manslaughter is 
further divided into two grades-the more serious being of the unlawful act 
type and the less serious being based upon something akin to criminal 
negligence.896 
2. Voluntary Manslaughter 
The elements of Voluntary Manslaughter899 in essence are: (1) inten-
tionally900 and (2) without justification; (3) causing the death of another per-
son;901 (4) solely by reason of passion (5) resulting from serious provocation; 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
891. 278 N.W.2d at 28. 
892. [d. 
893. [d. 
894. See IOWA CODE § 690.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
895. See State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 114·15 (Iowa 1970). 
896. IOWA CODE § 707.4 (1979). 
897. [d. § 707.5. 
898. [d. 
899. IOWA CODE § 707.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
715-17; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 144-46. 
900. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 528-601 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
901. "The 'killing' required for murder is essentially equivalent to the 'causing death' re-
quired for involuntary manslaughter. . . . It is an element of causation in both crimes. It re-
quires that the defendant did some act which resulted in the victim's death . . .. It is not 
essential for conviction in all cases that the accused actively participated in the immediate 
physical impetus of death." State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1980) (citations 
omitted). 
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and (6) without a reasonable cooling-off period. Absent such circumstances 
of passion, this intentional killing would, of course, constitute murder.eol 
The passion must be "sudden, violent, and irresistible" in nature,eoa and 
must result from a "serious provocation" (that is, "conduct that would ex-
cite, in a reasonable person" such a passion.eo4 Nevertheless, as spelled out 
in the Uniform Jury Instructions: 
Regardless of how sudden, violent and irresistible the passion may be, if 
there is an interval of time during which a reasonable person would, 
under the circumstances, have time to reflect and bring his passion under 
control, or, in other words, there is a sufficient time for a person of ordi-
nary reason and temperament to regain his control and suppress the im-
pulse to kill, then the act of the defendant was not committed solely by 
reason of passion caused by a "serious provocation."eoa 
This offense is a class C felony.eGe It appears to be a "forcible felony.''907 
By statute,808 this offense is made a lesser included offense80e in a prose-
cution for murder in the firste10 or second degree.911 Of course, this statutory 
provision merely satisfies the legal test for a lesser included offense and the 
evidence in the record of the case still must be examined to determine if the 
factual test is met.ell Moreover, Involuntary Manslaughter818 is made a 
lesser included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter under the same circum-
stances of requiring an independent factual basis.914 
902. IOWA CODE § 707.4 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 145. 
903. IOWA CODE § 707.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
717; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 145. 
904. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 717. See J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 12, § 146. Accord State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980). "Section 707.4 
requires that both a subjective standard and objective standard be met before a defendant can 
be convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The subjective requirement. . . is that the defendant 
must act solely as a result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion." The objective require-
ment is that "[t]he sudden, violent, and irresistible passion must result from serious provoca-
tion sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person." [d. at 122. 
905. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 717. Accord State v. Inger, 292 
N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980). "[A]s a final objective requirement" there must not be "an interval 
between the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temperment 
would regain his or her control and suppress the impulse to kill." [d. at 122. 
906. See note 311 supra. 
907. See note 128 supra. 
908. IOWA CODE § 707.5 (1979). 
909. See text accompany notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 
(1980). 
910. IOWA CODE § 707.2 (1979). 
911. [d. § 707.3. 
912. State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Iowa 1980). 
913. IOWA CODE § 707.5 (1979). 
914. State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Iowa 1980) (not error in prosecution for Volun-
tary Manslaughter to refuse to submit lesser included offense instruction on Involuntary Man-
slaughter in absence of factual basis for the latter). 
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3. Involuntary Manslaughter 
There are two grades of Involuntary Manslaughter.9U Both types, how-
ever, involve unintentional,918 but unjustifable, killings. 
The more serious grade, a class D felony,917 is based upon the commis-
sion of an underlying unlawful act that results in the death of a human 
being. The elements, as set out in the Code,918 include: (1) unintentionally 
and (2) without justification (3) causing the death of a human being919 (4) 
during the commission of a public offense other than a "forcible felony" or 
escape (or attempted escape). However, the supreme court in State v. Con-
ner&IO interpreted the legislative intent in this provision to also require a 
showing of recklessness911 on the part of the offender. 
The less serious grade, an aggravated misdemeanor,m is based strictly 
upon recklessness as the state of mind of the offense. The elements, as set 
out in the Code, are: (1) unintentionally and (2) without justification (3) 
causing the death of a human being (4) through commission of an act "in a 
manner likely to cause death or serious injury."923 The latter phrase, which 
was left undefined in the Criminal Code, has been interpreted by the su" 
preme court in State v. Conners" to mean reckesssly. Moreover, the Court 
ruled that recklessness, for the purposes of this statute, requires that the 
offender had "an awareness of the risk or at least that the accused should 
have been aware of the risk. "9111 
Aiding and abetting another to commit suicide has been interpreted918 
to satisfy this provision, and thus it is not error for the trial court to refuse 
to instruct the jury that suicide is not a defense to a charge of Involuntary 
Manslaughter. In State v. Marti,917 the defendant admitted putting three 
bullets in the gun, rotating the cylinder, firing twice on empty chambers, 
and setting the weapon down uncocked within arm's reach of the bedridden 
suicide victim. "[P]reparing and providing a weapon for one who is unable 
915. IOWA CODE § 707.5(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at 
Nos. 718-19; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 147. 
916. Regarding intentionally as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 528-65 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
917. See note 65 supra. 
918. IOWA CODE § 707.5(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
719. 
919. See note 901 supra. 
920. 292 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1980). 
921. Regarding recklessness as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 594-601 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
922. See note 63 supra. 
923. IOWA CODE § 707.5(2) (1979). 
924. 292 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1980). 
925. [d. 
926. State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
927. 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
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to do so and is known to be intoxicated and probably suicidal are acts 'likely 
to cause death or serious injury' "1118 within the provision on involuntary 
manslaughter, the supreme court concluded. On the other hand, State v. 
Conner929 held that mere disobedience of a signal light during operation of a 
motor vehicle in the absence of recklessness-does not constitute the under-
lying basis for Involuntary Manslaughter. 
The requisite act for this grade of Involuntary Manslaughter (which is 
based upon recklessness) was defined in State v. Inger980 as being "an act 
that is not a public offense as defined in section 707.5(1)"981 the latter being 
the unlawful act grade of Involuntary Manslaughter. The importance of this 
distinction was made apparent in Inger, since "the only possible act attribu-
table to the defendant" that was likely to cause death or serious injury was 
"an assault, a public offense within the meaningful of section 707.5(1).''981 
Because the factual basis was not met for submitting a lesser included of-
fense instruction,988 the trial court thus correctly refused to instruct on In-
voluntary Manslaughter in this prosecution for second-degree murder. The 
legal test component of the lesser included offense standard, on the other 
hand, is satisfied in the statute itself, with Involuntary Manslaughter made 
a lesser included offense in a prosecution for murder in the first984 or second 
degree98G or for Voluntary Manslaughter.9ae 
VI. GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS OFFENSES 
A. Offenses Against the Government 
Six offenses, including three new crimes and three other expanded 
crimes, are included in the chapter 718 offenses of the Code directed against 
governmental agencies and employees.taU The principal change, however, is 
the elimination of TreasoneS'1 as a crime cognizable under Iowa law. As Pro-
fessor Yeager explains, Treason is an offense of concern only to the United 
States and "[i]n the modern context, treason against the state of Iowa is not 
a viable concept."esa Professor Schantz adds that "the venerable offense of 
928. [d. at 583. 
929. 292 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1980). 
930. 292 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980). 
931. [d. at 124. 
932. [d. 
933. See text accompanying notes 619-723 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
934. IOWA CODE § 707.2 (1979). 
935. [d. § 707.3. 
936. [d. § 707.4. 
936.1. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 12, for any of these offenses. 
937. See IOWA CODE § 689.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
938. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 401. 
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treason [was] replaced by a narrower prohibition against insurrection."sss 
1. Insurrection 
The revised crime of Insurrection,s,o which combines into one offense 
the two former crimes of Inciting Insurrection941 and Inciting Hostilities,s42 
has been broadened to include interference with or disruption of any subdi-
vision of government (rather than being limited to State government itself, 
as under previous law). Another change requires a minimum of three per-
sons acting in concert to commit this offense, the rationale being that this is 
"the point at which activity of this type begins to pose a special threat be-
cause of the number of persons involved."943 The most drastic change, how-
ever, is in the focus of the conduct underlying this offense. Previously, the 
gravamen of the offense was incitement (via writing, speaking, etc.), whereas 
the new focus is placed upon physical violence or disruption.s" The require-
ment of the actual use of "physical violence against persons or property''''11 
means that mere passive conduct (e.g., a sit-in demonstration) will not be 
punishable under this crime, notwithstanding the conduct's disruptive ef-
fect.948 This also means that a disruptive activity accompanied by a threat of 
physical violence will not suffice. Other less serious offenses (e.g., Willful 
Disturbance947 and Harassment of Public Officers and Employees)s.e encom-
pass this type of activity. 
The mens rea of the revised crime is stated in the alternative: specifi-
cally, with the purpose of disrupting the state government of any s~bdivi­
sion thereof or of preventing a governmental body or officer thereof from 
performing a lawful function. Thus, it follows that this is a specific intent 
crime.94s 
There is only one grade of this crime. It is a class C felony,SIIO but is not 
939. Schantz, Objectives of Criminal Code Revision: Guidelines to Evaluation, 60 IOWA 
L. REv. 430 (1975). 
940. IOWA CODE § 7l8.1 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
402. 
941. See IOWA CODE § 689.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
942. See id. § 689.8. 
943. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 402, at 105·06. 
944. "Insurrection differs from riot and unlawful assembly in that it consists of violence 
directed against the government and its functions, whereas riot and unlawful assembly threaten 
individuals or property." [d. at 106. 
945. IOWA CODE § 7l8.1 (1979). 
946. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 402. 
947. See IOWA CODE § 7l8.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 959-68 infra. 
948. See id. § 7l8.4 and text accompanying notes 960-64 infra. 
949. For an extensive discussion of specific intent as a state of mind, see text and accom-
panying notes 480-509 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
950. A class C felony is punishable by either an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 
ten years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). 
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a "forcible felony.""II' In contrast, the related pre-revised offense of Trea-
son"llll was punishable by life imprisonment without parole or probation. 
2. Impersonating a Public Official 
The offense of Impersonating a Public Official"1l8 represents an expan-
sion of the prior law"M (which was basically limited to law enforcement and 
judicial officers) to include any elected or appointed official of any govern-
mental subdivision. According to Professor Yeager, this crime does not en-
compass "innocent mistakes" and the statutory language "implies 
knowledge"llll of the falsity or at least the lack of any reasonable belief that 
one has the authority which he assumes to exercise.""lIe The gravamen of 
this offense is the act of impersonation or mere pretense, and thus another 
person need not be defrauded, nor need there even be such a purpose."117 
This crime is an aggravated misdemeanor.9118 
3. Willful Disturbance 
The new crime of Willful Disturbance9119 was created to deal with inten-
tional disturbances of governmental deliberative bodies. The elements are: 
(1) willfully;980 (2) disturbing; (3) any governmental deliberative body; (4) 
with the purpose98l of either (a) disrupting the function of such body by 
tumultous behavior or (b) coercing by force or attempted force any official 
conduct or proceeding. 
The gravamen of this offense, a serious misdemeanor,9811 is disturbing a 
government agency, whereas the separate and less serious offense of Harass-
ment of Public Officers and Employees,988 also a simple misdemeanor, covers 
disruptive conduct directed toward the personnel of such an agency. 
Whether or not a single act which violates both of these sections can sup-
951. See note 128 supra. 
952. See IOWA CODE § 689.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
953. IOWA CODE § 718.2 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
403. 
954. See IOWA CODE § 740.5 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
955. For an extensive discussion of knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text 
accompanying notes 572-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
956. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 403. 
957. [d. 
958. See note 63 supra. 
959. IOWA CODE § 718.3 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
404. 
960. Regarding willfully as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 543-48 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
961. Regarding purposely as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 569-71 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 Drake L. Rev. 239 (1980). 
962. See note 40 supra.· 
963. See IOWA CODE § 718.4 (1979) and text accompanying notes 936-39 supra. 
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port two separate convictions is an open question. Unlike the more serious 
crime of Insurrection,- Willful Disturbance does not require multiple de-
fendants or physical violence. 
The phrase "tumultous behavior," which has been criticized by Profes-
sor Schantz,lHIlI is not defined in the Code. Professor Yeager suggests the use 
of its ordinary meaning, namely "a noisy uproar, with violence or under-
tones of violence, be adopted. ''886 
4. Harrassment of Public Officers and Employees 
A new crimelHl7 of Harrassment of Public Officers and EmployeeslHl8 en-
compasses any act willfullylHlll done, or attempted, with the purpose970 of 
preventing public personnel from performing their duties. Success is not re-
quired, nor is violence.1I71 
The victims of this offense can only be public personnel, and then only 
when they are on duty or attempting to be on duty. The general crime of 
Harrassment in Code section 708.7, on the other hand, provides that any 
person can be the victim. However, the scope of prohibited activity under 
this general offense is much narrower, being limited to the statutory enu-
meration. Both harrassment offenses are simple misdemeanors.1I72 
5. Falsifying Public Documents 
The crime of Falsifying Public Documents978 consists of a consolidation 
of four pre-revised statutes,II74 with two significant changes. One change is 
that the gravity of the level of mens rea has been lowered considerably, with 
the elimination of fraudulent intent, leaving this a general intent crime.1I711 
964. See IOWA CODE § 718.1 (1979) and text accompanying note8 940-52 supra. 
965. Schantz, supra note 939, at 435. 
966. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 404. 
967. "This section is not presently known within the Iowa statutory law. It appears to 
have been adopted to prevent interference with non-judicial personnel, as well as peace of-
ficers." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 244. 
968. IOWA CODE § 718.4 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
405. 
969. Regarding willfully as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 543-48 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
970. Regarding purposely as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 569-71 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
971. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 405. 
972. See note 37 supra. 
973. IOWA CODE § 718.5 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
406. 
974. See IOWA CoDE §§ 718.3, .18, 738.21, 740.12 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
975. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
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The prosecution need now only prove that a public document97G was falsified 
by a person "having no right or authority to do so." The other change is that 
the mere act of possessing a seal or counterfeit seal of any governmental 
body is made a crime, whereas the criminal act under the applicable p~e­
revised statute977 consisted of the consummated offense of counterfeiting. 
This offense is a "non-forcible" class D felony.978 
6. False Reports 
The substantive nature of the general979 intent crime of False Reports 
to Law Enforcement Authorities980 was not changed from that of the appli-
cable pre-revised statuteS.981 The newly-consolidated crime encompasses 
making false reports to a fire department or a law enforcement authority as 
well as falsely reporting a crime. This crime, a simple misdemeanor,981 over-
laps with two other more serious crimes-Making False Bomb RepOrts983 
and Malicious Prosecution91U-as well as with Harrassment,9811 also a simple 
misdemeanor. 
B. Offenses Relating to Interference with the Judicial Process 
Six offenses "concerned with the protection of the judicial process'ttl88 
are included in chapter 720 of the Code.987 Only one of these, Malicious 
Prosecution,988 is entirely new. Four of the five other offenses were revised 
and consolidated into this chapter. Only the crime of Compounding a Fel-
ony 989 was included unchanged as to substantive content, being modified 
only by providing for a simple penalty schedule. Two other comparatively 
minor offenses-Tampering with Witnesses or Jurors990 and False Represen-
976. Some public documents will also be financial instruments, see IOWA CODE § 715.1, 
and the false making or alteration of them should be prosecuted as a violation of IOWA CODE § 
715.6. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 406. The penalty (class D felony) is the same 
for both offenses, however. 
977. See IOWA CODE § 718.18 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
978. See note 65 supra. 
979. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
980. IOWA CODE § 718.6 (1979). 
981. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.31, .42 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
982. See note 37 supra. 
983. IOWA CODE § 712.7 (1979) (class D felony). See text accompanying notes 980-85 
supra. 
984. [d. § 720.6 (serious misdemeanor). See text accompanying notes 992-98 infra. 
985. [d. § 708.7(4). See text accompanying notes 967-72 supra. 
986. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 441. 
987. The related offense of Contempt was not transferred into the Criminal Code. See 
IOWA CODE ch. 6 (1979). 
988. IOWA CODE § 720.6 (1979). See text accompanying notes 992-98 infra. 
989. IOWA CODE § 720.1 (1979). 
990. IOWA CODE § 720.4 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
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tations or Records or Process991-were not substantially changed, and are 
not further discussed in this Article. 
1. Malicious Prosecution 
A new crime of Malicious Prosecution,SS2 a serious misdemeanor,9sB was 
added to the new Code. The elements include: (1) causing or attempting to 
cause another to be prosecuted; (2) while having no reasonable cause for 
believing that person committed the offense.994 Presumably, the state would 
also have to prove that the prosecution thereof was undertaken mali-
ciously,991! in light of the crime being titled "Malicious Prosecution" in the 
section heading. The problem, however, is that the word "maliciously" is not 
used in the text of the section itself. Otherwise, this would be a general in-
tent crime. S96 
One thing that is clear about this new crime is that the attempt need 
not be successful in order to be prosecutible. However, as Professor Yeager 
points out, "a mere false accusation of crime, unless made under circum-
stances which can reasonably be expected to lead to prosecution, will not be 
sufficient."99? Of course, filing a criminal complaint unequivocally demon-
strates the intent to have another prosecuted, but such act "is not a require-
ment" to fulfill a Malicious Prosecution charge.99s 
445. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. This is an aggravated misdemeanor, 
which is punishable by either a determinate term of confinement not to exceed two years or a 
maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a 
deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the above-mentioned con-
finement or fine. 
99l. IOWA CODE § 720.5 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
446. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. As a simple misdemeanor, this 
offense is punishable by either a determinate jail term not exceeding thirty days or a maximum 
fine of $100, but not both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a de-
ferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the above-mentioned confine-
ment or fine. 
992. IOWA CODE § 720.6 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 447. 
993. See note 40 supra. 
994. John Roehrick would add a third element, viz., "That the prosecution was done ma-
liciously." Regarding this, he queries: "As to the element of malice, the question arises whether 
it will be implied, by reason of the lack of reasonable belief, or will have to be strictly proven." 
J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 270. 
995. Regarding malice as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 549-65 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
996. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
997. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 447. 
998. [d. 
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2. Perjury 
The crime of Perjuryll9l1 was enlarged substantially in the new Code. Un-
like the pre-revised offense1ooo which was limited to false statements of ma-
terial facts made under oath in an official proceeding requiring sworn state-
ments, the new offense also includes the making of false denials under 
similar circumstances as well as the making of contradictory statements. 
The addition of both of these new modes of committing Perjury will 
strengthen the sanctity of the judicial process by serving notice that a wit-
ness can get into serious trouble for other kinds of falsification other than 
merely making false affirmative statements, it will not be necessary for the 
prosecution to prove which of the two (or more) contradictory statements 
were untrue. Rather, as Professor Yeager points out, the prosecution need 
only prove that "one of the statements must necessarily be false, and that 
the person making the statements knew that he was falsely testifying when 
the false statements was made."lool Specifically, the elements of a false 
statement type of Perjury are: (1) while under oath or affirmation; (2) know-
ingly;lOOI (3) making a false statement of fact; (4) such fact was material. 
The elements of false-denial Perjury are: (1) while under oath or affirma-
tion; (2) falsely denying knowledge of a fact; (3) such fact was material. 
The elements of the contradictory statement type of Perjury are: (1) 
while under oath or affirmation; (2) making contradictory statements; (3) 
knowinglOOS that one or the other was false; (4) both statements made during 
the three-year statute of limitations period. 
a. Oath. "Material"lOO4 false testimony must have been given under 
oath (or affirmation) in order for it to be punishable as Perjury. The form of 
the oath is immaterial, as long as it signifies a binding of conscience to tell 
the truth.looll A Perjury defendant's "sworn" false statements must have 
been made pursuant to an oath required (or authorized)1°08 by law. There-
fore, a false affidavit given pursuant to a "gratuitous oath" cannot be the 
basis for a Perjury prosecution.100'7 
999. IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2006-09; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 443; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 453-66. 
1000. See IOWA CODE § 721.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1001. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 443. 
1002. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-601 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1003. See note 1002 supra. 
1004. See text accompanying notes 1009-16 infra. 
1005. State v. Hulsman, 147 Iowa 572, 126 N.W. 700 (1910) (immaterial to omit tradi-
tional words "so help you God" in oath). 
1006. IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979). The question of whether "the defendant was required to 
be under oath or affirmation" is a question of law to be determined by the court. UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2002. 
1007. See, e.g., Mendez v. Commonwealth, _ Va. _, 255 S.E.2d 533 (in which the de-
fendant falsely executed an affidavit which was not required by law but which was imposed 
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b. Materiality. The false testimony must have been "material" in or-
der to be punishable under the perjury statute.1008 The legal test for deter-
mining materiality under Iowa caselaw is stated in the disjunctive, viz. an 
otherwise perjurious statement is material if it directly or circumstantially 
either: (1) supports or attacks a witness' credibility; or (2) has a legitimate 
tendency to prove or disprove some relevant fact irrespective of the main 
fact at trial; or (3) is capable of influencing the court or tribunal on any 
proper matter of inquiry.looe It is sufficient that the perjured testimony was 
material to any collateral inquiry during the official proceeding and thus it 
need not be material to the principal issue at hand. lolo Moreover, a perjurer 
need not have known that his false testimony was material, but instead only 
that the testimony was false. 1011 
"Materiality" is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. 1011 
This, of course, means that materiality is not included as an element in jury 
instructions. Rather, the procedural context in determining sufficiency of 
the prosecution's showing of materiality occurs upon defendant's motion for 
judgment of acquittal. Nevertheless, opinion evidence is admissible on the 
issue of materiality.lol8 
The materiality of known false testimony must be affirmatively proved 
by the prosecution, rather than presuming materiality from the mere fact 
that false testimony has been shown to have been given under oath. Never-
theless, it appears that the required materiality of the false statement may 
be demonstrated by its effect. In State v. Fisher, loa it was noted that a false 
statement during a sentencing hearing "resulted in permitting defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea and to have a jury trial which, at that point, he had 
waived. "10111 
c. Facts. A change in terminology in the statutory definition of Perjury 
could have the effect of significantly curtailing the scope of the Perjury stat-
ute. Whereas the pre-revised law referred in broad terms to false statements 
concerning any material "matter,"IOI8 the new Criminal Code covers only 
upon defendant by the prosecution as a condition precedent to defendant obtaining a poly-
graph examination that he had requested, his conviction for perjury was reversed because of 
the "gratuitous oath"). 
1008. IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979). See State v. Fisher, 282 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1979); State v. 
Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902, 913-14 (Iowa 1978); State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d U8, 122 (Iowa 1972). 
1009. See State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902, 913-14 (Iowa 1978); State v. Deets, 195 
N.W.2d U8, 122 (Iowa 1972). 
1010. State v. Shupe, 16 Iowa 36 (1864), 
1011. State v. Sargood, 80 Vt. 415, 68 A. 49 (1907). 
1012. State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 122 
(Iowa 1972). 
1013. State v. Thompson, 254 iowa 331, 117 N.W.2d 514 (1962). 
1014. 282 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1979). 
1015. [d. at 687. 
1016. IOWA CODE § 721.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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false statements of material "facts."1017 In State v. Deets, lOll "[a] false state-
ment of opinion or belief' was deemed "sufficient to support a charge of 
perjury" under the pre-revised law. 10111 Now, Perjury will be limited to a 
false statement of "fact." 
d. Mens Rea. Perjury clearly is not a strict liabilitylO'O crime. Indeed, 
the false testimony must be given intentionallylOlll with knowledgelOl1 of its 
falsity, rather than "in the honest belief that it is true, or by mistake or 
inadvertence. "1018 
A "good" motive does not vitiate the general mental responsibility or 
capacity for a willful or intentional act of perjury. As a New York court has 
pointed out: that the ultimate object to be attained by the perjury may be 
beneficient or indifferent in no way absolves or qualifies the criminality of 
the act. One may not commit a crime because he hopes or expects that good 
will come of it. lOl4 
e. Specific Result. The gist of the crime of Perjury is the intentional 
giving of false testimony, without any requirement of a specific result. Thus, 
it is still Perjury although the false testimony was not believed and thus 
could have had no influence. lOll! Likewise, it is immaterial to the question of 
criminal responsibility for Perjury that the case in which the perjured testi-
mony was given was subsequently reversed on appeal.lOII 
f. Quantitative Evidence Rule. Iowa follows the quantitative evidence 
rule in requiring that the falsity of the allegedly perjurious statement be 
established upon more than the word of one state's witness. This does not 
mean, however, that at least two witnesses must testify that defendant's 
statements were false. lo17Rather, this rule is satisfied either by two such wit-
nesses or by only one witness whose testimony as to falsity is buttressed by 
1017. IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979). 
1018. 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972). 
1019. [d. at 122. 
1020. Regarding strict liability as a substitute for mens rea, see note 471 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1021. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 528-42 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1022. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-601 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1023. See People ex reJ. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. I, 87 N.E. 792 (1909). Accord, 
State v. Lazarus, 181 Iowa 625, 164 N.W. 1037 (1917): "A man cannot be said to have falsely 
and corruptly sworn to a fact, if he in good faith believed the fact. . . to be true. . . . If a man 
is honestly mistaken as to the existence of a fact which he affirms to exist, under oath, he 
cannot be convicted of perjury upon a mere showing that the fact was other than was stated by 
him under oath." 
1024. People ex reJ. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. I, 87 N.E. 792 (1909). 
1025. See also State v. Fisher, 282 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1979), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 1014-15 supra. 
1026. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1976). 
1027. State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978). 
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other corroborative evidence. lo28 
g. Grading. All three forms of Perjury are punishable equally. The 
only grade of this offense is a class D felony.1029 It, of course, is not a "forci-
ble felony."103o 
h. Defense of Retraction. Another new feature in the Perjury statute 
is the retraction defense. Retraction of the false statement excuses the 
maker thereof from Perjury if the retraction is made "in the course of the 
proceedings where it was made before the false statement has substantially 
affected the proceedings. "1030.1 
Presumably, this is an affirmative defense in which counsel for the de-
fense must assume the burden of proving an effective retraction. Because 
the opportunity for retracting or recanting is unusual in criminal law, this 
defense "will no doubt be strictly construed," in Professor Yeager's 
estimation.1081 
i. Attorney-Client Privilege. That a perjurious attorney cannot ex-
cuse his false testimony under oath on the basis of the attorney-client privi-
lege was made clear in State v. Gartin.1032 In Gartin, the supreme court 
deemed it Perjury for the attorney-defendant to testify falsely that he had 
no knowledge concerning the matters under investigation even though it was 
true that any such knowledge had been gained through the attorney-client 
privilege. The proper approach, stated the court, would have been to claim 
the attorney-client privilege for refusing to testify at all. 
3. Suborning Perjury 
Suborning Perjuryl088 is an independent crime, separate from the target 
crime of Perjury. The thrust of this specific intentl034 crime is to persuade 
someone else to commit Perjury.l031i There are two alternative means of 
committing this crime: inducing either the making of false statements or the 
concealing of material facts. The elements of the false statement alternative 
are: (1) either procuring another person or offering an inducement to an-
other person; (2) to make a statement under oath; (3) in an official proceed-
ing; (4) with the intent that such person make a false statement. The ele-
1028. State v. Raymond, 20 Iowa 582 (1866). 
1029. See note 65 supra. 
1030. IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979). 
1030.1. See J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, at 265. See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 12, at No. 2002: "Whether the defense of retraction is a question of fact for the jury 
or a question of law for the court, is an open question." [d. 
1031. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 443. 
1032. 271 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978). 
1033. IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2006·09; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 444; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 446·67. 
1034. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1035. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2009. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 599 1979-1980
1979-80] Iowa Criminal Code 599 
ments of the concealing material facts alternative are: (1) either procuring 
another person or offering an inducement to another person; (2) who is rea-
sonably believed will be called to testify under oath; (3) to conceal material 
facts known to such other person. So defined, this revised crime combines 
the two separate pre-revision crimes of Suborning Perjuryl036 and Attempt-
ing to Suborn,I037 thus rendering the substantive consummated and at-
tempted offenses equally punishable. The reivsed crime is also broader than 
the pre-revised offenses in two respects. Because "the act which is solicited 
must be one which would be perjurY,"1038 the scope of this offense has been 
expanded with the expansion of what constitutes perjury.l039 Moreover, the 
revised definition of Suborning Perjury, unlike its predecessor, includes the 
act of procuring another "to conceal material facts known to such 
person. "1040 
For Suborning Perjury it is unnecessary for the person being procured 
to have been subpoenaed to testify. It is necessary, however, that the pro-
curer-defendant believe that the solicited testimony is false and that he in-
tend that the false or concealed testimony be given with guilty knowledge of 
the solicited person!041 However, it appears that under this statute it is no 
defense that the "procured" witness knew his statements were true although 
the procurer-defendant believed they were false. 1042 
Like the consummated target offense of Perjury,t°43 this inchoate of-
fense is punishable as a class D felony. Suborning Perjury, of course, is not a 
"forcible felony,"1044 as is Perjury. Although this is a specific solicitation 
statute, nevertheless there are no different penal consequences, since it also 
is a class D felony under the general solicitation statute10411 to solicit the 
commission of any felony. 
4. Compounding a Felony 
The elements of the unchanged crime of Compounding a Felonyl046 are: 
(1) with knowledge of another's commission of a felony; (2) receiving any 
consideration; (3) upon a promise to either (a) conceal such crime or (b) not 
to prosecute or (c) not to give evidence of such crime. The gist of this gen-
1036. See IOWA CODE § 721.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1037. See id. § 721.3. 
1038. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 444. 
1039. See text accompanying notes 999-1032 supra. 
1040. IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1979). 
1041. Boren v. United States, 144 F. 801 (9th Cir. 1906). 
1042. See R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 467. 
1043. See IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1979) and text accompanying notes 999-1032 supra. 
1044. See note 65 supra. 
1045. See IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 757-830 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1046. IOWA CODE § 720.1 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 442. R. 
PERKINS, supra note 12, at 518-22, 651-54. 
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eral intentlCU7 crime is the promise or agreement. Thus, Compounding a Fel-
. ony does not occur if, for example, a thief returns stolen property or gives 
some other thing of value to either the theft victim or a third party, merely 
hoping that this will discourage prosecution-as long as there is no agree-
ment.lCU8 On the other hand, the closely analogous situation of compromis-
ing a crimelcu8 is legal. That is, the victim of a crime or of some other wrong-
ful act may legally accept compensation or restitution for his injury or 
damage-even directly from the criminal himself. Compounding the crime 
occurs only when this compensation or restitution is in exchange for, or con-
ditioned upon, an agreement or understanding that the other person will not 
be prosecuted. lOGO This crime is complete upon the making of the agreement 
and thus the subsequent violation of the criminal bargain is no defense. lOGI 
Similarly, it is no defense that the other party has been tried and 
acquitted. IOU 
Absent consideration, a mere promise not to report a defendant to the 
authorities is not a crime. lOllS "Consideration" may consist of money or any-
thing of value or even some nonpecuniary advantage accruing to the person 
forbearing from prosecutinglOM (e.g., a store owner agrees not to prosecute 
on the consideration of his goods being returned by a thieO. The Iowa Su-
preme Court has held that it is immaterial that a theft victim merely re-
ceived return of his rightful property, as long as such return was premised 
upon an, agreement not to prosecute.10Il11 
Because the actus reus of this crime consists of receiving any considera-
tion, it follows that a thief who approaches his theft victim about an "ar-
rangement" can not be guilty of this offense. That is, "[o]nly the party who 
receives the consideration is criminally liable; the former criminal is not 
guilty of compounding by virtue of his act in giving the consideration."loH 
Other offenses cover the latter's wrongful conduct.10G7 
a. Misprison of Felony Distinguished. Compounding a Felony is dis-
1047. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1048. Austin v. Feron, 289 Ill. App. 528, 7 N.E.2d 476 (1937). 
1049. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 66. 
1050. See R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 521. 
1051. See Campbell v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 27, 57 S.W. 288 (1900). 
1052. See generally People v. Buckland, 13 Wend. 593 (N.Y. 1835). 
1053. "[A]bsent consideration, a mere promise not to report the offender, no matter how 
serious the offense, is not punishable." MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment (Tent. Draft 
No.9, 1959). See Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 (1819); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra 
note 12, § 66. 
1054. See Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 (1819); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra 
note 12, § 66. 
1055. State v. Ruthven, 58 Iowa 121, 12 N.W. 235 (1882). 
1056. Aikman v. Wheeling, 120 W. Va. 46, 195 S.E. 667 (1938); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 
supra note 12, § 66. 
1057. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 442. 
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tinguished from the early-English common law crime of Misprison of Fel-
onylOD8 (which is not recognized as a crime in Iowa} by the former's require-
ment of an agreement. The gravamen of the latter crime is mere non-
disclosure of a known felony committed by another person. 1008 
b. Extortion Distinguished. Compounding a Felony bears striking re-
semblance to the more severe offense of Extortion. l08o The latter can be 
committed by threatening to accuse another of a public offense, with the 
intent of obtaining anything of value for oneself or for another person. The 
focal point in Extortion is the threat, thus requiring an active role by the 
defendant. Contrastingly, one who compounds a Felony is nevertheless 
guilty merely by passively accepting unsolicited consideration by the origi-
nal criminal. In such a circumstance, the receiving party could never be 
guilty of Extortion, absent the threat. On the other hand, when the party 
compounding the Felony was the party who initiated the "arrangement," 
then he can be guilty of Extortion if the requisite threat can be proved. 
Whether thinly-veiled threats will suffice for Extortion remains to be seen. 
In resolving this matter, it is important to keep in mind that the requisite 
threat for Extortion need not be tied to threats of violence (but rather only 
to a threat "to accuse another of a public offense"). Considerable discretion 
appears to be reposed in prosecutors in selecting the appropriate charge in 
the individual circumstances. 1081 
c. Grading. The only grade of this crime is an aggravated misde-
meanor.1081 This single grade is better than the two-grade scheme under the 
pre-revised law (with the more serious grade relating to compounding a fel-
ony punishable by life imprisonment). The proper focus, used under the re-
vised law, is upon the compounding-actor's conduct in being a party to an 
unlawful agreement and in wrongfully receiving a benefit thereunder irre-
spective of the no-prosecution benefit received by the other party. 
17. 
1058. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 66; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 512-
1059. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 66. 
1060. See IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). 
1061. "The fact that there was evidence tending to show more than was required by the 
statute and also an attempt to violate another statute did not invalidate the prosecution of the 
charge here involved." State v. Stanton, 214 N.W.2d 125, 126 (Iowa 1974). Accord United 
States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) ("where criminal 
statutes overlap the government is entitled to choose among them provided it does not discrim-
inate against any class of defendants"); People v. Fowler, 516 P.2d 428, 429 (Colo. 1973). "[AJ 
single transaction that violates two criminal statutes may generally be prosecuted under either 
.... No constitutional proscription has been demonstrated which would prohibit the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion in such a situation .... " [d. See United States v. Batchelder, 99 S. 
Ct. 2198 (1979) (defendant may be sentenced under section with harsher penalty where defen-
dant's conduct falls within two sections of same criminal statute). 
1062. See note 63 supra. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 602 1979-1980
602 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
C. Offenses Relating to Official Misconduct 
1. Generally 
Eight offenses, many of which include consolidation of several pre-re-
vised statutes, comprise the offenses relating to Official Misconduct.10Ga Five 
offenses remain unchanged. Four of these relate to prohibited political activ-
ities involving public personnel or public property,10G4 and the other offense 
prohibits public personnel from having an interest in public contracts.10Ga 
2. Felonious Misconduct in Office 
The revised offense of Felonious Misconduct in Office, lOGS the intent of 
which is "to protect the integrity of public records and documents,m0G7 con-
sists of a consolidation of several prior statutes. lOGS The one new prohibition 
appears in section 721.1(2) of the Code; with the elements being: (1) a public 
officer or employee; (2) falsifying a public record or making what purports to 
be a public document; (3) with knowledgelOGe of its falsity. 
The mens rea component of this general intent crimelo70 requires only 
proof of an intent to make a false entry-instead of a fraudulent in-
tent-since, as Professor Yeager points out, "there is no legitimate reason 
for any person to knowingly falsify one of these instruments or docu-
ments."1071 Willful or intentional falsification is necessary, instead of mere 
mistakes and discrepancies arising from oversight, forgetfulness, or incom-
petence.1072 On the other hand, one's motive for the falsification is 
1063. IOWA CODE ch. 721 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these 
eight offenses, see note 12 supra. 
1064. These four offenses involve IOWA CODE §§ 721.3 (Solicitation for Political Purposes); 
721.4 (Using Public Motor Vehicles for Political Purposes); 721.5 (Participation in Political 
Activities During Working Hours by State Employees); and 721.6 (Labeling Publicly Owned 
Motor Vehicles) (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 464. There are 
no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these crimes, all of which remain in the Criminal Code 
as unrepealed sections of the 1977 low A CODE. These are all general intent crimes. See text 
accompanying notes 471-79 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1065. IOWA CODE § 721.11 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
466. This is a general intent crime. See text accompanying notes 471-79 in Part I of this Article, 
29 DRAKE L. REV. '239 (1980). 
1066. IOWA CODE § 721.1 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
464. 
1067. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 462. 
1068. See IOWA CODE §§ 740.9 (False Entries in Relation to Fees); 740.12 (False Entries, 
Returns, Certificates or Receipts); 738.21 (Forgery of Papers or Ballots) (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1069. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1070. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1071. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 462. 
1072. State v. Hamlin, 134 Iowa 493, 110 N.W. 162 (1907). 
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irrelevant. 1078 
The statute apparently covers all public records or documents actually 
kept in an official capacity during the course of public employment, whether 
or not the particular records or documents in question were required by law 
to be kept.lo74 Caselaw interpreting the predecessor statute is supportive of 
this proposition,'o711 and the revised criminal provisionlo7e still contains no 
limiting language (e.g., "when such is required ... by law") such as that 
used in the related offense of Nonfelonious Misconduct in Office. l077 
The single grade of this offense is a class D felony.l078 Again, the offense 
is not classified as a "forcible felony."1079 
3. Non-Felonious Conduct in Office 
The related, multi-faceted offense of Non-Felonious Conduct in Of-
fice loso consists of a consolidation, with only minor changes, of several for-
mer statuteslOSl concerning "fiscal mismanagement."losl However, neither an 
injury to government nor an intent to profit is required.'o88 Moreover, be-
cause of the statutory requirement that these acts be done "knowinglY,"los4 
this crime "deals only with intentional misconduct, and is not intended to 
reach negligent malfeasance or misfeasance."losli Nevertheless, the obvious 
purpose is to instill fiscal responsibility in the public sector. 
The elements of one type of misconduct covered in t.his statute are: (1) 
a public officer, employee, or person acting under color of such office or em-
ployment; (2) who knowingly; (3) makes a contract; (4) which contemplates 
an expenditure known to be in excess of that authorized by law. lose Thus, 
1073. Id. 
1074. Id. 
1075. Id. 
1076. IOWA CODE § 721.1(2) (1979) reads, in its entirety: "Falsifies any public record, or 
issues any document falsely purporting to be a public document" (emphasis added). 
1077. Id. § 721.2(2). 
1078. See note 65 supra. 
1079. See note 128 supra. 
1080. IOWA CODE § 721.1 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
463. 
1081. See IOWA CODE §§ 741.1 (accepting or giving bonuses or gifts relating to doing busi-
ness with a public agency); 740.4 (exercising public office without authority); 740.1 (extortion 
by public employee); 740.7 (failure to pay over fees); 740.11 (failure to take official oath); 740.19 
(misappropriating fees or fines); 740.3 (oppression in official capacity); 740.20 (private use of 
public property); 740.13 (solicitation for public purposes); 740.10 (taking more than lawful fee); 
740.15 (using public motor vehicles for political purposes) (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1082. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 463. 
1083. Id. 
1084. See text accompanying notes 471-79 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 
(1980). 
1085. Id. 
1086. IOWA CODE § 721.2(1) (1979). 
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this is a general intent crime. In the absence of definitive caselaw, this provi-
sion recently was the subject of a comprehensive attorney general's opin-
ionl087 regarding the criminal responsibility of county and city fiscal officers. 
Noting that Code section 721.2(1) "extends to every budgetary transaction 
involving the expenditure of tax dollars,"1088. the opinion states that each 
expenditure of public money must, in the first instance, be authorized by 
law; i.e., "each expenditure requires an appropriation which, in turn, ·re-
quires a formal act (e.g., a resolution) by the county or city governing 
body."1089 Accordingly, the opinion continues, "the mere existence of an 
unencumbered balance of cash or investments does not constitute authoriza-
tion by law for its expenditure. Before the county or city may use such mon-
eys, the governing body must appropriate same through budget 
amendments. "1090 
The knowledge requirement under the statute was interpreted in that 
opinion as being limited to "actual, positive knowledge of the facts," al-
though it was conceded that the requisite mens rea "may also include 
knowledge resulting from deliberate ignorance of the facts."109l The latter 
would include an employee who does not possess positive knowledge only 
because he consciously avoided it, for example, members of a city council 
who approve claims for expenditures while "deliberately ignoring" readily 
available information indicating the absence of necessary appropriations. 
The opinion noted: "Although we recognize the growing trend toward im-
puting actual knowledge from deliberate ignorance of the facts, we decline 
by this opinion to extend this view to section 721.2(1) and properly leave 
such conclusions to our judiciary."l091 The opinion concluded: 
If the county or city fiscal officer knowingly issues a purchase order or 
other form of contract with actual knowledge that insufficient appropria-
tions exist, section 721.2(1) is violated ·even though the fiscal officer did 
not negotiate the expenditure. Similarly, if the local governing body 
knowingly approves claims with actual knowledge of insufficient moneys, 
section 721.2(1) is violated even though the governing body did not nego-
tiate the contract. Obviously, if an additional appropriation to meet the 
excess is made according to statutory procedures before approval of the 
claims, no liability is created. And if the fiscal officer or governing body 
acts in honest mistake of the facts (e.g., inaccurate accounting, overesti-
mates, etc.), the requisite knowledge is absent and the offense is not 
committed.lo93 
1087. [1979] REP. ATI'y GEN. IA. 79-9-15. 
1088. Id. 
1089. Id. 
1090. Id. 
1091. Id. 
1092. Id. citing with approval the "highly critical examination" of the concept of deliber-
ate ignorance at Comment, 63 IOWA L. REV. 466 (1977). 
1093. [1979] REP. ATI'y GEN. IA. 79-9-15. 
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One apparent change is made in the part of the revised offense dealing 
with demanding or coercing employees to make contributions to any person, 
organization, or fund. IOe4 The pre-revised statute was expressly limited to 
political contributions, whereas the revised statutory section omits the ap-
plicable limiting language.I0811 As Professor Yeager points out, this revised 
section "is directed at the practice of forcing public employees to contribute 
to political campaigns as a condition of employment,"IOH nevertheless it ap-
pears that the total thrust of this revision will provide broader protection 
for public employees who otherwise could be pressured to contribute to 
charitable causes, such as the United Way Campaign, especially when there 
is an office "goal." The single grade of this offense is a serious 
misdemeanor. 1087 
4. Misuse of Public Records and Files 
A new general intentl01l8 Misuse of Public Records and Filesl089 was ad-
ded to the new Code as a general provision to prevent release, for personal 
profit, of certain public records or related accumulations of information by 
public officers and employees.lloo This provision, unfortunately, relates only 
to release for personal gain and does not even attempt to set a general pri-
vacy policy on "the availability of public records for general or limited in-
spection."llol The single grade of this offense is a serious misdemeanor.llol 
1094. IOWA CODE § 721.2(7) (1979). 
1095. "The only change in this subsection is that the misconduct is no longer limited to 
political contributions, but applies to any contribution." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 12, at 279. 
1096. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 463. 
1097. It is punishable by either a determinate jail term not exceeding one year or a max-
imum fine of $1000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a de-
ferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the above-mentioned confine-
ment or fine. 
1098. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1099. IOWA CODE § 721.10 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
465. 
1100. J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 12, states: 
This section establishes a general section concerning the confidentiality of records, 
particularly where there is no fee or right to such information. If this were only lim-
ited to excess fees, then it is felt that Section 721.1(3) would be applicable to cover 
the situation. However, since this section relates to information, files, dossiers, etc., 
more was contemplated than mere excess of fee. 
Id. at 284-85. 
1101. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 465. 
1102. See note 40 supra. 
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D. Obstructing Justice Offenses 
1. Generally 
Eight offenses relating to various aspects of obstructing justice comprise 
chapter 719 of the Code. The most significant change in these offenses was 
made by a 1978 amendment making Out of State Flight to Avoid Prosecu-
tionlI03 punishable conduct under the Escape section.lI~ Some significant 
changes were made in six of the eight offenses, with only minor changes 
made in the dual offenses relating to furnishing intoxicants or controlled 
substances to inmates.lIoli 
2. Interference with Official Acts 
The crime of Interference with Official Acts1lO6 represents an expansion 
of the pre-revised crime of Resisting Execution of Process. lID? This revised 
crime consists of either knowingly resisting or obstructing a known peace 
officer in performance of his duty, or knowingly restricting or obstructing 
anyone in the execution either of process or of a court order. An added ele-
ment requires knowledgelI08 by the defendant that the person being ob-
structed or resistedlI09 is a peace officer in performance of his duties, but 
knowledge of the scope of authority of the person restricted or obstructed is 
not required. Nor must the State prove that the defendant's intent was to 
obstruct the officer. 
There are two grades of this offense, although it is not divided into de-
grees. The basic offense, without more, is merely a simple misdemeanor.lllo 
Anyone of the following aggravating circumstances changes this minor of-
fense into an aggravated misdemeanor:1lll (1) purposeful infliction of "seri-
ous injury,"lllll (2) attempted infliction of "serious injury,"1ll8 (3) displaying 
1103. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1185, amending IOWA CODE § 719.4(4) (Supp. 1978). 
1104. IOWA CODE § 719.4 (1979). 
1105. See IOWA CODE §§ 719.7, .8 (1979) (Furnishing Intoxicant to Inmates and Furnish-
ing Controlled Substance to Inmates, respectively); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, 
at Nos. 1916-17 (controlled substance); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 32. Neither 
of these two minor offenses is discussed further in this Article. 
1106. IOWA CODE § 719.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1901-03; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 422. 
1107. See IOWA CODE § 742.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1108. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1109. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 1903 (definitions of "resist" 
and "obstruct"). 
1110. See note 37 supra. 
1111. See note 63 supra. 
1112. See IOWA CODE § 708.4 (1979) (Willful Injury) and text accompanying notes 107-18 
supra. 
1113. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) (Assault with Intent to Inflict a Serious Injury). 
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of a "dangerous weapon,"11l4 and (4) being armed with a "firearm,"lJJ6 each 
of which can constitute a separate crime.lJJe 
3. Refusing to Assist an Officer 
In its revised form, the crime of Refusing to Assist an OfficerlJJ7 in-
cludes three related pre-revised offenses,lJJ8 with several changes having 
been made. One change is that the assistance that can be summoned by an 
officer under the revised statute is limited to making an arrest or preventing 
any criminal act. A person refusing to assist in execution of process, upon 
being summoned by a police officer, is no longer subject to a criminal pen-
alty. Another change is effected by the addition of a factor of reasonableness 
in order for an offender's conduct to be punishable. That is, an offender now 
must act both unreasonably and without lawful cause in refusing to assist an 
officer. No statutory standard is included as to what is an "unreasonable" 
refusal. 11 19 
No element of scienter is required on the face of this statute which de-
fines a general intent crime.ll2O That is, there is no express requirement that 
the defendant know lllll that the person making the request or order for as-
sistance is indeed a police officer or magistrate.1122 This lack of knowledge, 
however, could arguably constitute a reasonable basis for the defendant re-
fusing or neglecting to render the assistance. However, the legislative intent 
may very well have been to exclude a scienter component from this crime, as 
discerned by reading this provision in pari materia with the related provi-
sion on Interference With Official ActslJlS (a scienter type offense). Finally, 
there is only one grade of this offense, which is a simple misdemeanor.lll4 
1114. See IOWA CODE § 708.1(3) (1979) (Assault) and text accompanying notes 10-55 
supra. 
1115. See IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979) (Carrying Weapons). 
1116. See notes 112-15 supra. 
1117. IOWA CODE § 719.2 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for this crime. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 423. 
1118. See IOWA CODE §§ 742.3, .5, 743.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1119. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 423. 
1120. Regarding general intent as a crime, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1121. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
572-93 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1122. See Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117 (1973), in which the Arkansas 
Supreme Court stated, in dictum, the proposition that "every citizen is bound to assist a known 
public officer in making an arrest, when called upon to do so." [d. at _, 490 S.W.2d at 119 
(emphasis added) (citing 4 Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure 223 (Anderson ed.». The 
Arkansas statute being interpreted also did not include an express scienter element, but scien-
ter was not at issue in the case. 
1123. IOWA CODE § 719.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra. 
1124. See note 37 supra. 
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4. Obstructing Prosecution or Defense 
The pre-revised crime of Interference with Administration of Justicelllll 
was made more restrictive in its application in the new crime of Obstructing 
, Pr-osecution or Defense, lUe as evidenced by making this crime a specific in-
tent offense.1l27 The revised offense basically involves tampering with physi-
cal evidence and with witnesses during the pre-trial or investigatory 
stage.lUe Such prohibited acts include: (1) knowingly tampering with admis-
sible physical evidence; or (2) knowingly making available or furnishing false 
information with the intent that it be used in another's trial; or (3) know-
ingly inducing a material witness either to fail to appear when subpoenaed 
or to leave the state, or to conceal oneself. lUll Such acts must be done "with 
intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of 
any person."1l80 There is only one grade of this offense. It is an aggravated 
misdemeanor .1181 
5. Escape 
The revised crime of Escapel131 differs, inter alia, from its predeces-
sor1133 by not equally punishing the acts of escape and attempted escape.llM 
This 'is accomplished by providing separate paragraphs for: (1) the consum-
mated offense of an intentionalll811 escape either from any "detention facil-
ity"1138 or from the custody of any public personnel to whom the defendant 
has been entrusted;1187 and (2) the essentially inchoate activity of being 
1125. See IOWA CODE § 723.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1126. IOWA CODE § 719.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1904-05; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 424. 
1127. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 510-10.1 
in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1128. See IOWA CODE §§ 720.2-.4 (1979) (interference with judicial process offenses of Per-
jury, Suborning Perjury, and Tampering With Witnesses or Jurors). 
1129. The more serious crime of Suborning Perjury, a class D felony, is committed if the 
inducement or attempted inducement is to a witness to testify falsely at trial or at some other 
official proceeding. See IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1979) and text accompanying note 65 supra. 
1130. IOWA CODE § 719.3 (1979). 
1131. See note 63 supra. 
1132. IOWA CODE § 719.4 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1906-10; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 425-28. 
1133. See IOWA CODE §§ 745.1, .3, .8 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1134. [d. § 745.18. There is no counterpart in the new Criminal Code, thus requiring an 
actual escape except for the alternative mode of being absent without leave. 
1135. Proof of intent was not an essential element of Escape under the pre-revised code. 
See State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871,134 N.W.2d 922 (1965). "The manner of effecting the escape 
is immaterial. It can !>e accomplished by stealth, guile, or violence." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 12, § 426. 
1136. This consolidates into one crime the two separate pre-revised crimes of prison 
break and breaking jail. See IOWA CODE §§ 745.1, .8 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1137. IOWA CODE § 719.4(2) (1979). Escape under either of these two alternative code sec-
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knowingly and voluntarily absent from any place where a prisoner is re-
Quired to be.1l38 This absent-without-Ieave provision would appear to en-
compass, attempted escapees who did not succeed in breaking out and thus 
did not escape from the detention facility, or did not succeed in breaking 
away from a custodial officer. 
In State v. Davis,1139 the Iowa Supreme Court recently reversed an es-
cape (by prison break)1140 conviction of a prison inmate, basing its reversal 
on the pre-revised escape law. In this case, the defendant inmate had failed 
to return to his jail cell at the designated time of day. The inmate had been 
given initial permission by prison authorities to leave his cell but had re-
mained in the penitentiary library (drinking alcohol), and did not even at-
tempt to leave the prison grounds. Since the gravamen of the pre-revised 
offense was unauthorized departure/HI the court reversed the conviction. In 
so doing, the court noted in dictum that the new revised crime of Escape 
(through its absent without leave provision) would impose criminal culpabil-
ity upon an inmate who failed to make a timely return to his jail cell, even 
though he had initial permission to leave and had made no attempt to leave 
the institution itself.114l1 Distinguishing State v. Eads,1143 the court noted 
that the defendant Eads was convicted under the pre-revised crime of 
Breaking Jail1144 because of his failure to return to the county jail following 
work release. The crucial point was that the Eads decision turned on the 
issue that a county jail prisoner on work release remained "in the legal cus-
tody of the Sheriff."I1411 No such comparable language was contained in the 
statute interpreted in Davis. The court in Davis noted therein that "[t]he 
new Iowa Criminal Code, not applicable here, plainly describes the offense 
the State would have us find in [the pre-revised] section 745.1."1146 
The substantive scope of the revised offense was restricted by not re-
taining violation of parole1147 as conduct constituting Escape. Violation of 
parole, under the new Criminal Code, is not a separate criminal offense. In-
stead, the parolee will only be subject to serving out the remainder, or some 
indefinite part thereof, of his sentence. 
tions is a class D felony if the defendant was convicted of or charged with any class of felony on 
the underlying offense, but only a serious misdemeanor when the underlying offense was any 
class of misdemeanor. 
1138. IOWA CODE § 719.4(3) (1979). This activity is punishable uniformly as a serious mis· 
demeanor, irrespective of whether the underlying conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor. 
1139. 271 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1978). 
1140. See IOWA CODE § 745.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1141. 271 N.W.2d at 696 (citing State v. Horstman, 218 N.W.2d 604, 605 (Iowa 1974». 
1142. [d. 
1143. 234 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1975). 
1144. See IOWA CODE § 745.8 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1145. See IOWA CODE § 356.26 (1979). 
1146. 271 N.W.2d at 696. 
1147. See IOWA CODE. § 74{i.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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A legislative amendment in 19781148 restored the pre-revised require-
ment1149 that a sentence for Escape shall run consecutively with the original 
sentence, that is, to commence after the expiration of the term of the origi-
nal sentence. The revised Criminal Code as passed in 1976 had omitted this 
requirement, and had thus left the matter to the judicial discretion of the 
sentencing judge. llIlO Of course, inclusion of the mandatory term "shall" 
removes discretion from the sentencing court, leaving only consecutive 
sentences in Escape cases. 
a. Flight to Avoid Prosecution. An addition was made by a 1978 
amendment to the crime of Escape to include Flight to Avoid Prosecu-
tion.11I11 This is a separate crime which is new to Iowa law. The elements of 
this offense are: (1) fleeing from Iowa; (2) to avoid prosecution; (3) for a 
felony or an aggravated misdemeanor. This is patterned after the federal 
crime of Flight to Avoid Prosecution or Giving Testimony,11II2 which is con-
siderably broader in its scope. The idea behind the new Iowa crime was to 
be able to invoke (for extradition purposes) the federal statute which is lim-
ited, by express terms, to interstate flight to avoid state prosecutions for a 
felony. This purpose is accomplished by making the state crime of Flight to 
Avoid Prosecution a class 0 felony. A collateral effect, however, is to impose 
additional penalties upon an offender who flees to avoid prosecution but 
nevertheless is apprehended, returned, and convicted of both the underlying 
offense and the "flight" offense. The apparent anomaly in this crime is. that 
a person who flees Iowa to avoid prosecution on only an aggravated misde-
meanor charge commits a class 0 felony by the collateral act of fleeing. 
It appears clear that under the Iowa statute, unlike its federal counter-
part, this crime is not triggered until formal commencement of prosecu-
tion. lUIs This is because the word "prosecution" is used in section 719.4(4) of 
the Code without further definition. Thus, the general definitional clause in 
section 801.4(12) of the Code governs the definition of "prosecution", de-
fined therein as "the commencement, including the filing of a complaint, 
and continuance of a criminal proceeding, and pursuit of that proceeding to 
final judgment .... "11114 Strictly interpreted, this means that a person who 
commits a felony or an aggravated misdemeanor will not violate this section 
if he flees before commencement of the prosecution against him. 
1148. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1091, § 4. 
1149. See IOWA CODE § 745.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1150. See State v. Buck, 275 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1979). 
1151. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1185, amending IOWA CODE § 719.4 (Supp. 1978). See 
generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 429. 
1152. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970). 
1153. See Lupino v. United States, 268 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
834 (1959); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 
(1957); contra, United States v. Rappaport, 156 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1957). 
1154. IOWA CODE § 801.4(12) (1979). 
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This is a specific intentlUltl crime, requiring proof that the defendant 
left the state with the intent "to avoid prosecution for a public offense 
.... "lUI8 Judicial interpretations of the federal statute have established 
that "the dominant purpose" of the interstate flight need not be to avoid 
prosecution,1l1l7 but that mere absence from the originating state is not suffi-
cient proof of an intent to flee to avoid prosecution. litiS 
b. Felony Murder Rule. One major change in the Code is that Escape 
has been made an underlying felony for purposes of the application of the 
felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree.1llI9 Under the prior law, 
unpremeditated murders during an escape or attempted escape we;e pun-
ishable under the felony murder rule1180 only as second-degree murder.1181 
c. Grading. There are four grades, including two classifications of pen-
alty schedules, of this offense, although they are not divided into degrees. It 
is a class D felony1182 for either (1) a person convicted of (or charged with) 
any felony to intentionally escape from any detention facility, or (2) a per-
son to flee from Iowa to avoid prosecution on a felony or an aggravated mis-
demeanor. Only a serious misdemeanor penalty1163 applies for either (1) a 
person convicted of (or charged with) any class of misdemeanor to inten-
tionally escape from any detention facility, or (2) a prisoner to knowingly 
and voluntarily absent himself from any place he is required to be. 
6. Assisting a Prisoner to Escape 
This revised offense has apparently undergone some changes from the 
prior law. The revised offensel184 focuses upon the actor's conduct, consist-
ing either of introducing or knowingly1l8t1 causing to be introduced into the 
possession of any prisoner certain instruments or devices for facilitating es-
cape. The crime is completed upon the mere rendering of assistance coupled 
with the intentl188 "to facilitate the escape of any prisoner,"1187 thus not 
1155. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1156. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1185. 
1157. Hett v. United States, 353 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 
(1966). 
1158. Barrow v. Owen, 89 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1937). 
1159. See IOWA CODE § 707.2(3) (1979) and text accompanying notes 1008-15 supra. 
1160. IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978) contained an all-inclusive listing of five 
underlying felonies (other than Escape) for purposes of felony murder in the first degree. 
1161. IOWA CODE § 690.3 (1977) (repealed 1978) defined second-degree murder as all mur-
der which was not first-degree murder, thus including felony murder during an Escape. 
1162. See note 65 supra. 
1163. See note 40 supra. 
1164. IOWA CODE § 719.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
1913-15; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 431. 
1165. Regarding knowledge as a particularized state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
480-509 in Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1166. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 480-509 in 
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requiring that any prisoner actually attempt to escape. In contrast, the lan-
guage of the pre-revised statute1188 appears to have required at least an at-
tempted escape. Moreover, unlike the pre-revised law/189 the revised offense 
does not include an attempt.1l7O 
The revised offense apeears to be more restrictive in the type of assis-
tance which. is criminalized. This assistance is statutorily limited to intro-
duction of "any weapon, explosive or incendiary substance, rope, ladder, or 
any [escape-facilitating] instrument or device"l171 into any detention or cor-
rectional facility. This compares with the former statutory language of a 
person aiding or assisting "by any means whatever" a prisoner in any place 
of confinement in an attempt to escape therefrom.1l72 The import of this 
statutory change is that the revised crime is more restrictive in its scope of 
included conduct. That is, this section "applies only to the listed acts which 
will be done before the escape is attempted and which, by themselves, would 
not be more than mere. preparation for the attempt, although any of them 
would be an overt act satisfying the requirements of the conspiracy section, 
section 706.1."1178 Other types of assistance to "escaping" prisoner would be 
left to be punishable Under traditional aidIng or abetting,1174 or conspir-
acy,11711 provisions. 
It is interesting to note that the offense of Assisting a Prisoner to Es-
cape can be punishable more severely than the underlying offense of Escape 
itself. Permitting a class A felon to escape from custody is a class C fel-
ony,l178 whereas an escaping class A felon is subject only to a class D felony 
penalty.1177 The same class D felony penalty schedule for Escape and for 
Assisting an Escape, however, are in effect for other felonies. Nevertheless, 
the unlawful act of assisting an escape by misdemeanants of any class is also 
punishable as a class D felony, while escapes by misdemeanants of any class 
are punishable merely as serious misdemeanors. Legislative clarification in 
this are would be of great assistance. 
7. Permitting a Prisoner to Escape 
The only substantive change in the offense of Permitting a Prisoner to 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1167. IOWA CODE 719.6 (1979). 
1168. See IOWA CODE §§ 745.12·.18 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1169. See id. § 745.18. 
1170. See J. ROEHRICK, supra note 12, at 257. 
1171. IOWA CODE § 719.6 (1979). 
1172. See IOWA CODE § 745.18 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1173. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 431. 
1174. See IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 398-421 in Part I of this 
Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1175. See IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1979). 
1176. See note 311 supra. 
1177. See note 65 supra. 
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Escape1178 is that, unlike its predecessor statute,1l79 the revised crime ex-
pressly applies not only to a jailor or other public personnel permitting, aid-
ing, or abetting a prisoner to escape, but also to such conduct related to an 
attempted escape. The revised statute makes it clear, through the language 
of "voluntarily ll8O permits, aids, or abets,"1181 that an intentional act (as 
opposed to negligence) is necessary to incur criminal culpability. The change 
in terminology from "suffering" escape to the revised language of "permits, 
aids or abets" should be of no consequence, however.ll82 The literal "reach" 
of this statute, especially as to permitting an escape, is recognized by Pro-
fessor Yeager as follows: 
When the person who permits the escape is also the person who has cus-
tody of the prisoner, and therefore has an affirmative duty to retain such 
custody, any failure to take the necessary steps to prevent an escape is 
permitting the escape. There seems to be no reason why the same cannot 
be said of any officer or employee who is aware of the escape attempt and 
who is in a position to prevent or impede it, but fails to do SO."S8 
The same questionable two-level grading scheme applies for this offense 
as for the related offense of Assisting a Prisoner to Escape. 1184 
1. Generally 
VII. MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES 
A. Animal O{fenses118r> 
Only minor changes were made in the three offenses which, taken to-
gether, provide limited protection to domestic animals from "some acts of 
wanton selfish cruelty."1188 The aggravated misdemeanorll87 crime of Injury 
to Animalsl188 is limited to maliciously causing aggravated injury to domes-
tic animals belonging to another. Contrastingly, the related simple misde-
meanor1189 offense of Cruelty to Animalsll90 is broader in scope because it 
1178. IOWA CODE § 719.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, Nos. 
1911-12; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 430. 
1179. See IOWA CODE §§ 745.9-.11 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1180. Regarding voluntarily as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 566-68 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1181. IOWA CODE § 719.5 (1979) (emphasis added). 
1182. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 430. 
1183. Id. § 430. 
1184. See text accompanying notes 1178-82 supra. 
1185. IOWA CODE §§ 717.1-.3 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 
12, for any of these offenses. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 391-94. 
1186. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 391. 
1187. See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
1188. Compare IOWA CODE § 717.1 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 717.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 392. 
1189. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
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encompasses intentional or negligent mistreatment of domestic animals be-
longing either to another or to defendant himself. The final related crime, 
Exhibitions and Fights,1191 is limited in its application to punish promoters 
for staging exhibitions where animals fight or are tormented. This section 
also applies to those persons furnishing a place for such exhibitions.1192 Also, 
this section is the only one of the three offenses extending its protection to 
wild, non-domesticated creatures.119S It is a serious misdemeanorY94 
There is no substantive change in these offenses, with the principal 
change being the inclusion of a single broad definition, "a nonhuman verte-
brate,"11911 to define the term "animal." This single definition replaces the 
extensive listing of specific animals under the former statutes. Nevertheless, 
all "animals" are not included in the protections of these three related of-
fenses. Section 717.1 covers malicious injury only to animals belonging to 
another. Section 717.2 is limited to cruelty to only certain types of animals 
(i.e., "any domestic animal, or fowl, or any dog or cat"). Section 717.3, while 
being the only provision to include all animals (including wild animals), has 
the most limited coverage (i.e., commercially using "animals," for exhibi-
tions and fights). 
2. Injury to Animals 
The elements of this offense are: (1) maliciously; (2) killing, maiming, or 
disfiguring; (3) any "animal"; (4) of another; (5) having no right to do so. 
Alternatively, this offense can be committed either by maliciously adminis-
tering poison to another's animal or by exposing another's animal to poison 
with the intent that it be taken. The latter of the three circumstances is the 
only one not requiring actual harm to the animal. 
The fundamental purpose of this section is, as it always has been, to 
protect animal owners from financial or other loss. (Legislative solicitude for 
animals themselves is embodied in section 717.2, as discussed below). Thus,. 
no protection whatsoever is given under section 717.1 to unowned animals or 
to animals owned by the perpetrator of the injury. Moreover, the terms "dis-
figure" and "malice" have been interpreted broadly to facilitate protection 
of animal owners, as discussed below. ll96 
1190. Compare IOWA CODE § 717.2 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 717.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 393. 
1191. Compare IOWA CODE § 717.3 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 394. 
1192. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, states that "[s]pectators, and even partici-
pants, do not violate this section unless they have taken a more active part in arranging, pro-
moting, or staging the exhibition. For example, bird handlers at cockfights are not included." 
Id. § 394. 
1193. Id. § 393. 
1194. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
1195. IOWA CODE § 702.3 (1979). 
1196. See text accompanying notes 1198-1204 infra. 
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The revised provision updates this section of the Code beyond Nine-
teenth Century notions. It recognizes that owners of unusual and exotic 
"non-human vertebrates" can suffer just as much from the killing, maiming 
and disfiguring of their animals as can dog-breeders and cattlefeeders. The 
original "Injuries to Beasts" provision was codified in 1851. It was drawn to 
protect farmers from livestock marauders, and it remained substantially un-
changed until the 1979 revision. Practically, of course, livestock owners will 
remain the single most important group protected by section 717.1. Even so, 
the new section 717.1 extends protection to owners of animals of all 
sorts-from zoo and circus animals to pet canaries and pet sharks-the sole 
exclusion being non-vertebrates. 
a. "Disfigure." There may be some confusion as to the meanings of 
"disfigure"1l97 and "maliciously." According to Professor Yeager, "[t]he 
word 'disfigure,' taken in its context, means some permanent disfigurement, 
and not something temporary, as may result from clipping the animal's hair 
in a strange fashion, even though a temporary disfigurement may be annoy-
ing to the owner . . . . "1198 The legislative and interpretive history of the 
pre-revised law does not support this conclusion, however. The words "mali-
ciously kill, maim or disfigure" were adopted wholesale from the previous 
enactment, which, in turn, took the phrase from past codifications beginning 
in 1851. The courts are likely, therefore, to attach especially heavy prece-
dential value to past interpretations of these words. Caselaw supports the 
conclusion that "maims" means permanent injuries and "disfigure" means 
non-permanent injuries. Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated: 
"[t]o maim as applied to domestic animals, implies some permanent injury; 
but to disfigure is a lower grade of the same offense, and the disfiguring 
need not be of a permanent character to make the offense complete."1l99 
The example of "disfiguring" given in that case was shaving a horse's mane 
or tail. 
"Disfiguring" as "non-permanent injury" is consistent with the conclu-
sion that section 717.1 is designed to protect animal owners, not animals. A 
painless shaving gives a dog no grief, but it could cause great injury to an 
owner, particularly if the animal is kept for show purposes. ' 
b. Maliciously.120o Early judicial interpretations of "maliciously" sup-
port both of these conclusions. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court has 
written that: 
[m]alice toward the owner of the animal is the ingredient of this offense; 
and although the injury may be but very slight, yet if it is of such a 
1197. Regarding disfigurement to a human being, see text accompanying notes 232-38 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1198. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 392. 
1199. State v. Harris, 11 Iowa 414, 415 (1861). 
1200. Regarding malice as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 549-65 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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character as to lessen the value of the animal to the owner, and shows 
the malicious intention of the person committing the act, we think, 
under the statute the offense is complete.1201 
Similarly, it has said that "[m]ere wantonness, or an intent simply to injure 
the animal without malice against the person. . . is not sufficient. . . . But 
although the owner may be unknown, if the act is done maliciously, for the 
purpose and with the intent of injuring such person, it is sufficient. "1202 
Malice must be directed toward the animal owner, and it will even be 
inferred if the act is wanton and the owner suffers injury. nos Since the value 
of the animal to the owner might be lessened by temporary disfigurement, 
as well as by permanent maiming, such permanence or lack thereof should 
be irrelevant. Furthermore, if "disfigure" and "maim" are to be equated, as 
Professor Yeager implies, there would have been no reason for the General 
Assembly to have used two distinct words. 
Admittedly, the problem of when there is injury and when there is not 
remains. State v. Harris1204 suggests a broad test, i.e., an animal owner 
might be injured emotionally, as well as financially. The problem will arise 
only rarely, that being when the animal is maimed or disfigured but the 
owner suffers no financial loss. Logic and convenience might prescribe a 
market value test, but justice counsels otherwise. An old man, fondly at-
tached to a worthless old mongrel, is entitled to the same protection under 
the criminal law as the farmer who owns cattle of great value. 
c. Relationship to Criminal Mischief. Another important issue raised 
by section 717.1 is its relation to section 716.1-criminal mischief. Criminal 
mischief is defined therein as "damage, defacing, alteration, or destruction 
of tangible property," and section 702.14 defines "property" as "anything of 
value, whether publicly or privately owned. The term includes both tangible 
and intangible property, labor and services. The term includes all that is 
included in the terms 'real property' and 'personal property.' " 
Professor Yeager120Ii asserts that sections 716.1 and 717.1 are mutually 
exclusive, that section 716.1 encompasses inanimate property and section 
717.1 animate. There seems to be little foundation for this assertion, as the 
statutory language is clear-section 716.1 says "tangible property." The dis-
tinction made is between tangible and intangible (and animals certainly are 
tangible), not between animate and inanimate. Had the General Assembly 
intended the latter distinction, it seems clear that they would have made it, 
since legislative awareness of such distinctions is evidenced by distinctions 
between animate and inanimate things being expressly made in the offense 
1201. [d. 
1202. State v. Linde, 54 Iowa 139, 142, 6 N.W. 168, 172 (1880). 
1203. State v. Williamson, 68 Iowa 351, 352, 27 N.W. 259, 261 (1886). 
1204. 11 Iowa 414 (1861). 
1205. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 392. 
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of Trespass. 1208 Further, chapters 714-716 of the 1979 Code include exhaus-
tive provisions on malicious mischief to various types of property. In all like-
lihood, the General Assembly intended to consolidate all previously enumer-
ated offenses into one-criminal mischief. It follows that all previously-
enumerated property is now encompassed by the term "tangible property." 
This conclusion is buttressed by an examination of the pre-revised offense of 
Malicious Injury.1207 It forbade anyone to "willfully and maliciously destroy, 
injure, or secrete any goods, chattels or valuable papers of another . . . ." 
The term "chattels" was broadly interpreted in a similar forerunner statute 
as being used "in its broadest sense" and as such "undoubtedly cover[ing] 
every kind of personal property."1208 Finally, in the 1895 case State v. 
Phipps,1209 the defendant's conviction for malicious mischief to animals was 
upheld even though the Code specifically prohibited injuries to animals in 
another section, similar to the overlapping in the present Code. 
All of this indicates that malicious injury to animals is probably subject 
to prosecution under both provisions, which has some important ramifica-
tions. First, anything prosecuted under section 717.1 will be punishable as 
an aggravated misdemeanor. Under chapter 716, the value of the animal's 
treatment, in the case of injury, or replacement value, in the case of killing, 
will determine the degree of the offense. First and second degree criminal 
mischief are felonies. 
Second, section 716.1 may encompass a broader range of animals than 
section 717.1, as the former includes "public property," and the latter only 
animals "of another." While municipal zoo animals may be covered by sec-
tion 717.1, almost certainly they would be covered under section 716.1. It is 
even conceivable that wild animals could fall within the protection of sec-
tion 716.1 if they are considered the ultimate property of the sovereign 
state. 
Finally, section 716.1 does not require a showing of malice to the owner. 
The mischief need only be done "intentionally by one who has no right to so 
act." 
d. Without a Right To Do So. An essential element of section 716.1 is 
that the perpetrator injured another's animal while "having no right to do 
so." This should include all traditional defenses to criminal behavior (e.g., 
self defense, defense of others, and defense of property), as well as express 
statutory exceptions permitting destruction of animals in limited circum-
stances. I210 This same limitation applies to any prosecutions for Malicious 
Mischief. 1211 
1206. See IOWA CODE § 716.7(2)(a), (d) (1979). 
1207. See IOWA CODE § 714.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1208. State v. Phipps, 95 Iowa 491, 493, 64 N.W. 411, 414 (1895). 
1209. [d. 
1210. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 162.19, 163.10, 188.50, 351.26, .27, .37, .39 (1979). 
1211. See text accompanying notes 1200-04 supra. 
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3. Cruelty to Animals 
Section 717.2 protects a select group of animals from enumerated acts 
of human cruelty. It is clearly designed to protect animals and not animal-
owners, but it is more narrowly drawn than previous provisions,1212 which 
protected "any animal" and "any creature." Why this change was made is 
not entirely clear. It is particularly mysterious in light of the expanded cov-
erage of section 717.1 and the new protection provided by section 717.3. Per-
haps the legislators felt a blanket provision was too difficult to enforce. In 
any case, precisely what is included within "any domestic animal, or fowl" 
must await a judicial determination. Older cases, interpreting "domestic 
animal" for purposes of section 717.1 and its forerunners, have accepted 
hogs,I213 oxen,I214 and horses. un 
Section 717.2 leaves other questions unanswered. The first prohibited 
act-failing to supply sufficient food and water-clearly applies only to 
those who have confined or impounded an animal. So, apparently, there is 
no affirmative duty to give food and water to an animal over which one does 
not have custody. 
The language of the provision (stated in the disjunctive, the repeated 
"who") indicates that the other prohibited acts apply without regard to who 
has confined the animal, or even if the animal is confined. Most of the enu-
merated transgressions are self-explanatory. Deprivation of necessary suste-
nance differs from failure to supply food and water only in that the former 
requires an active deprivation, not merely a failure to act, while the latter 
imposes an affirmative duty which may be violated by omission. Comment-
ing on similar language, the Iowa Supreme Court has said in dicta: 
[o]nly those owning or having the care or control [of animals] ... are 
required to provide [them] 'with proper food, drink, shelter or protection 
from weather,' and it was not intended to impose on others who may 
learn of an animal's lack of proper care the duty to supply these at the 
peril of being punished by the criminal laws of the state. 1216 
It is not clear whether "sustenance" includes shelter. The previous Code 
used the words "unnecessarily fail to provide the same with proper food, 
drink, shelter, or protection from the weather .... "1217 The express altera-
tion, coupled with the commonly understood meaning of "sustenance," may 
indicate an intent to exclude shelter. 
It is also not clear whether the phrase "unjustfied pain, distress or suf-
fering" applies only to "kill any such animal" or also to the other enumer-
1212. See IOWA CODE §§ 717.2, .3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1213. State v. Enslow, 10 Iowa 115 (1859). 
1214. State v. Harris, 11 Iowa 414 (1861). 
1215. State v. Lightfoot, 107 Iowa 344, 78 N.W. 41 (1899). 
1216. Pieper v. Krutzfeldt, 155 Iowa 716, 721, 136 N.W. 904, 906 (1912). 
1217. IOWA CODE § 717.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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ated acts of cruelty. Nor is it clear when "pain, distress or suffering" is "un-
justified." The best and most logical explanation is that "torture, torment, 
deprive of necessary sustenance, mutilate, overdrive, overload, drive where 
overloaded, beat, or kill" is meant to be an exhaustive list of acts of cruelty, 
which acts are defined as causing "unjustified pain, distress, or suffering." 
What is justified and what is not will depend largely on judicial sympathy 
for individual members of the animal kingdom. 
4. Exhibitions and Fights 
Section 717.3 is new, and like section 717.2, it refers to "any animal." 
However, it does not limit protection to animals "of another." Thus, wild 
animals are given only this limited protection in chapter 717. 
Although section 717.3 only applies to promoters and to persons who 
keep places where prohibited exhibitions and fights are held, section 725.11 
prohibits related conduct. That provision makes it a serious misdemeanor to 
have any connection with money paid as admission to any animal fights or 
baiting spectacles. The scope of section 725.11 may be broad enough to 
cover everyone remotely connected with such an affair, possibly including 
even the spectators.1218 
B. Bribery and Corruption Offenses1219 
1. Generally 
Five bribery offenses,122o three voting offenses,1221 and the crime of Mis-
conduct by Election Official1m comprise the bribery and corruption offenses 
in chapter 722 of the Iowa Code. Seven of these offenses remain unchanged 
from their pre-revised form. Only two bribery offenses relating to public em-
ployment or public service have been changed, but not until the 1980 legis-
lative session. 
1218. See note 1192 supra. 
1219. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these offenses. See generally J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 481-90. 
1220. These offenses, all of which essentially are specific intent crimes, are IOWA CODE §§ 
722.1 (Bribery); 722.2 (Accepting a Bribe); 722.3 (Bribery in Sports); 722.4 (Bribery of an Elec-
tor); 722.6 (Bribery of Election Officials) (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 12, §§ 482-86. 
1221. These offenses, none of which includes a particularized state of mind, are IOWA 
CODE §§ 722.5 (Improper Voting); 722.8 (Duress to Prevent Voting); 722.9 (Duress to Procure 
Voting) (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 487, 489-90. 
1222. IOWA CODE § 722.7 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
488. This is a particularized state of mind crime, with the prosecution required to prove that 
defendant "knowingly" did any of the prohibited acts. For a detailed discussion of knowledge 
as a requisite mental state of criminal activity, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in Part I of 
this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
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2. Bribery and Accepting Bribes 
The general crime of Bribery1223 in the new Iowa Criminal Code consists 
of a consolidation of several pre-r~vised Code sections into one, with a uni-
form penalty applying to "all attempts to bribe persons who are serving in a 
public capacity."1224 The statutory uniformity was mandated in 1975 by the 
Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Books.122~ Like prior law,1226 Bribery also 
encompasses the attempt to bribe, and makes the attempt equally punisha-
ble with the consummated offense. Conversely, the related offense of Ac-
cepting a Bribe1227 focuses upon the public official or employee who solicits 
or receives a bribe. 
With the substantive nature of these two offenses unchanged in the new 
Iowa Criminal Code as it went into effect in 1978, and as it was amended in 
1980, Iowa continues to have "very likely the strictest bribery statutes in 
existence."122s This is because of the broad statutory language prohibiting 
the offering or giving of "anything of value or any benefit"1229 to public of-
ficers or employees with the understanding that their official actions would 
be influenced thereby, and conversely the soliciting or accepting of same by 
public officers or employees.u3o 
The General Assembly rejected a bill in 19801231 which would amend 
these two bribery statutes to permit the giving, receiving, and even soliciting 
of gifts up to fifty dollar value "in anyone occurrence"1232 to any person 
serving in a public capacity even when done so with the intent to influence 
that person's official actions. An amendment that passed12ss maintained the 
prohibition against any gratuity but added the requirement that any gift, in· 
order to be illegal under these bribery statutes, must haven been "given pur-
suant to an agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the gift would 
influence the person serving in a public capacity."12s4 
The elements of the revised crime of Briberyl2S~ are: (1) offering, prom-
ising, or giving; (2) anything of value or any benefit; (3) to any person en-
gaged in a public capacity; (4) pursuant to an agreement or arrangement or 
understanding; (5) that the thing of value or benefit will influence the per-
1223. IOWA CODE § 722.1 (1979). 
1224. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 482, at 120. 
1225. State v. Books, 225 N.W.2d 322, 323-24 (Iowa 1975). 
1226. See IOWA CODE §§ 739.1, .4, .6, .11 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1227. IOWA CODE § 722.2 (1979). 
1228. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 481. The insignificant amendments in 
1980 apparently would not change Professor Yeager's opinion (stated in 1979). 
1229. IOWA CODE § 722.1 (1979). 
1230. [d. 
1231. H.F. 720 (1980). 
1232. [d. 
1233. H.F. 687 §§ 63 & 64 (1980). 
1234. [d. 
1235. IOWA CODE § 722.1 (1979), as amended by H.F. 687, § 63(m) 68th G.A. (1980). 
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son's exercise of his public duties. Similarly, those of the related revised 
crime of Accepting a Bribeuse are: (1) a person engaged in a public capacity; 
(2) knowingly; (3) accepting or receiving or soliciting; (4) any promise or 
anything of value on any benefit; (5) pursuant to an understanding or ar-
rangement; (6) that the promise, thing of value, or benefit will influence his 
exercise of public duties. 
a. Any Gratuity. The phrase "anything of value or any benefit" was 
construed in a 1977 attorney general opinion1237 to preclude public officials 
from being offered or accepting any gratuity, "no matter how slight or insig-
nificant,"US8 including a single cup of coffee or a free ride in an automobile. 
Of course, such a gratuity must have been received with knowledge that it 
was given with the intent to influence his official actions, although not nec-
essarily in a particular transaction. After the 1980 amendment, it is neces-
sary to show an agreement, arrangement, or understanding that the gift is 
for the purpose of influencing such official actions. 
This restrictive reading of a gratuity was reaffirmed, or at least not re-
jected, in a letter released by the Iowa Attorney General in 1979.1138 Never-
theless, an exception for general business or advertising gifts was essentially 
created in a subsequent official attorney general's opinion.124o That opinion 
suggested that businesses could give away small items "with their names 
and logos prominently displayed for advertising purposes" such as "pencils, 
letter openers, calendars, and the like" to "past customers, friends, other 
businesses as well as to government officials, employees, and agencies," with-
out running afoul of the bribery statutes.12n This was because of practical 
difficulties of proof as to the requirement of intent to influence official ac-
tions in these limited circumstances: "the value of the gift is very small, is 
given to a large group of people and not exclusively to public officials, and 
has obvious advertising benefits. "1142 
b. Intent. The intent of the donor to influence the donee's official ac-
tions is the gravamen of these two bribery offenses. As a result, the prosecu-
tion need not prove that the donee's official actions were, in fact, influenced. 
However, the donee apparently must know that the donor's purpose in giv-
ing the gift was to influence the donee's official actions. This is because the 
Accepting a Bribe statute refers to the public official or employee "know-
ingly [accepting] or [receiving] any promise or anything of value or any ben-
efit given pursuant to an understanding or arrangement that the promise or 
1236. IOWA CODE § 722.2 (1979), as amended by H.F. 687, § 64, 68th G.A. (1980). 
1237. [1977] REP. ATT'y GEN. IA. 77-12-13. 
1238. [d. 
1239. Letter, Miller to Pelton and Johnson, March 21, 1979. 
1240. [1979] REP. ATT'y GEN. IA. 79-4-27. 
1241. [d. 
1242. [d. 
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thing of value or benefit will influence .... "1243 
The placement of the adverb "knowingly"1244 limits its scope to the acts 
of accepting or receiving. This means that one must have been personally 
aware that he had received a gift. 
3. Gift Law Limitations 
The overlapping of these bribery offenses in chapter 722 with the unre-
pealed pre-revised gift-limitation124G law in section 68B.5 of the Iowa Code 
has continued. In the 1980 amendments, section 68B.5 had not been consid-
ered to be preempted by these bribery offenses under the pre-revised law.1248 
The amended gift law permits gifts1247 up to fifty dollars in value "in 
anyone occurrence" to any person serving in a public capacity. An unlim-
ited number of gifts can be offered, given, received, and even solicited, how-
ever, so long as the fifty dollars per occurrence limitation is not exceeded. 
The fifty dollars limitation applies to gifts involved "in anyone occur-
rence." This means that the value of all gifts involved in the same "occur-
rence" must be totalled, and not that each gift can equal up to fifty dollars 
when there are multiple gifts. m8 
What constitutes an "occurrence" is not set out in the statute. In its 
broadest sense, this could mean each separate contact which conceivably 
could occur daily if not hourly. Thus, a legislative lobbyist who has ten dif-
ferent meetings with a legislator on the same day to discuss the same legisla-
tive matter conceivabiy could legally "shower" that individual legislator 
with up to five hundred dollars worth of gifts during that one day. 
A more restrictive interpretation of the term "occurrence" is desirable 
to prevent emasculation of the apparent legislative intent to legitimatize the 
giving and receiving of small gifts. Indeed, probably the most commonly ex-
pressed concern by legislators had been their having to pay for their own 
meals and drinks even at meetings where they had spoken pro bono. It is 
submitted that an "occurrence" should be read in light of a function or a 
project, instead of every single face-to-face contact. Under this interpreta-
tion, a lobbyist could only confer one fifty dollar bevy of gifts upon an indi-
vidual legislator while lobbying on the same legislative matter. Accordingly, 
there could be one fifty dollar gift all at once or numerous small gifts which 
do not exceed a cumulative total of fifty dollars. This approach would per-
mit the fifty dollar limit for each occassion that a legislator spoke before the 
1243. IOWA CODE § 722.2 (1979), as amended by H.F. 687, § 64, 68th G.A. (1980). 
1244. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1245. H.F. 687, §§ 6-8, 68th G.A. (1980). 
1246. [1977) REP. ATI'y GEN. IA. 77-12-13. 
1247. The term "Gifts" is defined in IOWA CODE § 68B.2 (1979) (amended 1980). See H.F. 
687, § 6, 68th G.A. (1980). 
1248. [1980) REP. ATI'y GEN. IA. 80-6-20. 
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same organization, provided, of course, that each speech was bona-fide. 
An attorney general's opinion,1249 issued June 25, 1980, concluded that 
"a determination of whether two or more gifts constitute 'one occurrence' is 
to be made by reference to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
gifts in question."12110 Setting out some factors intended to be suggestive of 
the nature of the inquiry thought appropriate in individual cases to be de-
cided on their own merits, the opinion states: 
If the gifts involved are related to one another, they are likely part of the 
same occurrence. In making a determination as to the relatedness of 
more than one gift, it is our opinion that one would look to such factors 
as the nature and similarity of the gifts, the setting in which the gifts are 
given, the nature of the relationship between the donor and the donee, 
and the time lapse between the gifts in question. If the gifts in question 
are of a similar nature or are related to one another, if the gifts were 
made in the same or a similar setting, if the relationship between the 
donor and the donee rather than in the personal relations between the 
parties, and if there was a relatively brief period of time separating the 
gifts in question it is our opinion that such gifts would likely be found to 
constitute one occurrence. lUI 
Section 68B.5, until the 1980 amendments, had applied only to state 
officers and state employees, but now, like the bribery offenses, it applies to 
public officials at all levels of government. Section 68B.5 continues to over-
lap with sections 722.1 and 722.2 in prohibiting essentially the same con-
duct, with two major exceptions. The exceptions being a value in excess of 
fifty dollars,12112 only if given "in anyone occurrence," and that section 68B.5 
does not require an intent to influence the donee's official actions.12113 Ac-
cordingly, the prohibited gifts crime should be a lesser included offense of 
the crime of Accepting a Bribe. 
a. Grading. There is a single grade for each of these complementary 
bribery offenses in chapter 722. Bribery is a class D felony, whereas Ac-
cepting a Bribe is a class C felony. Of course, neither offense is a "forcible 
felony."l2II4 On the other hand, the less culpable section 68B.5 crime, Exces-
sive Gifts to Public Employees, is more realistically only a serious misde-
meanor. 121111 This same penalty schedule applies to the new offensel2116 for 
failure to report receipt of gifts valued in excess of fifteen dollars In any 
occurrence by public officials. and employees. 
1249. [d. 
1250. [d. 
1251. [d. 
1252. See note 1232 supra. 
1253. See notes 1245-46 supra. 
1254. See note 128 supra. 
1255. See note 40 supra. 
1256. IOWA CODE § 68B (1979) {new section unnumbered, as amended by H.F. 687, § 7, 
68th G.A. (1980». 
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C. Civil Rights Offenses l2&7 
No changes were made in the new Criminal Code regarding the two 
crimesl2&8 included in the unrepealed pre-revised code chapter on Infringe-
ment of Civil Rights. m9 Unfortunately, section 729.4 of the Code, relating to 
unfair employment practices, should not have been retained. This section 
conflicts with the modern non-penal approach to violations of civil rights as 
exemplified in the Iowa Civil Rights Act.1260 Moreover, section 729.4 does 
not include sex or physical handicaps in its coverage, unlike the civil rights 
act.1261 Each of these crimes has its own specific penalty provisions incorpo-
rated therein, in contrast to the general scheme of placing the individual 
crimes into a small range of classification of offenses.1262 
D. Offenses Against the Family 
Six offenses criminally defining "acts which attack the stability and wel-
fare of the family"1263 comprise Code chapter 726 on "Protection of the 
Family." Only the offense of Wanton Neglect of a Resident of a Health Care 
Facility1264 is entirely new. However, all five of the carryover pre-revised of-
fenses were changed somewhat. One of these "family protection" of-
fenses-Incest1266-is treated in this Article in another grouping of offenses 
relating to Sexual Abuse and sexual morality.l266 
1. Bigamy 
The major change made in the crime of Bigamy1267 was the elimination 
of "subsequent bigamous cohabitation"1268 as an alternative mode of com-
mitting the offense, thus criminalizing only those bigamous marriages made 
1257. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these three rather obscure 
offenses. 
1258. These two offenses relate to the implementation of Iowa constitutional prohibitions 
located in IOWA CONST. art. I, § 4. See IOWA CODE §§ 729.1 (religious tests for public office or 
public employment); 729.4 (discriminatory employment practices) (1979). 
1259. IOWA CODE §§ 729.1-.4 (1979). 
1260. IOWA CODE §§ 601A.l-.17 (1979). 
1261. Id. 
1262. See generally IOWA CODE §§ 902.1, .9, 903.1 (1979). 
1263. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 581. 
1264. See IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1282-84 infra. 
1265. IOWA CODE § 726.2 (1979). 
1266. See IX (H) supra. 
1267. Compare IOWA CODE § 726.1 (1979) with IOWA CODE §§ 703.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 
1978). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 2601-06; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 12, §§ 582-86; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 380-82. For a discussion of the 
background of the pre-revised law through the proposed changes in the 1974 hill, see Family 
Note; supra note 344, at 561-67. 
1268. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 583 at 144. See Family Note, supra note 
344, at 563-64. 
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in Iowa. So restricted, this revised offense can only be committed by either 
(1) marrying another person, while already having a living spouse, or (2) 
marrying a person, knowing that person already has a living spouse. As de-
fined, this revised offense applies equally to both parties in a bigamous mar-
riage, as compared to the separate, less serious pre-revised offense of Know-
ingly Marrying Spouse of Another1289 in addition to Bigamy1270 itself. 
The statute is unclear on its face as to the mental state required when 
the actus reus consists of marrying another while already having a spouse. 
The fact that the defendant knew he was married at the time is not a statu-
tory requisite. Contrastingly, knowledgel271 is expressly provided for when 
the actus reus consists of marrying another whom the defendant knows has 
another living spouse. Reading these two provisions (which are in the same 
section), in pari materia, the legislative intent to exclude knowledge as an 
element in the former situation seems clear.1272 The knowledge element is 
not mentioned in the Uniform Jury Instructions which set out the elements 
of Bigamy based upon the defendant having a living spouse.1273 
A person should know whether he is married or not,1274 and a new de-
fense based upon a mistaken but reasonable belief that his prior marriage 
was dissolved has been added to the new Criminal Code, as discussed be-
low.1275 There is no sound policy reason for extending the mens rea require-
ment beyond that,1278 and thus encumber the prosecution with having to 
refute spurious claims, such as amnesia. 
Three defenses to a bigamy prosecution are provided for in the new 
Criminal Code. Two of these, a three-year absence of the spouse1277 and a 
reasonable belief of the spouse's death,1278 were retained unchanged from 
the prior law. However, a third defense relating to a prior divorce1279 has 
1269. IOWA CODE § 703.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1270. [d. § 703.1. 
1271. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1272. But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON,' supra note 12, § 582: "The seriousness of the 
offense does not suggest that it was or is intended as an absolute liability crime." [d. at 144. 
1273. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2602. 
1274. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, states that "it usually will be a permissible 
inference that one is aware of his own marital state, particularly since the statutory exceptions 
include the more frequently occurring situations in which one can reasonably be confused on 
this point." [d. § 582. 
1275. See text accompanying notes 1279-80 infra. 
1276. But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 582. 
1277. IOWA CODE § 726.1(3) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 586. 
1278. IOWA CODE § 726.1(2). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 585. 
1279. IOWA CODE § 726.1(1). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 584. See also 
Family Note, supra note 344, stating: 
This [then proposed) provision contrasts sharply with [the then current) section 
703.2 of the Code which enumerates only the defense of a lawful prior divorce, and 
has been construed to disallow a defense of mistake of fact or mistake of law as to the 
belief in the validity of a prior divorce. . . . It is apparent from the drafter's records 
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been expanded considerably, by recognizing a defendant's mistaken but rea-
sonable belief that there was a valid dissolution of the prior marriage. A 
"reasonable belief," by terms of the statute, must be based upon "reasona-
bly convincing evidence" of a valid termination of the prior marriage. A rea-
sonable belief is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions as "that which a 
reasonable person would believe, based upon the facts and circumstances 
known to such person at that time,"128o without requiring seeking out proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth. Finally, this offense is a serious 
misdemeanor .1281 
2. Abandonment of a Dependent Person 
Several aspects of the pre-revised crime of Exposing and Abandoning a 
Child 1282 have been changed in the expanded crime of Abandonment of a 
Dependent Person.1283 One major change involves a significant broadening 
of the scope of protected persons. The new crime is defined in terms of a 
"dependent person"1284 instead of the limitation to children under the pre-
revised law. Thus, the offense of abandonment applies to mentally or physi-
cally infirm persons irrespective of their age. 128~ The operative fact is that 
the defendant have legal custody of the dependent person.1286 Moreover, the 
applicable maximum age of a child has been raised from six to fourteen 
years. 1287 
This revised crime can be committed, in the alternative, either: (1) by 
• 
that they added the defense of reasonable belief based on reasonably convincing evi-
dence to protect a person who had made a good faith effort to find out whether a 
prior divorce was valid. 
Id. at 565. 
1280. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2606. 
1281. As a serious misdemeanor, this offense is punishable by either a determinate jail 
term not exceeding one year or a maximum fine of $1000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives 
include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence, in lieu of the 
above-mentioned confinement or fine. See notes 40, 37, 63, 65, 128, 311, 327, 337, 416 supra. 
1282. IOWA CODE § 731.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1283. IOWA CODE § 726.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2611-14; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 589; Family Note, supra note 344, at 573-
76. 
1284. A dependent person is defined as any person "who by reason of mental or physical 
disability is not able to care for himself or herself .... " IOWA CODE § 726.3 (1979). 
1285. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 589. 
1286. The term "custody" is not defined in the Code. A good working definition has been 
suggested by Professor Yeager as "the legal duty of caring for and keeping the abandoned one." 
As he explains, "[t)his can be a temporary duty, informally assumed, such as that of a nurse or 
babysitter, as well as a more permanent duty, formally imposed, as by the appointment of a 
guardian." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 583 at 144. 
1287. The change is in line with the uniform definition of "child" generally applicable 
throughout the Criminal Code. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). But see text accompanying notes 
220-28 supra. 
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knowingly1288 or recklessly1289 exposing a dependent person to a hazard or 
danger against which such person could not reasonably be expected to pro-
tect himself; or (2) by abandoning a dependent person, knowing or having 
reason to believe such person will be exposed to such a hazard or danger!290 
Contrastingly, the sole actus reus under the pre-revised statute consisted of 
exposing a child with the intent solely to abandon it. Thus, this revised 
crime no longer is a specific intent1291 crime, under either of the alternative 
modes of commission. The act of exposure to a known danger, which ap-
pears to be an expansion of the prior law, can be done either knowingly or 
recklessly; thus "mere neglect of duty" is excluded as a predicate for this 
offense.1292 The related less severe offense of Wanton Neglect of a Minor1293 
can occur through acts of abandonment or through mere neglect of duty!294 
The alternative actus reus of abandonment apparently requires an element 
of permanency in light of the interpretation in State v. Wilson,12911 given the 
word "abandon" in the related offense of Wanton Neglect of a Minor, as 
discussed in detail below!298 This is a class C felony,1297 but is not a "forci-
ble felony."u98 
3. Nonsupport 
The pre-revised offense of Desertion1299 has been renamed Nonsup-
port,t300 with several modifications. The new elements are: (1) failure or re-
fusal to provide support for a child lSo1 or ward under the age of eighteen; (2) 
1288. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1289. Regarding recklessness as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 594-601 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1290. IOWA CODE § 726.3 (1979). 
1291. Regarding specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 705-23 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1292. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12,§ 589. See also J. ROEHRICK, supra note 81, 
at 367. 
1293. See IOWA CODE § 726.6 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1312-27 infra. 
1294. J; YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 592. 
1295. 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
1296. See text accompanying notes 1312-27 infra. 
1297. It is punishable by either an indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten years or a 
maximum fine of $5000 or both. 
1298. Because it is not a "forcible felony," a full range of ameliorative sentencing alterna· 
tives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation) is 
also available, in lieu of the above· mentioned imprisonment or fine. See note 128 supra. 
1299. See IOWA CODE § 731.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1300. IOWA CODE § 726.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2615-18; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 591; Family Note, supra note 344, at 576-
80. 
1301. Child in this section is limited to son or daughter, unlike under the general defini· 
tional clause in IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979) which defines a "child" as any person under fourteen 
years of age. 
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by a parent or guardian; (3) able to provide support.1302 This is a general 
intent crime. l303 
Two changes have been made in the definition of the victim of this of-
fense. The major change is the omission of a wife altogether. The other 
change lengthens the support requirements of parents or guardians by rais-
ing the age of the child or ward to be supported from sixteen to eighteen 
years. 
The revised offense did not retain the requirement of wilfull1304 failure 
or refusal to provide support. Nevertheless, there may be no operative effect 
of this omission, in light of the new parental requirement regarding ability 
to provide support but failing or refusing to do so. 
The new Criminal Code changes the concept of the level of support sig-
nificantly, with the omission of the pre-revised requirement that the child 
be left destitute. Support, under the new definition, means either "the mini-
mal requirements of food, clothing, or shelter"l3OIi in general, or any specific 
support level fixed by court order in particular, such as part of a dissolution 
of marriage decree. No statutory definition of "minimal" support is given. 
The standard used in the Uniform Jury Instructions is that the jury should 
determine what is "minimal" support "from the facts and circumstances of 
the present situation of the defendant's [unsupported child or ward]."1306 
This standard is not overly informative; it appears worthless as a legal 
guideline. Reference to "the basic necessities of life" would be preferable. l307 
A new special defense was added to statutorily exempt a parent or 
guardian from criminal responsibility for nonsupport of their runaway chil-
dren who left home without consent of their parents or guardians.1308 Thus, 
the "true nature" of the parent's duty is merely to offer the requisite sup-
port.t309 Also, this is a class D felony,1310 but is not a "forcible felony."1311 
1302. IOWA CODE § 726.5 (1979). 
1303. Regarding general intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 471-79 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L .. REV. 239 (1979). 
1304. Regarding wilfullness as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 543-48 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1979). 
1305. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2617. 
1306. [d. 
1307. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 591. 
1308. See IOWA CODE § 726.5 (1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2618; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12,.§ 591. 
1309. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 591. 
1310. It is punishable by either an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years or a 
maximum fine of $1,000 or both. 
1311. Because it is not a "forcible felony," a full range of ameliorative sentencing alterna-
tives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation) is 
also available, in lieu of the above-mentioned imprisonment or fine. See note 128 supra. 
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4. Wanton Neglect of a Minor 
The revised crime of Wanton Neglect of a Minor1312 is much more spe-
cific than the pre-revised statutel313 as to what activities are encompassed. 
Specifically, a parent or other person having custody of a minor (i.e., some-
one under eighteen) commits this crime either: (1) by knowingly13l4 acting in 
a manner likely to be injurious to the minor's physical, mental, or moral 
welfare; or (2) by abandoning such minor to fend for himself, knowingl3111 he 
is unable to do SO.1318 A specific defense is provided under the first alterna-
tive recognizing faith healing, but only to the extent that the particular reli-
gious method of healing is permitted under Iowa law. Under the second al-
ternative, the actus .reus of abandoning the minor, together with the 
requisite s~ienter, are sufficient to incur criminal culpability, without the ne-
cessity of any attendant circumstances (such as exposure of the minor to a 
hazard or danger as required for the more severe crime of Abandonment of a 
Dependent Person).13l7 
A charge of abandonment under subsection two of section 726.6 has 
been held to require an element of permanency, however. That is, leaving a 
minor unattended through a temporary absence will not support a convic-
tion. Reversing a conviction in State v. Wilson,1318 the Iowa Supreme Court 
noted that the term "abandons" in similar criminal statutes in other juris-
dictions "has generally been construed to mean an intention to leave the 
child permanently, as distinguished from temporary neglect."1319 The evi-
dentiary basis of this standard was insufficient to uphold the conviction of a 
single mother who left her eighteen-month-old child unattended in a base-
ment apartment for aproximately ninety minutes while she went nearby to 
use a public telephone for social purposes.1320 
The term "abandons" is not defined in the Criminal Code, either in 
section 726.6 or in the general definitions section. Because there are no Uni-
form Jury Instructions for this crime, there is no guidance from the bar 
committee either. A jury instruction on abandonment apparently can follow 
the statutory definition of abandonment in section 232.2(1) of the new Juve-
nile Code which was passed two years later in 1978, especially in light of the 
court's reference to section 232.2(1) with apparent approval, read together 
1312. IOWA CODE § 726.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2619-20; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 592; Family Note, supra note 344, at 580-
84. 
1313. See IOWA CODE § 731A.l (1977) (repealed 1978); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 12, § 592. 
1314. Regarding· knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 supra. 
1315. [d. 
1316. IOWA CODE § 726.6 (1979). 
1317. See id. § 726.3 and text accompanying notes 1282-96 supra. 
1318. 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
1319. [d. at 589. 
1320. [d. at 588. 
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with the court's previous interpretation of "abandons."1321 The definition set 
out in section 232.2(1) reads: 
"Abandonment of a child" means the permanent relinquishment or 
surrender, without reference to any particular person, of the parental 
rights, duties, or privileges inherent in the parent-child relationship. 
Proof of abandonment must include both the intention to abandon and 
the acts by which the intention is evidenced. The term does not require 
that the relinquishment or surrender be over any particular period of 
time. 
It certainly seems reasonable to use the same definitio"n of "abandonment" 
for both the related Criminal and Juvenile Codes. Moreover, the section 
232.2(1) definition is followed in the Code chapter on termination of paren-
tal rights. 1322 
Although the court intimated no opinion in State v. Wilson, it's appar-
ent that the defendant could have been convicted under the previous stat-
ute. 1323 The gravamen of the previous offense was wanton neglect, without 
mention of the more restrictive abandonment. "Neglect" was statutorily de-
fined as "willful neglect of such a nature, arising under such circumstances 
as a parent of ordinary intelligence actuated by normal and natural concern 
for the welfare of the child would not permit or be a party to."1324 
This crime, instead of the more serious crime of Abandonment of a De-
pendent Person, apparently would be committed when a young child is 
"abandoned under circumstances which make it unlikely that he will come 
to any harm before he is picked up .... "132~ As to the nebulous standard 
of leaving a minor to fend for himself, Professor Yeager feels that this prob-
ably means "more than mere survival, and will be held to mean survival 
under conditions which will not be injurious to the child's physical, mental, 
or moral welfare. "1328 The single grade of this offense is a serious 
misdemeanor. 1327 
5. Wanton Neglect of a Resident of a Health Care Facility 
A related crime was added to the new Criminal Code to extend protec-
1321. E.g., Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Iowa 1976). 
1322. See IOWA CODE § 600A.2(16) (1979). 
1323. See IOWA CODE §§ 731A.l-.2 (1977) (repealed 1978) (element of abandonment not 
included). 
1324. See id. § 731A.2. 
1325. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 592. 
1326. [d. 
1327. As a serious misdemeanor, this offense is punishable by either a determinate jail 
term not exceeding one year or a maximum fine of $1000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives 
include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in 
lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. See note 40 supra. 
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tion against wanton neglect to residents of health care facilities. 1328 The ele-
ments of this crime are: (1) knowingly;1329 (2) acting in a manner likely to be 
injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare; (3) of a resident of a 
health care facility.1S30 The subjects of this crime should only be personnel 
of a health care facility/331 with legal obligations towards their residents be-
ing imposed similar to the parent-child obligation under section 726.6 of the 
Code. The single grade of this offense is a serious misdemeanor.lS32 
E. Health, Safety, and Welfare O/fenses l333 
Ten offenses relating to health, safety or welfare are collected in section 
727 of the Code, with no substantial changes being made in four of these.1S34 
All ten offenses were included in scattered portions of the pre-revised code. 
None of these offenses represents conduct that is central to the criminal 
justice system. In light of this, whether they should be included in the new 
Criminal Code at all is questionable,13311 especially since several other regula-
tory type offenses were not included.1888 
Expansion of the conduct constituting the crime has occurred in five of 
these offenses. The simple misdemeanor offensel337 of Exposure to Radia-
1328. IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2621-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 593. 
1329. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1330. IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1979). 
1331. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 593. 
1332. As a serious misdemeanor, this offense is punishable by either a determinate jail 
term not exceeding one year or a maximum fine of $1000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives 
include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in 
lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. See note 40 supra. 
1333. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 12, relating to this group of 
offenses. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, §§ 601-12. 
1334. The four unchanged crimes, all simple misdemeanors, involve IOWA CODE §§ 727.3 
(leaving abandoned or unattended refrigerators with lockable doors accessible to cildren); 727.7 
(failure to include in telephone directories a warning about falsely claiming an emergency); 
727.6 (falsely claiming an emergency in order to obtain use of a telephone line); 727.9 (transact-
ing business without a license) (1979). An eleventh related offense, Maintaining Pay Toilets in 
Public Rooms, also a simple misdemeanor, has been transferred outside the Criminal Code to § 
135.21, after originally appearing as § 727.11. For a discussion of the various sentencing options 
for simple misdemeanors, see text accompanying note 37 supra. 
[d. 
1335. Schantz, supra note 939, at 444, which states: 
In sum, the [then proposed] Code's relocation or elimination of the "regulatory" stat-
utes located in our [pre-revised] criminal Code seems rather thorough. However, one 
might well take exception to nearly all of [the chapter on] "Health, Safety and Wel-
fare." Regulation of fireworks, x-rays and abandoned refrigerators, if needed at all, 
surely belongs outside the criminal code. 
1336. See text accompanying notes 1346-57 infra. 
1337. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
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tion,1888 previously limitedl88t1 to "the use of x-rays in the retail shoe 
trade,"luo was broadened to criminalize "the intentional exposure of persons 
to x-rays for any purpose other than medical diagnosis and treatment."1841 
The serious misdemeanorlu1 offense of Wiretaps and Eavesdropping,1843 for-
merly limited to wire taps on telephone and telegraph lines/344 was broad-
ened to prohibit "any electronic or mechanical interception of conversations 
or communications."lull The simple misdemeanor1346 offense of Distributing 
Dangerous Substances1u7 was expanded from mere inclusion of 
pharmaceuticals to general terminology, specifically "corrosive, caustic, poi-
sonous or other injurious substance,"lu8 which should provide "the maxi-
mum desirable coverage."IU. The revised simple misdemeanor1311o offense of 
Obstructing Emergency Phone Calls18111 now applies to persons using any 
telephone or telegraph line, after previously being limited to failure to relin-
quish party lines or public pay ~lephones.18111 
Contrastingly, two of these revised offenses are more limited in scope. 
The serious misdemeanorl8118 offense of Exhibiting Deformed or Abnormal 
Persons18114 was changed from an absolute prohibition18l111 to a qualified pro-
hibition resting upon the consent of the exhibited person. As Professor 
Yeager explains, the purpose of this law is to protect such persons from ex-
ploitation while not "depriving these unfortunates of what may be their only 
1338. IOWA CODE § 727.4 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
605. 
1339. . See IOWA CODE § 732.24 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1340. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 605. 
1341. [d. 
1342. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1343. IOWA CODE § 727.8 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
609. 
1344. See IOWA CODE § 716.8 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1345. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 609. 
1346. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1347. IOWA CODE § 727.1 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
602. 
1348. IOWA CODE § 727.1 (1979). 
1349. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 602. 
1350. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1351. IOWA CODE § 727.5 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
606. 
1352. See IOWA CODE § 714.33 '(1977) (repealed 1978). 
1353. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1354. IOWA CODE § 727.10 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
611. 
1355. See IOWA CODE § 725.12 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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opportunity to earn a living."uH It certainly is difficult to argue with such 
logic, expecially since only consenting, paying customers will see the 
exhibits. 
The other "criminalization" cutback occurred with the Fireworks of-
fense,1867 a serious misdemeanor.18I111 The revised crime is limited to sale, of-
fering for sale, exposing for sale, or using fireworks. 13I111 This crime no longer 
prohibits possession, or criminalizes a non-sale transfer of fireworks. 1880 The 
wisdom of such changes can be questioned, since the overall effectiveness of 
regulation of fireworks can be reduced. 
F. Labor Related Offenses1881 
Several labor related offenses are included in each of three chapters of 
the Code dealing with blacklisting employees,1882 labor union member-
ship,1888 and labor boycotts and strikes.188• These unrepealed pre-revised 
chapters dealing with rather obscure and petty crimes were unfortunately 
left in the new Criminal Code. Each of these crimes has its own specific 
penalty provisions incorporated therein, in contrast to the general scheme of 
placing the individual crimes into a small range of classification of 
offenses.1886 
G. Public Disorder Offenses 
1. Generally 
Four misdemeanor crimes constitute the offenses relating to public dis-
order, appearing in chapter 723 of the new Criminal Code. Two of these, 
Riot and Unlawful Assembly, require multiple offenders (three or more) in 
order for the disruptive activity to be criminal. These offenses relate to dis-
ruption of the public peace and quiet, as opposed to attempted disruption of 
governmental bodies.1888 
1356. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 611, at 151-52. 
1357. IOWA CODE § 727.2 (1979). See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 
603. 
1358. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying note 40 
supra. 
1359. See IOWA CODE §§ 732.17-.19 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1360. [d. 
1361. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions for any of these offenses. 
1362. IOWA CODE ch. 730 (1979). 
1363. [d. ch. 731. 
1364. [d. ch. 732. 
1365. See generally id. §§ 902.1, .9, 903.1 (1979). 
1366. See id. § 718.1 (1979) (Insurrection, which includes attempted disruption of govern-
mental bodies) and text accompanying notes 940-52 supra. 
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2. Riot 
The most serious of these offenses is Riot,1387 an aggravated 
misdemeanor .1888 
a. Actus Reus. An individual's actus reus in this crime consists of will-
ingly joining in or remaining a part of a riot, knowing or having reasonable 
grounds to believe that a riot is occurring. A riot (i.e., the corpus delicti of 
the offense) is statutorily defined as an assembly of three or more persons in 
a violent manner to the disturbance of others, with one or more of these 
persons using unlawful force or violence against another person or causing 
property damage.18G8 
b. Intent. Of course, "mere presence at the scene of a riot is not pun-
ishable."187o This is because a person must willingly and knowingly1871 have 
joined in or remained a part of a riot. The requisite showing of intent re-
quires evidence that defendant "conduct[ed] himself in a violent man-
ner."1871 So interpreted, this statute does not extend to punishment of inno-
cent bystanders and accordingly is not unconstitutionally overbroad.1878 
c. Remaining a Part Of. The initial purpose for an assembly is irrele-
vant. If a lawful assembly becomes riotous and an individual intentionally 
remains a part of the riot, then he is liable to criminal sanction. Of course, a 
defendant must know1874 or have reasonable grounds to believe that a riot is 
occurring.1876 Moreover, he must conduct himself in a violent manner, thus 
preventing an innocent bystander from being criminally punished, as noted 
above.187G 
d. Multiple Offender Requirement and Joint Liability. While retain-
ing the numerical requirement of three or more offenders, the crime of Riot, 
as redefined,1877 makes it clear that now only one of these "rioters" needs to 
1367. [d. § 723.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 2301-03; 
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 502; R. PERKINS, supra note 12, at 405-08. 
1368. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confine-
ment not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alterna-
tives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, 
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. See note 63 supra. 
1369. IOWA CODE § 723.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at Nos. 
2301-02. 
1370. Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa 1979). 
1371. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
1372. [d. 
1373. [d. 
1374. Regarding knowledge as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 572-93 in 
Part I of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1980). 
1375. IOWA CODE § 723.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 
2302; Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1979). 
1376. See text accompanying notes 1372-73 supra. 
1377. See IOWA CODE § 743.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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"actually use unlawful force or violence"l818 in order for all of them to be 
convicted. Once the prosecution has proved a riot, anyone of the partici-
pants can be convicted even though the offender did not actually participate 
in the personal injury or property damage. All that need be proven is "com-
munity oT purpose"1878 with proof that a particular defendant was a partici-
pant in the riot itself.1880 So restricted, this provision has been held to be 
not unconstitutionally overbroad.1881 
e. Public Place. That "riotous activity is punishable only if it occurs in 
public" was determined in Williams v. Osmundson,1881 notwithstanding the 
lack of any such restriction in section 723.1 itself. This interpretation is in 
line with the purpose of preserving public order, rather than of regulating 
"private relationships. "1888 
f. Constitutionality. The constitutionality of section 723.1 has been 
upheldl884 on the following grounds: (1) the statute is not overbroad by ap-
plying to lawful assemblies that become unruly, because it requires a specific 
intent to engage in action that is known to be a riot; (2) the statute does not 
create an unlawful presumption because "mere presence" at the scene of a 
riot is not punished; (3) the statute is not void for vagueness since it fur-
nishes reasonable notice as to its proscribed activity (violent group activity 
occurring in public). 
3. Unlawful Assembly 
The only significant change made in the simple misdemeanorl881 crime 
of Unlawful Assemblyl888 was to broaden the scope of the offense to include 
persons who remain part of an unlawful assembly although knowing, or rea-
sonably believing, that an unlawful assembly exists.1887 An individual's actus 
reus in this crime consists of knowingly and willingly joining in or remaining 
a part of an unlawful assembly. An "unlawful assembly" is an assembly of 
1378. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 502. 
1379. "It is the community of purpose, rather than the community of activity, which is 
essential to establish the riot." [d. at 125. 
1380. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at No. 2302, which states: "The 
fact that only the defendant is on trial is immaterial. It is not necessary that any other person 
alleged to be involved be tried at the same time." 
1381. Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1979). 
1382. [d. 
1383. [d. at 627. 
1384. Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1979). 
1385. A simple misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate jail term not exceed-
ing thirty days or a maximum fine of $100, but not both. Other sentencing alternatives include 
a defened judgment, a defened sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the 
above-mentioned confinement or fine. See note 37 supra. 
1386. IOWA CODE § 723.2 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 12, 
for this crime. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 503; R. PERKINS, supra 
note 12, at 403-05. 
1387. See IOWA CODE § 743.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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three or more persons assembled together in a violent manner and with in-
tent to commit a public offense. I888 
Generally a prelude to a Riot, this essentially inchoate offense can be 
charged when the requisite personal violence or property damage for a Riot 
has not occurred or when the criminal intent is to commit a public offense 
not involving personal violence or property damage.1389 However, a rowdy 
gathering of three or more persons is not ipso facto an unlawful assembly. 
"It becomes one [an unlawful assembly] when there is a community of pur-
pose to commit a public offense."1S90 
4. Failure to Disperse 
Several changes were made to the pre-revised crimes now consolidated 
in the new crime of Failure to Disperse/s91 a simple misdemeanor.ls92 One 
change is that the scope of the new crime has been broadened to cover per-
sons in the immediate vicinity of a riot or unlawful assembly, rather than 
being restricted to active participants therein. Another change is the drastic 
reduction in the number of necessary participants in the underlying activity. 
That is, although the criminal responsibility for Failure to Disperse is an 
individual matter, nevertheless there must still be at least three persons in-
volved in the underlying criminal activity (e.g., Riot or Unlawful Assembly) 
before triggering the right of a peace officer to give an order to disperse (of a 
nature being criminally punishable for violation thereof). The final change 
limits the classification of public officials authorized to order dispersals, for 
purposes of this crime, to peace officers. Formerly, such orders could be 
made by judges, magistrates, and certain other public officials. 
Specifically, the elements of the revised crime of Failure to Disperse 
are: (1) refusal to obey a peace officer's order to disperse; (2) by either a 
participant in a Riot or an Unlawful Assembly or by any person in the vicin-
ity of a Riot or an Unlawful Assembly; (3) who is within hearing distance of 
such order.189s Thus, this statute is broad in its reach, extending to all per-
sons in the immediate vicinity of a Riot or an Unlawful Assembly rather 
than being restricted, as it could be, to active participants therein. 
1388. IOWA CODE § 723.2 (1979). 
1389. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 503 at 125. 
1390. Id. 
1391. IOWA CODE § 723.3 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 12, 
for this crime. See generally, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 504. 
1392. See note 18 supra. 
1393. Regarding "the subjective requirement that any person who is within hearing dis-
tance must disperse," one commentator ponders: "Will this be a presumption or an element 
requiring strict proof, before a person can be convicted under this section?" J. ROEHRICK, supra 
note 12, at 306. 
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5. Disorderly Conduct 
The newly-styled offense of Disorderly Conduct1894 can be committed in 
any of seven ways. This offense, a simple misdemeanor,18911 represents a con-
solidation of several pre-revised crimes,18116 both with and without change, as 
well as two new types of punishable activity. This offense fills the void cre-
ated when only one or two persons engage in disruptive conduct which oth-
erwise would constitute Riot or Unlawful Assembly (except for the three or 
more persons requirement). 
Two of these alternatives, "public" fighting1897 and disturbing a meeting 
or other lawful assembly,18118 were incorporated into the new Criminal Code 
without change. Three others incorporate some changes. These include Dis-
orderly Conduct: (1) by making unlawful noise near a hospital or house and 
causing unreasonable distress to occupants thereof;1899 (2) by making know-
ingly false reports of catastrophes;14°O and (3) by knowingly and publicly 
desecrating the United States flag.1401 
One of the two new types of Disorderly Conduct involves directing abu-
sive epithets or any threatening gesture at another, knowing (or reasonably 
believing) that a violent reaction is likely to be provoked. HOI This crime has 
been described as "an incitement to disorderly conduct.''1408 The other new 
crime consists of unauthorized obstruction of a public way, with the intent 
to prevent or hinder its use. 1404 
Unlike Riot and Unlawful Assembly, the crime of Disorderly Conduct 
does not have any minimal numerical requirements regarding participants 
therein. Indeed, six of the seven types of Disorderly Conduct can be com-
mitted by a sole actor. 
Only unlawful fighting in a public place or in or near any lawful assem-
bly "requires" more than one participant. Strictly speaking, this type of con-
duct can also be punishable as participation in a Riot (a much more serious 
1394. IOWA CODE § 723.4 (1979). There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 12, 
for this crime. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 505. 
1395. See note 1385 supra. 
1396. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.42, 727.1, 744.1,.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1397. IOWA CODE § 723.4(1) (1979). 
1398. [d. § 723.4(4). 
1399. [d. § 723.4(2). 
1400. [d. § 723.4(5). Ct. IOWA CODE § 712.7 (1979) (false reports concerning, inter alia, 
placement of incendiary devices). "This is a broader concept than was previously the law. It 
now allows an epidemic or other catastrophe to qualify as a means of committing the offense." 
J. ROEHRICK, supra note 12, at 310. 
1401. IOWA CODE § 723.4(6) (1979). 
1402. IOWA CODE § 723.4(3) (1979). "This section is an incitement to disorderly conduct, 
for which there was nothing comparable under the [pre-revised] statutes of Iowa." J. ROEHRICK, 
supra note 12, at 309. 
1403. J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 12, at 309. 
1404. IOWA CODE § 723.4(7) (1979). This section is closely related to IOWA CODE ch. 657 
(1979) (nuisance law). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 12, § 505. 
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offense),14011 when three or more persons are involved and their group vio-
lence is directed at others. The choice of the particular charging statute (i.e., 
ij.iot or Disorderly Conduct) in this situation is strictly a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion.1406 
1405. Riot is an aggravated misdemeanor punishable by a jail term of up to two years or a 
fine of up to $5,000, or both. Disorderly Conduct is merely a simple misdemeanor punishable by 
a jail term of up to thirty days or a fine of up to $100 but not both. 
1406. For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion in charging, see notes 1055-56 in Part I 
of this Article, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 239 (1980). 
